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ABSTRACT 
 
The past ten years has been a decade of land wars in India. Rapid urbanization is spilling 
beyond city boundaries into the highways connecting large cities, instigating a frenzied consolidation 
and conversion of agricultural lands into urban/industrial lands. This process is fraught with 
conflict, as different social groups compete to stake their claims on the land value increments – the 
increases in land value due to the change in land use from agricultural to non-agricultural - of these 
newly converted highway lands.  
Against the backdrop of conflictual land consolidation processes, this dissertation examines 
the unique case of the Pune highways, located in the state of Maharashtra in India. Along some of 
Pune’s highways, agrarian landowners – sometimes voluntarily and sometimes with the mediation of 
bureaucrats – are pooling their fragmented agricultural lands, converting them to urban and 
industrial lands, and forming collective institutions of land ownership to own and control these 
newly converted highway lands. In other words, agrarian landowners along these highways are not 
being displaced from their lands. Instead, they are capturing some or all of the land value 
increments, and are benefiting from the urban transition. I examine the conditions that made these 
collective institutions possible in the Pune region, and the possibility and desirability of transferring 
these conditions to other regions elsewhere that are mired in similar land conflicts.  
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My main finding is that the core of India’s land conflicts is a change in the valuation of land 
from fertility to location. This new, highway-induced restructuring of the land market interacts in 
complex ways with older caste-based forms of agrarian land control and these changes in land-based 
social relations is the source of conflict. India’s rapid urbanization along highways is taking place not 
within cities, but in-between cities, and is leading to new forms of politics that defies the urban-rural 
dichotomies.    
I also use Pune’s land conflicts and cooperatives as a window into the broader phenomenon 
of India’s 21st century transition from an agrarian to urban economy, and articulate the major 
elements of the new regional institutions that are needed for managing land markets during an 
uncertain urban transition. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION – TERRITORIAL POLITICS OF INDIA’S LAND CONFLICTS 
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The past ten years in India have been a decade of land wars. In early 2008, the small village 
of Singur in the state of West Bengal, located along the Kolkata1-Delhi national highway, grabbed 
international media attention as the site of one of India’s most contentious and violent struggles 
over land acquisitions. The protests by the Singur farmers was against the forced acquisition of 
agricultural lands by the state government for the setting up of a small-car manufacturing factory by 
Tata Motors, one of India’s largest corporations. By the end of 2008, Tata Motors decided to pull 
out of West Bengal, and ruling state government, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), lost office 
for the first time in thirty years in the subsequent state elections. In 2011, land acquisition for the 
160-kilometer Yamuna Expressway, connecting the cities of Delhi and Agra, unleashed a wave of 
violence, with protesting farmers torching government vehicles in their rage against the acquisition, 
and the state government deploying police forces to quell the protesters. The farmers-police clash 
resulted in the death of two farmers and two policemen. In 2010, the Indian government’s Ministry 
of Environment and Forests rejected the proposal by the London-based firm, Vedanta Resources, to 
mine bauxite from the Niyamgiri hills. The government’s move was an outcome of four years of 
protests by the Kondh tribes to protect their ‘sacred mountain’ from resource extraction. 
The large-scale coercive acquisition of land is not a new phenomenon. History has countless 
examples, including the violent displacement of populations during the British enclosure movement 
in the 16th to 19th centuries and the forced acquisition of land through territorial conquests in the 
pre-colonial and colonial times (Pistor, 2011; White et al., 2012). But, the 21st century land conflicts 
are erupting within a new context of a globalized, liberalized economy. Since Independence in 1947 
till the 1980s, India’s land conflicts were precipitated by the state’s coercive acquisition of land, 
enabled through the eminent domain legislature, for “public purposes” like dams and state-led 
industrialization. With the liberalization of the Indian economy since the late 1980s onwards, both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Formerly Calcutta. 
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the nature of the public purpose and the institutional actors involved in these land conflicts have 
changed. Besides the earlier “public purposes” of dams, most recent land conflicts are over the 
state’s acquisition of agricultural land for privatized real estate and infrastructural developments like 
infrastructure corridors and superhighways, Special Economic Zones and hi-tech cities (Levien, 
2012).  The easing of regulations on the domestic real estate industry and the opening up of the real 
estate sector to foreign investment has led both to the privatization – the more direct and central 
role of the private sector in the production of the built environment – and the “foreignisation” 
(Zoomers, 2010)  - the complex linkages through which foreign investors are directly and indirectly 
involved in these land processes – of land development. India’s contemporary land conflicts, then, 
are the visible expressions of a country in transition from a state-led, socialist economy to a more 
liberalized and globalized one.  
 
Against the backdrop of India’s contemporary land conflicts, the highways connecting the 
city of Pune, in Western India, to its neighboring cities stand out as stories of success. Along these 
Pune highways, agrarian landowners from multiple villages are coming together, sometimes 
voluntarily and sometimes with the mediation of bureaucrats, pooling their fragmented agricultural 
landholdings, forming land cooperatives and leasing these lands to industrialists and property 
developers. The land development along Pune’s highways poses some unexpected puzzles: 
- As countries around the world are moving towards private property rights regimes, why are 
land cooperatives emerging in the Pune region, especially within the context of a liberalizing 
economy?  
- As state actors around the country resort to coercive land acquisition strategies, what 
explains the strange but good performance of the Pune bureaucrats in not resorting to coercion, but 
using cooperative strategies to consolidate agricultural land for urban expansions? 
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- The most marginalized groups along Pune’s highways – a tribal group called the Thakkars 
– are enthusiastic about giving up their agricultural lands in exchange for any form of monetary 
and/or non-monetary compensation. India’s land conflicts are framed as taking place between 
farmers and industrialists, or farmers and the state on behalf of industrialists. What, then, explains 
the willingness of the most marginalized sub-group of farmers – the marginal tribal landowners – in 
parting with their agricultural lands?  
In this chapter, I argue that India’s ongoing land conflicts cannot be analyzed as a 
monolithic category. Instead, these conflicts can be disaggregated into three types, based on the 
underlying sociospatial processes driving them. My dissertation focuses on one type of land conflict, 
which I characterize as the politics of redistribution.  
 
1.1 CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVES, SURPRISE FINDINGS 
Activist, media, policy and popular discourses frame India’s land conflicts as taking place 
between farmers and industrialists. National and international media reports are splashed with the 
farmers v. industrialists headlines: Aljazeera’s “The great land grab: India's war on farmers” (Shiva, 
2011), the Washington Post’s “In India, fresh clashes over rural land as farmers stand up to 
government” (Denyer, 2011), and NDTV’s [New Delhi Television] “UP farmers bring agitation to 
Delhi, plan Parliament ‘gherao’” (NDTV, 2010) “and “Farmers’ agitation spreads to Agra, villagers 
set office on fire” (NDTV, 2011). 
The assumptions underlying the current debates find clear expression in the proposed 
amendment to India’s antiquated eminent domain legislation - the 1894 Land Acquisition Act (LAA) 
- that is now slated for debate in Parliament (Government of India, 2011). The proposed 
amendment treats all contemporary land conflicts over the conversion of agricultural lands to non-
agricultural as the same: Singur, a land conflict along highways, is no different from Vedanta in 
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Niyamgiri, a land conflict over mineral-rich lands. It assumes that the main source of aggrievement 
for the “project affected persons” is the poor compensation resulting from the undervalued market 
price of their land. The proposed remedy is a more efficient regulation of the land market, including 
better methods for land valuation and more attractive forms of land compensation for the aggrieved 
landowners.  
 
Yet, when I started my fieldwork on land conflicts in the Pune region, I was met with some 
unexpected findings that challenged the framing of these conflicts as between farmers and 
industrialists. In the Khed region along the Pune-Nashik highway, agrarian landowners had 
protested against a proposed industrial development in 2006. When I spoke to the landowners in the 
region, I was surprised to learn that most of the younger generation males of the Thakkar group – a 
tribal group that has historically worked as agrarian laborers for the upper-caste landowners – were 
not a part of the 2006 protests. In fact, these Thakkars were willing, and eager even, to give up their 
lands for the new highway developments. The sudden market demand for their marginal agricultural 
lands empowered these younger generation, male Thakkars with some financial independence, and 
offered them an opportunity to break out of the relationships of dependency with upper-caste 
landowners.  
Around 60 kilometers from Khed is the Bhimashankar forest. Unlike the Khed Thakkars, 
who have had private property rights to their small plots of land since the late 19th century, the 
Bhimashankar Thakkars have indigenous, usufruct claims to their land. Since the Indian government 
declared the forest area a protected wildlife sanctuary in 1985, the Thakkars have had an antagonistic 
relationship with the Forest Department and local government officials. Threatened by relocation, 
these Thakkars are demanding recognition of their indigenous claims to the forest lands. The 
Bhimashankar Thakkars, and more broadly, forest-dwelling tribals, use land conflicts as a politics of 
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recognition - of a positive revaluation and affirmation of tribal ways of living and of a validation of 
the tribals’ indigenous, communal, usufruct  and other forms of property rights. Without falling into 
the trap of essentializing the tribals as a culturally invariant social group that represents an alternative 
development paradigm to modernism and capitalism,2 we still can see that the forest and mineral-
rich lands represent a unique political geography distinct from other regions mired in land conflicts. 
Besides tourism, forest lands in India are in high market demand because they are rich in mineral 
resources. The synchronous overlap between mineral-rich forest lands and tribal habitats is pitting 
the lives and livelihoods of the eight million tribals living on these mineral-rich lands against the 
ravenous need for minerals like coal and bauxite by a rapidly industrializing country. An added layer 
of complexity is the raging internal civil war in the region that is now called the ‘Red Corridor’ – a 
region with the richest mineral-rich lands, but home to the poorest tribal populations. This region, 
spanning eight Indian states, is controlled by a guerrilla group called the Naxalites, or Maoists, who 
claim to be fighting on behalf of the tribal groups against an extractive state. These conflicts over 
mineral-rich and forest lands are a politics of recognition. They demand new imaginations for 
asserting a place for tribals within ecologically fragile and commercially coveted forest lands, and this 
is a distinctly different project from that of the Khed Thakkars.’ 
Around 45 kilometers to the south of the Khed area - on the outer fringes of the city of 
Pune, and in the villages of Baramati district along the Pune-Sholapur highway – live another tribal 
group, the non-pastoral nomadic tribes like the Gosavi, Garudi, and Pardhi. These groups have 
traditionally provided services like petty trading and street entertainment to the sedentary village 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Baviskar (1996), Comaroff and Comaroff (2009) and Li (2010) for critiques on the dominant, 
essentializing tribal narratives. Baviskar points to the tribals’ performance of essentialized narratives 
of the exotic other to appeal to non-governmental organizations, the media and other actors that 
support tribal rights; Comaroff and Comaroff to the commodification of the tribal ethnicity by 
tribals themselves for consumption in the global marketplace; and Li for the arbitrariness in the 
predominantly colonial social construction of the tribals as a census category.  
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populations. But, a long history of exclusion that was formally institutionalized in the colonial period 
through categorizing these groups as ‘criminal tribes’ has stripped them of even the most basic 
citizenship rights. The non-pastoral nomadic tribes make up more than nine percent of the 
population of Pune district, but they are invisibles in the state records (Nambiar, 2009).3 Lacking any 
form of documentary identification - be it birth certificates, ration cards or election cards - these 
nomadic tribes cannot even exercise their right to vote. These tribes are starting to organize 
themselves, with the mediation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to demand ration 
cards, election cards and other documentary forms of identity that can grant them the right to vote, 
the entitlements of universal public services, and the access to public subsidies and targeted 
programs for improving the life-chances of low-income and low-caste groups. The political claims 
of the non-nomadic tribes are similar to that of the residents of informal settlements are starting to 
burgeon around the peripheries of Pune city. The high rents of inner-city informal settlements is 
leading to a market displacement of the poorest informal residents from settlements within Pune city 
to the city fringes, where urban land is cheaper (Kundu et al, 2002; Bapat, 2004). For the non-
pastoral nomadic tribes and the informal residents, their land struggles are more than just claims to 
land. They are signifiers of deeper struggles for the rights to participate in the everyday workings of 
these territories. Precisely because many social groups lack legal status as property owners, their land 
struggles take on wider meanings of “residents rights” – the rights to land, jobs, water and other 
urban amenities not just for citizens, but for all urban residents.4 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For more information on the non-pastoral nomadic tribes, see the work of Econet, an advocacy 
group in Pune that works with India’s nomadic tribes for their human and institutional 
development: http://econetindia.org/non-pastoral-nomaic-tribes. 
4 For more on the “right to the city” debate, see, amongst others, Purcell, 2002, Harvey, 2003, 
Mitchell, 2003. The contemporary notions of the “right to the city” grew out of Henri Lefebvre’s 
writings on the theme, particularly in his 1968 book, Le droit à la ville and 1991 book, The Production of 
Space. 
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1.2 TERRITORIAL POLITICS OF LAND CONFLICTS 
The simplistic, and misleading, framing of India’s land conflicts as between farmers and 
industrialists cannot capture this complicated terrain of land politics. Instead, I suggest a new 
conceptual mapping of India’s land conflicts based on the political claims being made by different 
marginalized groups through these land struggles. I refer to this control of land, and more broadly, 
of a territorially bounded space, to articulate larger projects of accumulation, resistance, identity, 
and/or power consolidation as ‘territorial politics’ (Delaney, 2005; Jessop et al, 2008). The territorial 
politics of India’s land conflicts can be more accurately captured by categorizing land conflicts into 
three broad types: conflicts precipitated by the i) politics of redistribution (the Khed Thakkars), ii) 
politics of recognition (the Bhimashankar Thakkars), and iii) politics of exclusion (the nomadic tribal 
groups).   
 
Table 1.1: Territorial politics of land conflicts 
 
 
NATURE OF 
LAND CONFLICT 
DISADVANTAGED 
GROUPS IN LAND 
CONFLICT 
RELATIONSHIP OF 
DISADVANTAGED 
GROUPS TO LAND 
POLITICAL CLAIMS 
BEING MADE BY 
DISADVANTAGED 
GROUPS THROUGH 
LAND STRUGGLES 
REMEDIES FOR 
LAND CONFLICT 
POLITICS OF 
REDISTRIBUTION 
MARGINAL 
OWNERS OF DRY 
LAND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS TO LAND 
CHALLENGING 
HISTORICALLY 
PRODUCED, AGRARIAN 
FORMS OF LAND-BASED 
CONTROL 
FINANCIAL REMEDY 
OF EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE BENEFITS OF 
URBANIZATION 
POLITICS OF 
RECOGNITION 
FOREST-
DWELLING 
TRIBALS 
INDIGENOUS 
PROPERTY CLAIMS 
TO LAND 
RECOGNITION OF 
TRIBAL ECONOMIES, 
EPISTOMOLOGIES AND 
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
CULTURAL REMEDY 
OF VALIDATING 
TRIBAL WAYS OF 
LIVING 
POLITICS OF 
EXCLUSION 
RESIDENTS OF 
INFORMAL 
SETTLEMENTS, 
NOMADIC TRIBES, 
LANDLESS 
LABORERS 
DE FACTO TENURE, 
SELF-HELP AND 
OTHER FORMS OF 
PROPERTY CLAIMS 
TO LAND 
WIDER RANGE OF 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
DE-LINKED FROM 
STATUS OF PROPERTY 
OWNERSHIP 
POLITICAL REMEDY 
OF ENLARGED 
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS 
!
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India’s land conflicts are a symptom of the deeper process of the restructuring of land markets 
during an agrarian to urban transition. Centering an analysis of urban change on the experiences of 
the most disenfranchised within the polity brings the specific aspirations, opportunities and risks 
confronted by these marginalized groups to the very core of our conceptualizing of contemporary 
urban transformations. As an illustration, a region along a highway may be characterized as the 
politics of exclusion, redistribution or recognition depending on the relationship of its marginalized 
groups to their land. If the region has an agrarian history of acute landlessness, or if the highway 
region has a large number of informal residents, these groups in their present situation will not 
benefit from the land value increments of highway urbanization, and the transition is best 
characterized as the politics of exclusion. If, as in the case of the Pune highways, the region has low 
incidences of landlessness, the transition can be managed as a politics of redistribution. And if forest 
lands adjoin the highway, the incidences of tribal groups with indigenous property claims point to a 
politics of recognition. The spatial entity – the regions along the highway – is not taken-for-granted 
as a distinct human settlement that can be sharply distinguished from other regions, say the city or 
the urban fringe. Instead, it is the relationship of the most marginalized social groups to their land 
and the changes to these relationships during an agrarian to urban transition that differentiates a 
particular territory from another. 
The categories of redistribution, exclusion and recognition are merely instrumental devices 
to disaggregate the varied property conditions of India’s most marginalized groups. This does not 
mean, for instance, that marginalized social groups with private property rights to their marginal 
plots of land are seeking only material redistribution, and are indifferent to recognition claims. In my 
dissertation, I show how the Khed Thakkars are, in fact, using their meager landed assets as a route 
to both material redistribution and social recognition. Instead, these categories offer a new way for 
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planners and policy-makers of slicing through the complex land conflicts the country is facing, and 
to articulate appropriate solutions to the different types of land conflicts.  
 
Land cooperatives, as redistributive remedies, are inventive solutions to resolve the 
contentious politics of redistribution. But, land cooperatives exclude those without private property 
rights to their land, and will not work for land conflicts precipitated by the politics of exclusion. 
They are also not appropriate for land conflicts over mineral-rich and forest lands, which are 
struggles for recognition – for a positive revaluation of indigenous property claims to land.  
My dissertation focuses on the highway regions characterized by the politics of 
redistribution, and analyzes the performance of Pune’s land cooperatives as redistributive 
solutions to this particular type of land conflict.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH FOCUS AND FRAMEWORK 
1.3.1 POLITICS OF REDISTRIBUTION 
The core of the highway land conflicts in the Khed region, and more broadly, in agrarian 
regions where the land conflicts are rooted in a politics of redistribution, is a change in the forms of 
land rent during an agrarian to urban transition. Land rent is the price paid for the exclusive use of 
land. In an autarkic agrarian economy, the rent of agricultural land is determined by its fertility and 
location, i.e. the most valuable land has the highest productivity (a function of its fertility) and the 
lowest transportation costs (a function of its location) (Scott, 1980; Fujita, 2012). In a liberalized 
urban/industrial economy, the determinants of land rent changes. It is no longer the combination of 
fertility and location that separates the most valuable plot of land from the least valuable one, but 
the location of land within a transnational real estate market. In rapidly urbanizing countries like 
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India, the explosive demand for urban land, combined with the scarcity5 of serviced urban land, is 
transforming urban land into a high-value market commodity. This does not mean that all available 
non-urban land can be converted into urban land to meet the demands of the urban expansion. It is 
only land in certain “appropriate locations” that is suitable for urban/industrial uses (Sathe, 2011). 
These appropriately located lands include land around the peripheries of large cities, land along 
infrastructure corridors and mineral-rich lands (Ibid). The frenzied conversion of agricultural land 
along highways into urban land is a function of this shift in land rent, as fertile land that previously 
fetched high market values in an agrarian economy are now being converted into urban/industrial 
land to capitalize on their favorable location.  This new, highway-induced restructuring of the land 
market during an urban transition interacts in complex ways with more traditional forms of caste-
based control, and is the basis of the politics-of-redistribution type of land conflicts.  
Caste is a persistent marker of political, economic and social relations in India, particularly in 
rural India. The most powerful social groups in rural India are the dominant castes, an intermediate 
caste group between the upper-caste Brahmins and the low-caste Dalits and tribals. The dominant 
castes “wield preponderant economic and political power” over the other castes, and have been the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The scarcity of serviced urban land is described in one of two ways. Some scholars argue that the 
exponential growth of the urban population – commonly refered to as the ‘urban turn’– demands a 
rapid opening up of the supplies of urban land. For instance, India’s urban population is projected 
to increase from 340 million in 2008 to 590 million in 2030 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). If 
adequate urban land is not made available to accommodate these urban expansions, urbanization 
will proceed in a haphazard, laissez-faire manner and result in informal and irregular settlements 
with poor services, scarcities in serviced land markets that will further exclude the poor from these 
formal land/housing markets, and environmental degradation through urban sprawl. Others argue 
that there is no urgent demand for urban land. The transformation of land into an international 
tradeable asset within the new political-economic context of neoliberalization demands these 
speculative narratives of rapid urbanization and land scarcity. Tania Li, for instance, argues that 
similar to the earlier commodity ‘rushes’ like the gold rush, these narratives of land scarcity make 
land appear to be a commodity that is “valuable, limited/scarce, and poised to rise in value,” and are 
discursive instruments to attract investors and potential buyers into investing in land and real estate. 
In other words, it is the speculative narratives of land scarcity that are fueling these processes. I 
explain these arguments in details in the section on the liberalization of land markets in Chapter 2.  
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backbone of Indian democracy since Independence in 1947 (Srinivas, 1987). Through long histories 
of socio-spatial segregation, the most marginalized groups in the Khed villages – the tribals – owned 
the driest land, and the dominant caste landowners owned the most fertile lands. In other words, 
long histories of socio-spatial politics produced a neat mapping of social power with land ownership. 
The intense demand for highway lands for urban expansion over the past two decades has changed 
the metric for land valuation from fertility to location. Also, in the interest of food security, the 
Indian state requires that, as far as possible, only dry lands, and not fertile lands, be acquired for 
infrastructural, industrial and urban development. In response to these shifts, previously 
unproductive dry lands adjacent to the highways, owned by the Dalits and tribals, are now 
transformed into attractive market commodities, and similarly, fertile lands located away from the 
highway lose their market value. Marginalized groups are capitalizing on this shift in market demand 
for their dry lands to challenge historically produced, agrarian forms of land-based control by the 
dominant-caste landowners. It is in this context that the younger generation male Thakkars of the 
Khed region are eagerly parting with their dry lands for industrial/urban expansions.  
Though the policy of acquiring only dry lands for industrial/urban expansion indirectly 
targets the lands of the most marginalized groups, these land consolidation processes for 
urbanization also affect dominant caste landowners. The latter also own some dry lands, and the 
practical reality of consolidating contiguous plots of land for urban/industrial developments 
necessitates the acquisition of some fertile lands in addition to dry lands. Moreover, the poor 
performance of agriculture - aggravated by labor shortages as Dalit and tribal agricultural laborers 
are now finding alternative work in the factories coming up along the highways - coupled with the 
bright prospects of urbanization – driven by the skyrocketing prices of urban land and the prospects 
of the ‘India Shining’ growth story - is changing the aspirations of dominant caste agrarian 
landowners. These landowners want to be included in the benefits of India’s urbanization, and their 
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protests against land consolidation stem from a demand for more inclusive compensation packages 
for their land.  
This is the basis of many of the recent land conflicts in India that have been misleading 
framed as taking place between farmers and industrialists. The dominant castes in West Bengal – the 
Mahisyas – played a central role in the Singur protests against the Tata Nano manufacturing plant 
(Majumder, 2012). The dominant caste Jats were at the forefront of the violent Yamuna Expressway 
protests (Mahaprashasta, 2012), and the conflict was resolved when the state government made the 
land compensation package more attractive to the landowners (unlike the Pune case, land 
cooperatives were not formed along the Yamuna Expressway; farmers agreed to part with their land 
when they were offered higher monetary compensations). Khed, Singur, Yamuna Expressway – 
these land conflicts are underpinned by the politics of redistribution, where different social groups 
compete to stake their claims on the land value increments as land use changes from agricultural to 
non-agricultural, and more broadly, on the benefits of highway urbanization.  
 
1.3.2 FRAMEWORK OF LAND VALUE CAPTURE 
A central planning question that arises from the restructuring of land markets during an 
agrarian to urban transition, within the context of a liberalized economy, is: how can/should the 
land value increments be allocated amongst different institutional actors, such as the agrarian 
landowners, politicians, bureaucrats, industrial firms and property developers? The question of the 
allocation of land value increments arises because of the peculiar nature of land as a commodity. 
Unlike other commodities, land is a natural resource, fixed in supply, and immobile. Because of 
these attributes, increases in land value are a complex mix of public and private actions. The value of 
land increases not only because of the efforts and investments of the private landowner, but also 
because of public action (George, 1879; Loucks, 1930). Public action includes public investment in 
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infrastructure and social services, changes in land use and land use regulations, and population 
growth and economic development (Ibid). The practical challenge with land value increments is how 
to ascertain the proportion of the land value increment arising from public and private actions 
respectively (Ingram and Hong, 2012). Allocating too little of the land value increment to the private 
sector de-incentivizes private landowners from making investments in their property, allocating too 
much deprives society of its fair share of the increment. It is easiest to calculate land value 
increments when “the change in land value [is] associated with an action that took place over a 
relatively brief period of time, such as a public infrastructure project [and/or] a regulatory change” 
(Ibid: 5). The land value increment accompanying an urban transition – with the change in land use 
from agricultural to urban – is a “time-bound action” (Ibid) that lends itself to a more accurate 
estimation of the increments created by public action.  
The idea of the land value increment traces its origins to the 19th century political economist, 
Henry George, who argued that increases in land value are collectively created by society, and, 
therefore, these land value increments should accrue to society as a whole. More recently, there has 
been a growing interest among some scholars on the relevance of land value increments in managing 
urban growth (Ibid; Smolka and Amborski, 2000). They argue that the intense demand for urban 
land, and the changes in land use and land use regulations to accommodate this increasing demand, 
are creating skyrocketing increases in land value, and planners have to innovate with new regulatory 
mechanisms for a more “collective ownership of the public created land value” (Ibid; Fainstein, 
2012). My theoretical moorings in analyzing the restructuring of India’s land markets during an 
urban transition are tied to this framework of land value increments. The rest of my dissertation uses 
the lens of land value increments to evaluate who captures the land value increments of the newly 
converted highway lands, through what process, who decides how the captured land value 
increments are used, and how these increments are used.    
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1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
At the start of my fieldwork in mid-2010, India’s land conflicts were the subject of much 
heated debate amongst policy-makers, academics, activists, the media, and the general citizenry. The 
private sector was condemning the statist land acquisition laws as the “biggest constraint” to 
urgently needed industrialization and urbanization – “70 percent of the 190 delayed [infrastructure] 
projects are on account of land acquisition problems” (IDFC, 2009: 1). Social activists, on the other 
hand, were coming down hard on the state for resorting to coercive practices of eminent domain 
that was leading to the widespread displacement and disfranchisement of India’s most marginalized 
groups. Though these critiques on what was wrong with the current state of land management in 
India were crucial in framing the problem, less attention was being paid on how to resolve these 
land conflicts. I spent the first few months of my fieldwork traveling, talking to policy-makers and 
activists, and looking for cases of “success” – cases where conflicting institutional interests had been 
successfully reconciled; empirical cases that could offer a way forward from the current land 
impasse. Such empirical cases of success would be worthy of further investigation because they 
enable us to identify the “right conditions” under which typical institutional or structural 
“constraints can be prevailed over” (Peattie, 1990; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Mukhija, 2010).   
It was at this time that I came across the Khed case during my visit to Pune. The Khed case 
seemed unique in successfully bringing together institutional actors with oppositional interests – 
agrarian landowners and industrialists – in an innovative land cooperative experiment. The Pune 
bureaucrats played a pivotal role in mediating these negotiations, which seemed to offer some hope 
that the public sector is not always incompetent and/or corrupt. The active involvement of 
bureaucrats also pointed to the possibility of scaling up the land cooperative experiment – through 
identifying the conditions that made the Khed bureaucrats effective conflict mediators, and 
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replicating these conditions elsewhere to incentive good bureaucratic performance in land 
management. By December 2010, I had moved to Pune for an in-depth analysis of the Khed land 
cooperative. But a few months in the field further complicated, and enriched, my research design 
through the discovery that land cooperatives were being formed only along some highways in the 
Pune region, and not along others, and that different forms of land cooperatives were being formed 
along different highways.  
Because of these findings, I narrowed in on three highways in the Pune region – the Pune-
Mumbai, Pune-Sholapur and Pune-Nashik highways – as the focus on my study.  
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Figure 1.1: Research case studies - The three Pune highways 
 
Like many other regions in other parts of India, the Pune-Mumbai highway remains mired in 
land conflicts. A number of large-scale, self-contained, primarily residential townships (gated 
communities) have started coming up along the Pune-Mumbai highway. The state acquired land for 
these highway developments, on behalf of the developers, using its eminent domain powers, leading 
to widespread tribal displacements and political corruption.  
	  
	   18 
Along the Pune-Sholapur highway, agrarian landowners voluntarily pooled their fragmented 
agricultural lands, developed primarily residential townships, and formed shareholding companies to 
manage these townships. These landowners devised some strict rules to regulate these shareholding 
companies - each landholding family receives shares proportional to the land given up for the urban 
development, only these agrarian landowners are allowed as equity members of the shareholding 
company, and shareholders cannot sell their shares to outsiders. These regulations ensure that the 
agrarian landowners capture all the land value increment of the newly converted urban land.  
The Pune-Nashik highway is part of an automobile manufacturing agglomeration economy. 
Land cooperatives are being formed along this highway to open up the supply of land for auto-
related industrial firms. But these land cooperatives are not voluntarily formed; they are bureaucrat-
mediated. The first of these bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives is the Khed Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ). SEZs are industrial enclaves that are exempt from the economic regulations governing 
industrial firms in other parts of the country. The special regulations are expected to incentivize 
foreign direct investment (FDI), improve manufacturing exports, and encourage firms to locate in 
geographies areas where they would have no market incentives to locate. In 2006, the agrarian 
landowners in the Khed region protested against the formation of the SEZ. Local bureaucrats 
overcame these protests through the formation of a land cooperative. Fifteen percent of the shares 
of the new SEZ development are owned by the farmers’ land cooperative, and the remaining 85 
percent of the shares are held in a joint partnership between the bureaucrats and the private sector 
firm. Following the Khed example, other highway villages along the Pune-Nashik highway have 
agreed to new developments – like more SEZs and an international airport – if they get a deal 
similar to the Khed one.  
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The Pune highways represent three models of land consolidation along highways: 
- The Pune-Mumbai highway represents a pure state model of land consolidation, of the state 
acquisition of land through the use of eminent domain. 
- The Pune-Sholapur highway represents a pure market model of land consolidation, where 
agrarian landowners voluntarily consolidate their lands for urban/industrial uses through the 
formation of voluntarily-formed land cooperatives.  
- The Pune-Nashik highway represents a hybrid model of land consolidation, where 
bureaucrats use negotiation, and not coercion, to mediate land transactions between agrarian 
landowners and incoming businesses and form bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives as hybrid 
institutions to bring together the conflicting intersests of landowners and private sector firms.  
In other words, the state appropriates all of the land value increment in the Pune-Mumbai 
highway case, agrarian landowners capture all of the land value increment in the Pune-Sholapur 
highway case, and the bureaucrats, private sector firm and agrarian landowners share the land value 
increment in the Pune-Nashik highway case.  
 
Table 1.2: Institutional outcomes along Pune’s highways 
HIGHWAY INSTITUTIONAL OUTCOME WHO CAPTURES THE LAND VALUE INCREMENT? 
PUNE-
MUMBAI 
Pure state model of land 
consolidation Parastatal 
PUNE-
SHOLAPUR 
Pure market model of land 
consolidation  Agrarian landowners  
PUNE-
NASHIK Hybrid model of land consolidation  
Agrarian landowners, parastatals, 
and private sector firm 
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The Pune highways offer a natural experiment to compare three different institutional 
arrangements for managing land during an agrarian to urban transition. The different institutional 
outcomes along highways within the same region allowed me to hold many variables constant – such 
as state-level politics, regional agrarian and land tenure histories, level of regional economic 
development – and to seek answers to some key questions like: Why did land cooperatives emerge 
along two of Pune’s highways – the Pune-Sholapur and Pune-Nashik highways – and not along the 
Pune-Mumbai highway? Why did different forms of land cooperatives – voluntarily formed and 
bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives - emerge along the Pune highways? Which of these modes of 
land consolidation – public, private, or public-private – are more equitable and democratic in their 
distributional outcomes? Other questions that motivate my research include: How are the most 
marginalized groups along the Pune highways, i.e. the tribals, experiencing the transition, and how 
effective are land cooperatives in equitably redistributing land value increments to these groups? More 
broadly, what do the Pune land conflicts and cooperatives tell us about India’s agrarian to urban 
transition along highways? These are the questions I set out to answer in the rest of the dissertation. 
 
 1.5 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 Having laid out the broad framework of territorial politics, the rest of the dissertation 
focuses on a specific type of highway land conflict – those characterized by the politics of 
redistribution.  
Chapter 2, on “Highway Urbanization,” situates the current phenomenon of highway 
urbanization in India within a wider historical and geographical context. It argues that the 
contemporary processes of urbanization are set within the context of a new form of globalization, 
and as such, these urban processes are markedly different from 19th and 20th century phenomena like 
suburbs. It outlines the unique challenges posed by the phenomenon of highway urbanization to 
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existing institutions for governing land, and lays out the broad contours of the encounters of a 
democratic India with the new globalizing economy.   
Chapter 3, on “The Pune Highways,” hones in on the three highways in the Pune region. It 
provides an in-depth empirical account of an urban development project along each of these 
highways – the Lavasa Lake City project along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway, the Magarpatta 
Township along the Pune-Sholapur highway, and the Khed Special Economic Zone (SEZ) along the 
Pune-Nashik highway. This chapter introduces the “dominant caste agrarian landowners,” also 
called the agrarian bourgeoisie, and points to the presence of the dominant caste landowners as the 
main explanatory variable for the emergence of land cooperatives along two of Pune’s highways, but 
not along the Pune-Mumbai highway.   
Chapter 4, on “Cities of Sugar: The Magarpatta Model of Land Consolidation,” analyzes one 
form of land cooperative – the voluntarily formed shareholding cooperatives along the Pune-
Sholapur highway. It traces these voluntarily formed cooperatives to the region’s rich history in 
sugar cooperatives. Since the earlier agrarian institutions of sugar cooperatives are now being re-
worked into shareholding companies in land, this chapter asks why sugar cooperatives emerged only 
in some regions in post-Independent India from the 1950s to 1970s, and not in others. To draw 
larger inferences at a country-wide scale, I compare the Western Maharashtra region, within which 
the Pune-Sholapur highway is located, to the Southern Karnataka region. The Western Maharashtra 
region has the country’s densest concentration of sugar cooperatives. In contrast, the Southern 
Karnataka region is also rich in sugarcane cultivation, but all the sugarcane is processed in privately 
owned sugar factories, not in sugar cooperatives. This chapter analyzes the replicability of the 
Magarpatta model of land consolidation, both in terms of i) practical replicability: how transferable 
are the conditions that made this model possible to other regions of the country? ii) normative 
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replicability – is this model democratic and socially equitable; is it a desirable model to replicate in 
other regions of the country?  
Chapter 5, on “Adversarial Cooperation: The Khed Model of Land Consolidation,” analyzes 
another form of cooperative – the bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives along the Pune-Nashik 
highway. Unlike the Magarpatta region, the Khed region lacks a prior institutional history of sugar 
cooperatives. In the Khed case, inventive bureaucrats played a crucial mediating role in bringing 
together diverse social groups, often with conflicting interests, in a collective land experiment. The 
Southern Karnataka comparison is instructive here, too. Though the Southern Karnataka region has 
a critical mass of dominant caste landowners who have been agitating against coercive land 
acquisition practices, the bureaucrats in this region lack the resourcefulness of the Khed bureaucrats 
in innovating with new institutions like land cooperatives. This chapter outlines the clever timing of 
the Khed bureaucrats in fostering collective action amongst conflicting social groups, and also 
explains why the Southern Karnataka region lacks savvy bureaucrats like the Khed ones.  
Chapter 6, the “Coda: Land cooperatives as redistributive regional institutions,” evaluates the 
performance of land cooperatives in democratically and equitably allocating land, and more 
precisely, the land value increments, amongst different social groups. It concludes that though 
Pune’s land cooperatives are far from ideal institutions of democracy and social equity, they do open 
up new possibilities for dealing with the challenges of contemporary highway urbanization.  
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Chapter  2 
HIGHWAY URBANIZATION
	   24 
 
Rajgurunagar, Chakan and Talegaon are a cluster of ‘villages’ located around 40 kilometers 
from Pune along the Pune-Nashik highway. Rajgurunagar has a population of 19,000, and is 
governed by a Village Panchayat.  But, it hardly fits the description of a village. With its four and five 
story commercial buildings, tightly packed single-family homes and multi-family apartments of four 
to six stories, it could pass off as a high-density, mixed-use neighborhood within a bustling city. 
Chakan was proposed as the location for the new Pune International Airport. Apartment complexes 
advertising the proximity to the airport have started burgeoning in Chakan. In August 2012, the state 
government changed the location of the proposed international airport from Chakan to 
Rajgurunagar.  The Pune-Nashik highway is a successful automobile-manufacturing cluster. 
Rajgurunagar, Chakan, Talegaon and their neighboring villages have large manufacturing factories 
for the multinational and domestic auto companies, Volkswagon, Daimler-Benz, Mahindra and 
Mahindra and Bajaj Auto.  
The ‘villages’ of Rajgurunagar, Chakan and Talegaon are a diverse mix of social groups – 
old-time residents, newly arrived skilled and unskilled industrial workers, and migrant agricultural 
laborers. The top-level managers in these factories commute daily from Pune city to these villages 
for their work. The factories are reluctant to employ local labor for permanent jobs, partly because 
they lack the requisite skills and partly because of fear of unionization. The Dalit and tribal residents 
in these highway ‘villages’ work in these factories, mainly as daily-wage and contract laborers, on 
their own agricultural fields, and on the fields of dominant-caste landowners. The more affluent 
agrarian landowners have started their own construction, trucking and restaurant businesses to 
service the new highway developments. The dominant-caste landowners face acute labor shortages 
as most of the Dalits and tribals who previously worked on their lands now find work in the 
factories. These landowners rely on unskilled laborers who come to this region from some of the 
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most economically distressed parts of the country, particularly from north Karnataka, and provide 
these migrant laborers accommodation, food and some paltry wages in exchange for agricultural 
work.  
It is a common sight to see apartment complexes being built in the midst of agricultural 
fields in these highway villages. As common a sight as the apartments are the billboards advertising 
these apartments, with flashy slogans that sell apartment ownership as a means to a “worldclass” 
urban lifestyle.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Views of Rajgurunagar Village Panchayat 
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Figure 2.2: Apartments coming up in the midst of agricultural fields in Chakan. Chakan was the 
proposed location for the new Pune international airport, and the apartment advertisement reads: 
"Book your flat and fly to Singapore." 
 
	  
Figure 2.3: Industrial cluster in Talegaon 
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The highway ‘villages’ of Rajgurunagar, Chakan and Talegaon has thriving industrial 
economies. With a population from 15,000 to 20,000 residents each, they meet the demographic 
criterion of the Indian census for urban areas to have a population size exceeding 5000 people. And 
yet, these areas remain as villages in India’s census statistics, their residents are enumerated as rural, 
and they are governed by rural local governments.  
 
2.1 URBANIZATION-OUTSIDE-CITIES: “THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO 
COME?” 
Rajgurunagar, Chakan and Talegaon are not aberrations in India’s agrarian countryside. The 
rapid restructuring of land markets along highways exaggerates, and makes more perceptible, the 
subtle changes that are underway in India’s villages. India’s most rapid urbanization is not taking 
place within its larger cities of Mumbai or Bangalore, but in large villages that are classified as 
villages but have “an increasingly urban character” (IIHS, 2011). This “grey zone” of villages is 
home to nearly 80-140 million residents (Ibid). Pointing to the declining hold of culture and 
agriculture, the traditional “mainstay” of village life, on contemporary Indian villages, scholars are 
underscoring the disappearance of the Indian ‘village’ as we commonly understand it (Gupta, 2005). 
Nearly 40 percent of the rural population in half of India’s states is now engaged in non-agricultural 
work, and the numbers are increasing (Ibid). Agriculture contributes to only one-fourth of the rural 
GDP (Credit Suisse, 2012). 75 percent of new factories in the past decade were set up in villages, 
contributing to nearly 70 percent of the new manufacturing jobs created (Ibid).  
This is true not only for India, but for other countries in the global south. In Africa, 
Nairobi’s industrial and urban expansion is spilling beyond city boundaries into the regions along 
inter-urban highways connecting Nairobi to its neighboring cities of Mombasa and Kampala (UN-
HABITAT, 2008). Since the 1980s, the Nairobi-Mombasa highway has become the favored 
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destination for manufacturing firms, and the highway region is a teeming mix of industries, high-
income residential properties, and informal settlements. In Egypt, the urban transition is taking place 
within the North Delta Region - the triangular region connecting Cairo to the coastal cities of 
Alexandria and Ismailia-Port Said (Ibid). The zones along the Cairo-Alexandria and Cairo-Ismailia 
highways within the North Delta Region accommodate nearly 50 percent of Egypt’s industries. The 
story is not too different in other parts of Africa, with the Greater Ibadan–Lagos–Accra highway 
spanning four countries in West Africa, and the Johannesburg–Pretoria and Maputo–Johannesburg 
highways in South Africa (Ibid). The phenomenon is marked in Southeast and East Asia, with the 
state-sponsored projects of “transborder growth triangles” (Douglass, 2000). The most ambitious of 
these include the Sijori Growth Triangle linking the city-state of Singapore to Johor Baru in Malaysia 
and part of the Riau Islands in Indonesia; the mega-urban regions linking Medan in Indonesia to 
regions within Malaysia and southern Thailand; and the industrialization along the new highways 
connecting Bangkok to Laos and Vietnam (Ibid). China’s urbanization and industrialization is 
predominantly taking place in villages, and has attracted much scholarly attention to urban villages, 
villages-in-the-city, and rural industrialization (Friedmann, 2005; Hsing, 2011). Recognizing the scale 
of these urban developments, the UN-HABITAT identified massive urban conurbations like urban 
corridors, mega-regions and  city-regions as the “shape of things to come” (UN-HABITAT, 2010). 
Urbanization is spilling beyond city boundaries not only in countries in the global south, but 
also in the Western advanced industrialized societies. The emergent built environment in the U.S is a 
“fragmented and multi-nodal mixture of employment and residential settings, with a fusion of 
suburban, exurban, and central-city characteristics” (Chaves et al, 2011: 35). For instance, 
projections based on current growth trends in the U.S show that nearly 70 percent of the country’s 
population growth and 80 percent of its employment growth will be accommodated within ten 
“megapolitan areas” – “integrated networks of metropolitan areas” – clustered along inter-state 
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highways (Carbonella and Yaro, 2005; Lang and Dhavale, 2005). Frankfurt has witnessed a dramatic 
socio-spatial restructuring in the past two decades, where most of its dynamic growth has taken 
place “in a para-urban zone beyond a 10-mile radius and inside a 100-mile radius around the center” 
(Keil and Ronneberger, 2006). Terms like the 100-mile city (Sudjic, 2006), edgeless city (Lang, 2003), 
metroburb (Chaves et al, 2011), technoburb (Fishman, 2006) are attempts to capture these liminal 
geographies that defy the neat city-suburb-village transect that characterized earlier eras of 
settlement development in the U.S.  
 
Given the scale of these contemporary forms of urbanization-outside-cities, scholars have 
advanced a number of explanations for the emergence of these urban forms. These explanations can 
be broadly grouped into four schools of thought: i) the endogenous view, ii) the convergence view, 
iii) the agglomeration view, and iv) the uneven development view.  
 
2.1.1 THE ENDOGENOUS VIEW 
The most popular voices within this school are Jean Gottman, Terry McGee and John 
Friedmann, who argue that the hybrid geographies of urbanization-outside-cities are emerging due 
to endogenous reasons, i.e. reasons internal to their national economies.  
One of the closest historical precedents to the contemporary urbanization along 
infrastructure corridors was the massive urban conurbation stretching along the Boston-Washington 
highway in the 1960s, termed by the French geographer, Jean Gottman, as megalopolis (1964). 
Integrated by an infrastructural spine, Gottmann argued that the Bos-Wash megalopolis, as a form 
of urbanization, has been developing into a powerhouse of agglomerated economic activity since the 
settling of the Puritans in New England in the 17th century. In a persuasive argument for articulating 
a “new image” for U.S urban development in the 1960s, John Friedmann pointed to the skewed 
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spatial structure of economically thriving metropolitan core regions and economically impoverished 
inter-metropolitan peripheries (1965). He argued that the policy and planning focus on the city and 
metropolitan regions led to a neglect of the inter-metropolitan peripheries, a zone that 
accommodates more than one-fifth of the U.S population. Instead of the fixed physical artifact of 
the city, Friedmann urged planners to adopt more relevant and timely categories of space like the 
“urban field,” which he defined as “a pattern of point locations and connecting flows of people, 
information, money and commodities” (Ibid: 314). In the context of Asia, in the 1960s, Terry 
McGee characterized the distinct pattern of urbanization in South-east Asia as ‘desakota,’ a 
neologism that combines the Baha Indonesian term ‘desa’ [village] and ‘kota’ [city] (1967). McGee 
argued that the desakota model of urbanization was unique to South-east Asia, with its well-
developed infrastructure of roads and canals, a dense rural population engaged in smallholder 
cultivation, and an integrated ‘transactive’ urban-rural environment in terms of movements of 
people and commodities. 
  Most of the writings on the endogenous view are from the 1960s and 70s. In a more recent 
work on the urban villages and rural industrialization in China, Friedman points to endogenous 
variables – including high rural population densities, an excess supply of labor, historical antecedents 
(like craft traditions), high levels of household savings, resourceful local leadership and 
entrepreneurial talent on the part of households – as explanations for China’s contemporary 
urbanization (2005).  
 
2.1.2 THE CONVERGENCE VIEW 
Challenging the endogenous view, scholars within the convergence view argue that it is 
“Orientalist” to talk about a unique South-east Asian or a Third World city (Dick and Rimmer, 
1998). Instead, we need a “single urban discourse” that recognizes the aspiration of countries in the 
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global south to catch up with the West (Ibid). Some convergence scholars point to the similar 
conditions of high levels of income inequality and perceived sense of low public safety in both the 
U.S and South-east Asian countries (Ibid). These common conditions are propelling the South-east 
Asian middle class towards adopting American forms of urbanism, including gated residential 
communities, patrolled shopping malls and privatized recreational spaces. Others point to the 
international diffusion of Anglo-American models of suburbanization to countries in the global 
south via institutional actors like master planners, design consultants and property specialists from 
the U.S who are hired as foreign experts to consult on the new urban developments (Ibid), and 
domestic architects, planners and government officials who model their urban developments on the 
“northern exemplars of the good suburban life” (Clapson and Hutchison, 2010: 4).  
The convergence view acknowledges globalization as a driving force behind the forms of 
urbanization in the global south. Globalization, in this view, is defined as the flow of ideas from the 
West to the rest of the world. From colonial times to the present, models of urban development 
have been transferred from Western cities to cities in developing countries, with the only difference 
between then and now being the length of the time lag: technology transfer is more rapid in 
contemporary times.  
 
In contrast to the endogenous and convergence views, the agglomeration and uneven 
development views situate the contemporary urban processes within a new form of globalization. 
The 1970s saw a radical restructuring of the global economic system of production, with the shift 
from Fordism to post-Fordism. The economic recession that swept through the established 
industrial cities of the United States and Western Europe spelled the decline of the Fordist 
production paradigm – of large, vertically integrated corporations to ensure mass production of 
standardized goods, and of the Keynesian welfare state with its redistributive social-welfare policies 
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and the nationalized institutions of collective bargaining to stabilize mass consumption (Piore and 
Sabel, 1986; Scott, 1988). These social-political-economic changes interacted with technological 
advancements to further destabilize the Fordist system. Technological innovations - like the rise of 
information and communication networks that accelerated the flows of capital, labor, goods and raw 
materials, and the development of shipping containers that drastically reduced the cost of shipping 
and allowed the production process to be separated into different, highly specialized geographical 
locations (Castells, 1996; Levinson, 2008) – enabled the unprecedented spatial dispersion of the 
production process of the global economy. The agglomeration and uneven development schools 
view the contemporary growth of mega-regions and inter-urban corridors are the spatial correlates 
of this changing economic order.  
 
2.1.3 THE AGGLOMERATION VIEW 
This view addresses a central paradox of the new form of globalization. We are in the midst 
of the digital era – or, in the words of Manuel Castells, in an information age or network society 
(1996) – which makes it possible for a placeless, borderless dispersal of economic activity across the 
globe. Yet, instead of the diminishing, and ultimately vanishing, role of place within global economic 
organization, we are seeing the resurgence of place in a new form – in the form of large urban 
conurbations like mega-regions and inter-urban corridors. Agglomeration scholars agree that current 
economic activity requires these large urban conurbations as the command and control nodes for 
organizing the globally dispersed economic activities (Sassen, 2001; Scott, 2006). However, these 
scholars diverge on the question of who should benefit from these emergent sociospatial processes.  
Some agglomeration scholars analyze the emerging clusters with firms as their unit of analysis. The 
most popular articulation of this view is that of Michael Porter. As companies struggle to decide 
where to locate their operations within this globally dispersed economy, Porter advises them to shift 
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their thinking from “internal to external sources of company success” (2000). The earlier ideas on 
the competitive advantage of companies – like how the company is internally organized and 
managed, on the business costs such as taxes and utitity rates – have now taken on larger 
considerations. The wider environment within which a company locates now exerts a great deal of 
influence on how competitive firms are (Ibid). The more business-oriented/economic view for 
agglomeration argues that firms cluster in a dense regional economy to increase their productivity, to 
innovate faster, and to be more globally competitive in a global economy. Clustering improves 
economic competitiveness in three ways. First, firms within an agglomeration have access to shared 
inputs, employees and public goods (Ibid; World Bank, 2009). For instance, firms can be more 
nimble in increasing or decreasing production through hiring and firing, and/or subcontracting, 
labor and services to specialized firms clustered in the region. Second, the geographical 
concentration of the labor pool facilitates a better matching between firms and workers (World 
Bank, 2009). Third, innovation and learning takes place through knowledge spillovers - the 
transmission of ideas amongst entrepreneurs and workers both within-industry and between-
industry (Ibid). 
The flexible specialization scholars shift the unit of analysis from firms to small-scale firms 
in developing countries. The post-Fordist period witnessed the emergence of new dynamic centers 
of economic growth in regions like central and northwestern Italy and the Silicon Valley. These new 
regions of growth were based on flexible specialization, characterized by networked clusters of 
small-scale, technologically sophisticated and decentralized firms (Ibid; Piore and Sabel, 1986). 
Taking forward the work pioneered by Piore and Sabel, scholars working in the context of newly 
industrializing countries have argued that the flexible specialization form of industrial organization is 
particularly advantageous to countries with “incipient industrialization” (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). 
Developing countries are characterized by a few large enterprises at the top and many small 
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struggling enterprises at the bottom that lack the resources to scale up to mid-sized firms. Clustering 
allows small-scale firms to grow into global players through mobilizing resources in small amounts, 
and through sharing the resources that require larger economies of scale (Ibid).   
Scholars who are more focused on questions of social equity than on the economic 
competitiveness of firms offer a third point of view within the agglomeration school. These scholars 
point to the potential of these regional economic clusters in preventing regressive inter-jurisdictional 
competition. The intense competitiveness amongst cities around the world in attracting transnational 
firms to their jurisdictions has led to short-sighted, parochial and fragmented decision-making, with 
many local governments prioritizing pro-business economic policies over policies for improving 
collective public goods and services (Donahue, 1997; Libertun de Duren, 2006). Regional economic 
agglomerations provide the incentives for local governments to work cooperatively with one another 
and to advance regional visions, instead of pitting them against each other (Douglass, 2002; Dewar 
and Epstein, 2007). 
 
2.1.4 THE UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT VIEW 
In contradistinction to the agglomeration view, critical scholars argue that these 
contemporary phenomena of mega-regions and inter-urban corridors are expressions of uneven 
development. The concept of uneven development traces its earliest articulations to the French 
sociospatial theorist, Henri Lefebvre. Writing in the 1960s, Lefebvre argued that by the 21st century, 
capitalist development would reach its apogee through a complete urbanization of human society. 
Capitalist urban space, according to Lefebvre, would be “global [the space of sovereignty...a 
fetishized space, reductive of differences], fragmented [a space that is separating, disjunctive, a space 
that locates specificities, places or localities, both in order to control them and in order to make 
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them negotiable], and hierarchical [ranging from the lowliest places to the noblest, from the tabooed 
to the sovereign]” (Lefebvre, 1991: 282).  
Marxist geographers like David Harvey, Neil Smith and Neil Brenner have compellingly 
carried forward Lefebvre’s idea of global-fragmented-hierarchical space in their analyses of uneven 
development. Drawing a link between urbanization and capitalism, Harvey underscores the active 
role that urbanization has played in absorbing the surpluses of capitalism: the cycles of development, 
destruction and redevelopment of urban places is a necessary condition for capitalism to survive 
(Harvey, 1985; 2003). Similarly, Smith expounds on the concept of uneven development in his book 
of the same name: “Capital attempts to see-saw from a developed to an underdeveloped area, then 
at a later point back to the first area which is by now underdeveloped… This is the see-saw 
movement of capital, which lies behind the larger uneven development process.”  (Smith, 1984: 
149). Of particular importance to the emergence of mega-regions and inter-urban corridors, these 
Marxist economic geographers dismiss as obsolete the spatial categories of urban and rural (Harvey, 
2003; Brenner, 2013). Brenner argues that the crisis of the Fordist model of capital accumulation in 
the 1970s marked the weakening of the nation-state as the key arbiter of economic and social 
relations (2004). But, the weakening of the nation-state does not mean the end of the state. It merely 
represents “state spatial restructuring,” i.e. the restructuring of the scales at which the state operates, 
in a post-Fordist era. Besides the upscaling of state regulatory processes – through the formation of 
supranational blocs like the European Union and Mercosur – we see a simultaneous downscaling of 
political scale in the emergence of subnational urban regions. Instead of the idea of balanced 
national economic development that was the driving force of the earlier Fordist era of capital 
accumulation, contemporary strategies of economic growth focus on increasing the territorial 
competitiveness of certain urban regions. The concentration of major socioeconomic assets in a few 
globally competitive urban regions is leading to one of the most exacerbated forms of uneven spatial 
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development. Instead of the conventional spatial categories of urban and rural, Brenner calls for “a 
new lexicon of sociospatial difference” that captures the “unevenly woven fabric of worldwide 
urbanization” (Brenner, 2013: 101).  
The main concerns of the Marxist geographers against uneven development were clearly 
expressed in the former’s trenchant criticisms of the World Bank’s 2009 World Development 
Report (WDR) on “Reshaping Economic Geography.” The central message of the WDR was that 
uneven spatial development is an inevitable correlate of economic growth. The report argued that 
when policy makers seek to balance economic development and redirect growth from prosperous to 
impoverished areas, they are unnecessarily interfering with market logic and restraining economic 
growth. Instead, the report argues that regional clusters should be allowed to grow unfettered. It is 
only when countries reach an intermediate stage of urbanization that instruments for balancing 
economic growth – like connective infrastructure and spatially targeted policies – be used to 
integrate the economically lagging areas with the economically leading ones. Critical scholars rallied 
against what they perceived to be an economically reductionist justification for uneven development 
(Peck and Sheppard, 2010: 333), and argued instead for active policy interventions to correct these 
uneven spatial processes (Scott, 2009).  
 
2.2 SITUATING MY RESEARCH WITHIN THE LITERATURE 
The megapolitan regions along the U.S inter-state highways, the transborder growth triangles 
in South-East and East Asia, the highway urbanizations in India and Kenya – all of these urban 
processes are not endogenously driven by public and private actors within a particular nation-state. 
The endogenous scholars – Gottman, Friedman, McGee – developed neologisms such as 
megalopolis, urban field and desakota in the 1960s and 70s, at a time when the nation-state remained 
a powerful arbiter of economic relations in both developed and developing countries. However, it is 
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clear that we live in a different world post-1970s, and the endogenous views needs to be revised to 
recognize the role of globalization in explaining contemporary urban processes. In a 2005 article on 
“renewing the [desakota] debate,” McGee re-conceptualized his earlier work on desakotas for the 
current times: “Globalization has accelerated the flow of people, commodities, capital and 
information that is causing both detachment of the city core and integration with its surrounding 
extended metropolitan region at the same time. Detachment in the sense that the city cores are 
increasingly sourcing their resources such as food and leisure from a wider global market and 
integration in the sense that the resources of the peri-urban region such as land and water are 
increasingly needed” (McGee, 2005: 43).  
Since the 1980s, countries around the world are converging towards similar processes and 
forms of urban growth – Special Economic Zones (SEZs), residential gated communities, patrolled 
shopping malls – and these spaces are located within ever expanding urban conurbations, like along 
inter-urban highways and within mega-city regions. Though countries around the world are 
converging towards similar urban forms, it is misleading to assert that they are converging towards 
an Anglo-American model of suburbanization - as espoused by the convergence school – for two 
reasons. First, suburbs are linked to a specific moment of development within the industrial history 
of the West. Most clearly expressed in the zonal or concentric ring theory of E.W.Burgess, suburbs 
had a discrete form – they were the concentric zone of residential uses around the city, which served 
as the core for organizing economic activity – and they were embedded within a specific historical 
moment – suburbs represented one of the concentric zones of development around an outwardly 
growing, industrializing modern metropolis (Dear, 2003; Dear and Dahmann, 2008). These models 
were based on the growth patterns of Chicago, considered to be the paradigmatic modernist city of 
the late 19th to early 20th century. The past few decades have seen some large-scale changes – the rise 
of information technologies, the end of the Cold War, the deregulation of national economies – 
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which have moved us into a new era that scholars varyingly call postmodern, post-socialist, post-
Fordist. How relevant, then, is the historically specific development of Anglo-American suburbs as 
the explanation for contemporary urban processes that are unfolding in a different time period? 
Second, as urbanization-outside-cities becomes a dominant form of urbanization around the world, 
it takes on varied forms and is driven by different sociospatial processes. In the US, the functionally 
monolithic suburbs that ringed the core city have now been replaced by regions that represent a 
“fragmented and multimodal mixture of employment and residential settings, with a fusion of 
suburban, exurban and central-city characteristics” (Chaves et al, 2011: 35). Scholars have coined 
neologisms like metroburb, technoburb, edgeless city and privatopia to distinguish these 
contemporary urban processes from earlier suburbs. The North Delta region in Egypt – the 
triangular region bounded by the Cairo-Alexandria and Cairo-Port Said highways on two sides, and 
by the coast on the third – is largely unplanned, with private industrial firms, large-scale property 
developers and small-scale builders converting agricultural lands within this region into formal and 
informal developments. The Sijori Growth Triangle connecting Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia is 
strongly planned and led by the Singaporean developmental state to make the Singapore region an 
economically competitive hub within a globalizing economy. The convergence explanation leaves 
unanswered many important questions such as: though the US technoburbs and Singapore’s Sijori 
Growth Triangle look similar in urban form, what are the different narratives leading to these 
convergent urban formations; besides the flow of ideas and planning practices from the US to the 
rest of the world, what are the new geographies of policy transfers – like, for instance, the role of 
Singapore in serving as an aspirational model of development and as the technical expert for Asian 
countries; and, with the new form of globalization, what are the key differences in the modes of 
policy transfers across countries? The convergence school’s blinkered focus on the Anglo-American 
model of development lumps diverse urban processes under the monolithic category of the suburb, 
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it leaves many other regions of the world that are growing in influence out of the orbit of analysis, 
and it does not adequately explain the difference between the pre-1970s and post-1970s forms of the 
global transfer of ideas and planning practices.  
In my work, I agree with the underlying argument that launches both the agglomeration and 
uneven development views – the post-1970s context of globalization that is producing, and is in turn 
produced by, these emergent forms of urbanization. The agglomeration and uneven development 
views differ in their evaluation on the role of the state within these contemporary processes of 
globalization and urbanization. The agglomeration view sees highway urbanization as a proactive 
response on the part of the state in responding to the opportunities and risks posed by the increased 
mobility of capital within this global era. The nation-state is being rendered irrelevant by these global 
flows, and the local government is too small a scale to effectively deal with transnational capital. 
Large urban configurations, like highway urbanization, are more appropriate scales of political 
organization that can level the playing field between spatially fixed governments and mobile capital. 
Unlike the agglomeration view that grants agency to the political actors within highway-regions and 
city-regions in negotiating with the new opportunities and threats of globalization, the uneven 
development view strips these actors of their agency. This view argues that, caught in a web of inter-
jurisdictional competition, highway regions have no option but to compete with one another to 
attract footloose capital: “city-regions are forced to be competitive, forced to take on more 
responsibilities, forced to restrict their welfare functions, and forced to integrate with their 
surrounding regions” (Beauregard, 2006).   
  Though I agree with the starting point of post-1970s globalization as the framework within 
which we analyze these urban changes, I situate my own work somewhere between the 
agglomeration and uneven development views. Instead of starting a priori with either of these views 
– with their deterministic roles for the state and the predictable outcomes of contemporary 
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globalization and urbanization (a celebrated outcome in the agglomeration view and a crippling 
outcome in the uneven development view), I use the analytical lens of land as a heuristic into these 
broader global transformations. The sector of land underwent a radical restructuring from the 1970s 
onwards, leading to the creation of a transnational real estate market (Pistor, 2011). A number of 
policy interventions led to the creation of these globally interconnected land markets, including the 
deregulation of land markets to allow foreign direct investment in the real estate industry, the 
creation of new financial instruments to make land more easily tradable amongst global investors, 
and the promotion of “free trade zones” that grant private property rights to firms even if the 
national law does not permit it (Ibid; White et al, 2012). Through an in-depth analysis of 
restructured land markets along the highways in the Pune region, I interrogate the rationalities 
guiding the actions of the different public and private institutional actors during this agrarian to 
urban transition, the changing roles of these different institutions and their changing relationships to 
one another as they are exposed to the new opportunities and risks of a transition, the changes in 
land ownership and the attendant changes in land-based social relations. As explained in the 
introductory chapter, I use the framework of land value capture to analyze these changes in land and 
land-based social relations.  
 
2.3 INDIA’S HIGHWAY URBANIZATION  
In 2001, the Indian government launched one of the most ambitious infrastructure 
development programs the country has ever seen, comparable in scale only to the 19th century 
railway building enterprise of colonial India. The 2001 highway development program planned to 
widen and pave 64,000 kilometers of national highways. This upgraded network of highways has led 
to an exodus of land and building intensive industries out of cities into these highway regions (Ghani 
et al, 2012; 2013). Lands along the highways are cheaper than inner-city lands, and their proximity to 
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transportation corridors makes them attractive destinations for industries. These highways are also 
favored destinations for self-contained residential enclaves, which are marketed as residential havens, 
far from the congestion, crime and poor infrastructure that plagues large Indian cities. 
Some of India’s highways are designated as Infrastructure Corridors. These infrastructure 
corridors are tolled highways constructed through public-private partnerships. They are part of the 
state-sponsored industrial clustering plan to make certain regions within the country more globally 
competitive and attractive to foreign direct investment (FDI) through developing state-of-the-art 
infrastructure. These corridors are generally master planned by parastatals, or by consulting firms 
hired by parastatals.  
 
This section looks at the new challenges posed by India’s highway urbanization to our 
existing institutional frameworks, and it concludes with some preliminary insights on the interactions 
of the democratic India with a new globalizing, liberalizing economy. It points to the mixed reality 
of contemporary urbanization in India, with certain aspects of the urban transition enfranchising the 
most marginalized groups, and other aspects of it disfranchising them.  
 
2.3.1 HIGHWAY URBANIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES TO 
DECENTRALIZATION 
In 1991, the Indian government introduced a new decentralization policy – the 73rd 
Constitutional Amendment Act for village governments and the 74th Constitutional Amendment for 
city governments – for devolving decision-making to urban and rural local governments. As the 
government pushed forth a decentralization policy, the country has been witnessing a new form of 
highway urbanization that is much larger in scale than the political jurisdiction of individual cities 
and villages. The institutional challenges posed by highway urbanization can be framed within a 
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larger debate on the comparative advantages of decentralized local governments versus regional 
governments in managing large-scale, trans-local transformations. The advocates of centralized 
governments argue that local governments are fragmented and parochial, and lack the incentives to 
advance regional interests (Downs, 1994; Altshuler, 1996; Calthorpe and Fulton, 2001). In the US, 
local government authority over land use regulations has resulted in urban sprawl and racial 
segregation (Ibid). In the US, as well as in the developing economies of Latin America and China, 
inter-jurisdictional competition among local governments to attract desirable industrial and business 
uses has diverted public monies away from collective public goods towards pro-business financial 
incentives (Donahue, 1997; Ding, 2005; Libertun du Duren, 2008). These advocates thus thus view 
them as necessary for regional equity, because risk spreading and equitable distribution of benefits is 
possible only within a centralized state that captures most of the costs and benefits associated with 
its land use decisions (Downs, 1994; Oats, 1999). The advocates of decentralized local governments, 
on the other hand, accuse centralized regional governments of being unresponsive to localized 
public interests, too far removed from citizens to allow for effective communication of information 
from the government to the public, and too large in scale to allow for meaningful citizen 
participation in decision making (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom et al, 1961; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). 
Researchers have attempted to reconcile this dichotomy between decentralized local governments 
and centralized regional governments through a turn to regional institutions, as opposed to regional 
governments, on the grounds that these institutions will allow cities to maintain their autonomy 
while simultaneously giving them incentives to advance regional interests (Frug, 2002; McKinney 
and Johnson, 2009). My work on land cooperatives falls within this middle ground of regional 
institutions. The land cooperatives that are emerging along Pune’s highways encompass a number of 
highway villages, and a central evaluative criterion is to analyze if these land cooperatives strengthen 
or undermine existing local democratic institutions.  
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2.3.2 HIGHWAY URBANIZATION AND THE CHALLENGES TO STATE-
MARKET DICHOTOMIES 
Besides the 1991 decentralization policies, contemporary highway urbanization is unfolding 
within the context of a liberalized economy. From the 1980s onwards, India started moving out of a 
socialist model of development towards a more market-oriented economy. The sector of land 
experienced dramatic changes from the 1990s onwards. The liberalization of land markets included, 
amongst other policy changes, an opening up of the real estate and construction industries to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the repealing of redistributive land regulations – like the Urban Land 
Ceiling and Regulation Act that redistributed urban land beyond a certain threshold acreage from 
individual landowners towards public purposes – to enable more unhindered market transactions in 
land. Before the 1980s, urbanization was largely confined within the political boundaries of cities, 
but since the 1990s, the most rapid urbanization in India has been taking place in large villages and 
small towns located at the peripheries of large cities and along infrastructure corridors. Scholars 
from oppositional points of view have advanced explanations on the connection between the 
liberalization of land markets and the phenomenon of highway urbanization.   
The optimistic view argues that with the opening up of the economy, capital is no longer as 
scarce as it used to be during socialist times (Sathe, 2011). With the influx of domestic and foreign 
capital, the main constraint that countries like India are facing is the shortage of serviced urban land. 
This shortage of serviced urban land is not only hindering urbanization and industrialization; it is 
also leading to a proliferation of informal settlements (Smolka, 2003; Angel, 2008). This view argues 
that the short supply of formal, serviced land leads to exorbitant land prices within cities, making 
informal and unauthorized land the only affordable option open to the poor (Ibid). Policy 
interventions for opening up the supplies of serviced urban land will not only facilitate smoother 
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urbanization and industrialization, it will also address the root cause of urban informality (the 
shortage of serviced land in desirable locations). One of the ways in which land supply can be 
increased in a regulated manner is through ‘guided land development’ or ‘infrastructure-led 
development,’ i.e. the provision of infrastructure networks that can serve as the guiding spines along 
for new urban development. Pointing to historical precedents like the 1859 Cerda plan for Barcelona 
– a network of gridded roads to increase the urban land area by ten times – these advocates of 
liberalized land markets argue that guided land development has worked successfully in the past, and 
countries in the global south must take on more proactive approaches to deal with their urban 
transition (Angel, 2008). They also point to the urgency of acting now – once the urban transition is 
complete, it will be too late for these countries to intervene and rectify the haphazard urban growth 
(Ibid).  
An oppositional point of view, from a critical political economy perspective, relates the 
frenzied conversion of agricultural lands to urban/industrial lands to the broader processes of 
neoliberal capitalist accumulation (Sassen, 2001: 256; Harvey, 2006), using the idea of the “rent gap,” 
conceptualized by the Marxist geographer, Neil Smith. Smith defines the rent gap as “the gap 
between the actual capitalized ground rent (land value) of a plot of land given its present use and the 
potential ground rent that might be gleaned under a ‘higher and best use’” (1987). The 
redevelopment of inner-city informal settlements into high-end urban developments, the 
redevelopment of waterfronts into swanky destinations for urban consumers, the conversion of 
agricultural lands into industrial and commercial complexes – all of these seemingly unrelated 
processes are instantiations of the broader neoliberal phenomenon of opening up these “as yet 
untapped areas of the developing world to private foreign investment” (Ibid; White et al, 2012). In 
other words, the liberalization of land markets and the attendant phenomenon of highway 
urbanization are functions are neoliberal globalization.   
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As India makes its transition from a state-led to market-oriented economy, the land 
cooperatives represent a unique form of hybrid institution. Land cooperatives are market institutions 
that incorporate social values. They emerged to remedy the institutional flaws of the pure market, 
and have more of a social orientation through democratic worker control of the production process 
and profit-making under non-exploitative, more humane conditions (Whyte and Whyte, 1991). As 
countries around the world are shifting to private property rights regimes, why are collective 
institutions emerging within a country that is fast liberalizing? How effective are these land 
cooperatives in improving the bargaining position of marginalized groups, and in protecting their 
rights, vis-à-vis local and global corporate actors? 
 
 
2.3.3 INTERACTIONS OF A DEMOCRATIC INDIA WITH THE NEW 
ECONOMY 
 21st century India is making a transition from an agrarian to urban economy, similar to the 
18th and 19th century industrial revolution in the West. But, India’s transition is taking place under 
conditions of intensified territorial competitiveness within the context of a post-1970s form of 
globalization. In the sector of land, an added layer of complexity is that India’s public officials have 
little prior experience working with deregulated land markets, and they have to learn how to regulate 
private sector participation in their land markets, while simultaneously ensuring that the urban 
transition strengthens the global competitiveness of their regions/countries.  
 Other developing countries in South-east Asia, Africa and a few Latin American countries 
are also undergoing an urban transition. But the narrative of India’s agrarian to urban transition will 
be scripted by the encounters of a democratic India – with its own unique set of democratic 
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paradoxes and challenges - with a liberalizing and globalizing economy. The land conflicts along 
India’s highways offer us a window into these encounters. 
 
Unlike Western liberal democracies, India did not witness a classic bourgeois revolution 
(Vanaik, 1990; Varshney, 1998). The newly independent post-colonial state, under the leadership of 
Nehru, was committed to the ideals of modernity and state-led industrialization. India’s social 
transformation towards a modern nation-state, then, was not led from within civil society by an 
industrial bourgeoisie, but was a top-down, state-led strategy. The numerical and economic strength 
of the agrarian propertied classes meant that power had to be shared between the agrarian and 
industrial bourgeoisie. Since Independence, Indian democracy has been a fragile balance of class 
power amongst three distinct groups – the state-bureaucratic elites, the agrarian propertied class, and 
the industrial capitalists (Bardhan, 1984; Kaviraj, 1988; Vanaik, 1990). Different eras in India’s post-
Independence history have seen one or more of these groups gain more control than the others 
within the tripartite ruling coalition, but at no point has public policy antagonized any of these 
groups (Kaviraj, 1988). As Indian political commentators have noted, “if any of these classes is 
seriously dissatisfied and leaves the ruling bloc, that not only alters the structure of the coalition, but 
threatens it with political disaster” (Ibid: 2431). I argue that the conflicts along India’s highways are 
rooted in the re-negotiations amongst the three groups within the ruling coalition – the bureaucratic 
elites, the agrarian landed class, and the industrial capitalists – during an uncertain era of agrarian to 
urban transition. 
India’s urban transition and the liberalization of its land markets have been analyzed through 
a number of theoretical frameworks, many of them borrowed from the experiences of North 
Atlantic cities. The starting point for many analyses on the changes in urban property relations in 
India have been the growth machine and other theories of urban politics produced in the context of 
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U.S cities (Weinstein, 2008; Sami, 2012). A growing niche of Indian scholars has interrogated the 
hegemonic role of the burgeoning urban middle class – previously dependent on public sector 
employment, but now riding the wave of economic liberalization and relying on private professional 
jobs for economic prosperity – in imagining a more globally competitive and liberalized future for 
India (Fernandes, 2006; Harriss, 2006). These analyses, though deeply insightful, still sharply divide 
Indian politics into urban and rural. The urban-rural divide blinds us both to the intra-urban and 
intra-rural conflicts (for instance, the caste-based conflicts between dominant caste and tribal 
agrarian landowners) and to the urban-rural coalitions that are being formed between agrarian and 
industrial elites. My dissertation is particularly attentive to the new form of politics emerging along 
India’s urbanizing highways that defies the urban-rural dichotomies: of the role of the agrarian 
propertied class in shaping the direction of industrial/urban land policy, of the re-workings of older 
agrarian institutions into new urban forms to meet the contemporary challenges of the urban 
transition, and of the new urban-rural coalitions as India’s politically important agrarian landed elites 
seek new terms of inclusion in contemporary India’s urban growth story.  
The most visible expression of these urban-rural politics is the new institutions – like the 
land cooperatives – emerging along Pune’s highways. Pune’s land cooperatives, then, offer us not 
only an empirical case of an institutional solution to India’s seemingly intractable land conflicts but 
also offer us a point of entry into understanding the complex dynamics of the 21st century agrarian 
to urban transition of one of the world’s largest democracies. The main findings of my dissertation 
on Pune’s land cooperatives are summarized in the next section.  
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 2.3.4 COLLECTIVE INSTITUTIONS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
Collec t ive  inst i tut ions :   
In theory : Much of the current work on land cooperatives and collective institutions has 
focused on the normative justifications for cooperatives – on the importance of workers 
cooperatives in challenging the surplus-extracting impulses of capitalism (Whyte and Whyte, 1991), 
on the importance of cooperation as a strategy of resistance against the new “neoliberal” forms of 
capitalism (Sennett, 2012). The more operational inquiries on cooperatives have focused on why 
they work in some areas and not others (Ostrom 1990; Bardhan 1993), why they work for some 
commodities and not others (Attwood and Baviskar 1987), and the reasons for their operational 
success or failure (Whyte and Whyte, 1991). These operational studies rarely question the intent for 
the formation of cooperatives, but tacitly assume that they are being formed to challenge the more 
inhumane and exploitative forms of capitalism. 
In pract i ce : My work shifts the discourse of cooperatives away from ideological assumptions 
on their formation – cooperatives as “alternatives to capitalism” (Whyte and Whyte 1991) - to 
investigating the political-economic contexts within which they emerge, and the linkages between 
cooperatives and the local power structures within which they are embedded. My research concludes 
that far from being institutions of worker control, Western Maharashtra’s sugar cooperatives were 
captured by the dominant-caste Marathas and the Congress party. These agrarian class and caste 
hierarchies are reproduced in the Magarpatta model of shareholding companies in land. The Khed 
model of bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives were institutional mechanisms by savvy bureaucrats 
to overcome local protests by dominant caste agrarian landowners against the proposed SEZ 
development. More broadly, there is a strong instrumental rationality in the formation of Pune’s land 
cooperatives. The tripartite ruling coalition – the dominant-caste agrarian landowners, the industrial 
capitalists, and the bureaucratic-managerial elites - are negotiating with one another to find 
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arrangements that will maximize their own interests during an uncertain transition, while being 
careful not to antagonize and alienate the other two groups. One such negotiated solution is the 
collective institutions in land.  
In providing hope : The most hopeful outcome from the Pune highway land conflicts and 
cooperatives is the increased autonomy of the tribals from agrarian forms of caste-based control. As 
owners of marginal plots of dry land and as members of the land cooperative, the tribals will receive 
dividends from their landed assets. The restructuring of land markets and the formation of land 
cooperatives provide the material basis for the tribals to start asserting self-respect both for their 
labor and for themselves. These claims of redistribution and recognition by tribals will hopefully 
lead to changes in the formal planning process and give a stronger voice and improved status for the 
tribals in India’s urban growth story.  
 
Having set the broad canvas of the contemporary urbanization processes outside cities, the 
next chapter hones in on highway urbanization in India, through the case study of three highways in 
the Pune region.  
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Chapter 3 
 
THE PUNE HIGHWAYS 	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Converting agricultural lands along India’s highways into urban/industrial lands is not 
simple. Since the process involves urban and rural regulatory regimes, it is a complicated, and 
sometimes redundant, process. Urban and rural lands are planned and regulated by different state 
agencies. Urban lands in most Indian states are managed by parastatals. These are quasi-state 
institutions that have more financial discretion and lower levels of accountability compared to 
general purpose governments like municipalities. Agricultural lands are managed by district-level 
Revenue Departments. Revenue Departments were initially set up in the late 19th century during 
colonial rule to extract taxes from agricultural lands, which were a significant source of colonial 
revenue. Agricultural lands continued to be vested with the Revenue Departments after 
Independence. The District Collector (DC), the bureaucrat in charge of the Revenue Department, 
has long enjoyed power and prestige in district-scale decision-making.  
Besides the overlaps in jurisdictional boundaries, the process involves multiple pieces of 
urban and rural legislations. The laws regulating agricultural lands that are relevant in these 
conversion processes are the Land Reforms Act – which prohibits the purchase of agricultural land 
by companies and non-agriculturalists – and the Land Revenue Act – which regulates agricultural 
land revenues, and takes a conservative stance on the conversion of agricultural lands to non-
agricultural lands (if more lands are converted from agricultural to non-agricultural, it reduces the 
stock of agricultural lands for revenue collection). The laws regulating urban lands that come into 
play in the conversion process are the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act – which restricts the 
acreage of urban land that an individual can own – and the Town and Country Planning Act – which 
oversees the byelaws and levies (like betterment charges, water and road cesses) for urban residential 
and commercial developments.  
Arguing that these land conversion processes are outdated and unnecessarily byzantine, 
some states – including Maharashtra – have legislated Integrated Township Acts, which expedite the 
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land conversion process for all residential and mixed-use developments that are larger than 100 acres 
in size.  
 
The first section in this chapter outlines in more detail the regulatory steps and laws in the 
conversion of agricultural land to residential, commercial and industrial uses. The next section 
provides a rich description of an urban development project along each of the three Pune highways 
– the Lavasa Lake City project along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway, the Magarpatta Township along 
the Pune-Sholapur highway, and the Khed Special Economic Zone (SEZ) along the Pune-Nashik 
highway.  	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3.1 INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS IN LAND CONSOLIDATION 
In the following tables, the urban institutional actors and acts are marked in red font, and the rural 
actors and acts are in green font.  
 
Table 3.1: Land conversion for residential and commercial uses 
Regulatory step Institutional actor 
involved 
Act invoked 
Individual agrarian landowner forwards 
application for conversion to the 
Revenue Department. 
Revenue Department Land Reforms Act, 
Land Revenue Act 
If the conversion does not cause a 
public nuisance, the District Collector 
(DC) of the Revenue Department 
approves it.  
  
The landowner forwards the converted 
land to the following urban parastatals 
for No-Objection-Certificates (NOCs): 
the residential parastatal to check if the 
proposed development conforms to the 
master plan (if the region is covered by 
the master plan), the pollution control 
board, the water supply and sewerage 
board, and the transportation 
department.  
 
Residential parastatal (if 
the state has one) or the 
city planning agency, 
Pollution Control 
Board, water supply and 
sanitation parastatals (if 
the state has one) or the 
WSS agency within the 
urban local government, 
Transportation 
parastatal.  
Town and Country 
Planning Act, and 
relevant pollution and 
water control acts, and 
transportation acts.  
On receiving the NOCs, the landowner 
forwards the application to the Village 
Panchayat. If the proposed land-use and 
development does not endanger public 
health and safety, the Village Panchayat 
approves the building permit, thereby 
completing the conversion process.  
Village Panchayat Village Panchayat Act 
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 Table 3.2: Land acquisition and conversion for industrial uses (including SEZs) 
The private sector firm approaches the 
industrial parastatal with a proposed industrial 
location.  
Industrial parastatal Relevant industrial 
parastatal act. For 
Maharashtra, it is 
the Maharashtra 
Industrial 
Development Act.  
The industrial parastatal issues a preliminary 
notification for the area. The notification has to 
be publicized in the locality, in the official 
gazette, and in at least two local newspapers, 
one of which has to be in the regional language.  
Industrial parastatal  
The owners/occupiers of the land have 30 days 
to show cause notice as to why the parastatals 
cannot acquire their land.  
  
The industrial parastatal has the discretion to 
accept/reject the notice, and passes the final 
notification for the area. With the passing of 
the final notification, the land vests with the 
state free of encumbrances. Unclear land titles 
is an endemic problem in India, and the 
mediation of the state in acquiring agricultural 
land and conveying the land free of 
encumbrances relieves the private sector firm 
from any future legal troubles that may arise 
due to irregular tenure.  
Industrial parastatal  
The Revenue Department is the price-fixing 
authority. The DC mediates the negotiations 
between the industrial parastatal and the 
landowners for the fixing of the price of land 
compensation. The fixing of the price is not 
arbitrary, but depends on the guidance and 
market values of land in that region.  
Revenue 
Department 
Industrial 
parastatal act 
The converted land application is forwarded to 
the Village Panchayat. If the proposed land-use 
and development does not endanger public 
health and safety, the Village Panchayat approves 
the building permit.  
Village Panchayat Village Panchayat 
Act 
The industrial parastatal either services the 
converted and unencumbered land itself, and 
then sells the serviced industrial land to the 
private sector firm, or it hands over the 
unserviced land to the private sector firm that 
then develops the infrastructure itself.  
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Table 3.3: Land acquisition and conversion for integrated townships 
The developer approaches the 
residential parastatal with a proposed 
location for the township.  
Residential parastatal (if 
the state has one) or the 
city planning agency) 
Integrated Township 
Act 
The parastatal issues the preliminary 
and final notification for the area if the 
proposed development meets the 
following conditions: the minimum area 
of the development is 100 acres, and it 
conforms to the planning and building 
regulations of the integrated township 
policy, including the provision of water 
supply, waste management and roads 
within the township. 
Residential parastatal (if 
the state has one) or the 
city planning agency) 
Integrated Township 
Act 
The non-agricultural conversion is 
automatic, and the Revenue 
Department is not involved in the 
procedure. If any government land lies 
within the proposed township 
boundary, the government leases the 
land to the developer. The integrated 
township development is exempted 
from the condition that only 
agriculturalists are eligible to buy 
agricultural land, and from any ceiling 
limits on the purchase and holding of 
agricultural lands by individuals and 
developers. 
  
 
As evident from the tables above, converting agricultural land to industrial lands involves 
fewer steps and institutional actors compared to the conversion of agricultural lands to residential 
uses. The most streamlined procedure is the Integrated Township Act, which expedites the process 
through authorizing a single-window agency to convert the land (for more on the equity 
consequences of these acts, see the final section in Chapter 4 on “Cities of Sugar”).  
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3.2 HIGHWAY URBANIZATION: THE PUNE CASES 
As mentioned earlier, the Pune highways offer a natural experiment because, within the same region, 
different institutional outcomes emerged along the three major highways connecting Pune to its 
neighboring cities. The Pune-Mumbai Infrastructure Corridor is an example of a pure state model of 
land consolidation, the Pune-Sholapur highway of a pure market model of land consolidation, and 
the Pune-Nashik highway of a hybrid model of land consolidation.  
 
3.2.1 PUNE-MUMBAI EXPRESSWAY 
 India’s expressways or infrastructure corridors – the Pune-Mumbai Expressway, which is 
part of the Delhi-Mumbai Infrastructure Corridor, the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor, 
and the Yamuna Expressway – are different from highways. The expressways/infrastructure 
corridors are tolled highways constructed through public-private partnerships. They are part of the 
state-sponsored industrial clustering plan to make certain regions within the country more globally 
competitive and attractive to FDI through developing state-of-the-art infrastructural corridors. 
These corridors are generally master planned by parastatals, or by consulting firms hired by 
parastatals, to sort out the locations of the SEZs, industrial clusters, and integrated townships along 
these corridors.   
A number of integrated townships have been formed along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway, 
including the Sahara and Lavasa townships. Here, I focus on the Lavasa township as an instantiation 
of the kind of urban development that is becoming sine qua non along most of the infrastructure 
corridors in India.  
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 LAVASA LAKE CITY 
Around 40 kilometers from Pune, and 90 kilometers from Mumbai, along the Pune-Mumbai 
Expressway, is India’s largest integrated township, Lavasa Lake City.6 Spanning 25,000 acres - 
approximately 1/5th the land area of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai - the township 
stretches across seven hills within the ecologically sensitive Sahayadri mountain range. Lavasa Lake 
City heralds itself as the first planned hill city of Independent India. In a historical reference to the 
hill towns - Shimla, Mussoorie, Darjeeling - planned by the colonial state in the nineteenth century 
with the intention of escaping both the heat and the native Indian population of the lower-lying 
plains (Kenny, 1995; Kennedy, 1996), this 21st century integrated township promises respite from 
the congestion and poor infrastructure that plagues large Indian cities. Of the five proposed towns 
that make up the township, the first, Dasve, was completed in 2011, and the others are slated for 
completion by 2020.  
The Lavasa Corporation, a private company registered under the Companies Act 1969, is 
planning the township. The international design firm, HOK International Limited, is preparing the 
Lavasa master plan based on the priniciples of New Urbanism - a design philosophy that promotes 
compact, walkable and mixed-use cities. The US-based Biomimicry Institute is partnering with HOK 
to incorporate sustainable design principles into the daily functioning of the township through 
initiatives like energy-efficient design and eco-friendly waste management. As its name suggests, 
biomimicry is an emergent design approach that seeks environmentally sustainable solutions by 
emulating nature. An example is designing “a solar cell inspired by a leaf.”7  
In an ironic twist, the city being planned on the principles of biomimicry is now under 
litigation for egregious environmental practices. Social activists like Medha Patkar – who led the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 http://www.lavasa.com 
7 http://biomimicry.net/about/biomimicry38/institute/ 
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protests against the Narmada Dam in the 1990s - have been protesting against the Lavasa project 
since 2006 for its displacement of tribal populations and degradation of ecologically sensitive lands. 
The environmental resistances reached a head in 2012, when the lawyer and former Indian Police 
Service officer, Y.P.Singh, as the representative of six NGOs, sent a legal notice to the Central 
Government’s Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) against Lavasa. Singh charged the 
Maharashtra state government with granting environmental clearance to the Lavasa project when it 
did not have the statutory powers to do so. The 1994 Environmental Impact Assessment 
Notification vests these powers only with the central government through the environmental 
ministry. Lavasa Corporation defended itself by arguing that tourism projects are exempted from the 
1994 notification, and the township project received a ‘mega tourism project’ status from the state 
government, thereby exempting it from the MoEF environmental clearance.  
Another on-going litigation against the Lavasa project since 2008 is the petition to the Pune 
High Court by two tribal agrarian landowners against Lavasa’s acquisition of their lands. In 2008, the 
Maharashtra state government appointed the Lavasa Corporation as the Special Planning Authority 
for the township project. In other words, the state government delegated the planning functions 
vested in local and state legislative bodies to a private company. The granting of Special Planning 
Authority status authorized Lavasa Corporation to acquire land for the township. The petitioners 
charged the Special Planning Authority with approving a master plan that did not conform to the 
Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act and Development Control Regulations. 
Sharad Pawar, one of Maharashtra’s most influential politicians and a Union Minister in the 
Cabinet, is seriously implicated in the Lavasa litigations. Pawar’s daughter, Supriya Sule - also a 
Member of Parliament - and her husband had large, personal stakes in the Lavasa Corporation as 
shareholders. Sharad Pawar’s nephew, Ajit Pawar, was the minister in charge during the state 
government’s approval of the Lavasa project.  
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The environmental and planning irregularities scarring the Lavasa project prompted the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India to investigate the development. The CAG is 
India’s Supreme Audit Institution that ensures accountability, transparency and efficiency of public 
administration. This organization audits the receipts and expenditures of the Government of India, 
state governments and government-owned companies. The CAG report on Lavasa was completed 
in April 2012, and it unequivocally indicted the project for its violation of procedural due process 
and improper delegation of power. The CAG charges against the Lavasa development included the 
state government’s lack of publicity of the project, the opaque tendering process with only Lavasa 
Corporation in the bidding for the project, the granting of Special Planning Authority to a private 
firm without precedent, and the diversion of lands originally marked for afforestation for the 
development of the private township.  
The case is sub judice, but the growing media and public flak against it may lead to the 
rescission of Lavasa Corporation’s status as Special Planning Authority. One town, however, has 
been completed, the second is close to completion, and as the case proceeds in court, the Lavasa 
Corporation is continuing its construction and marketing activities with the remaining three towns. 
 
 3.2.2 PUNE-SHOLAPUR HIGHWAY 
The most rapidly urbanizing growth triangle in Maharashtra is the Mumbai-Pune-Nashik 
region. Pune and Nashik are logical regions for urban expansion, given their proximity to the state’s 
economically primate city, Mumbai. The Pune-Sholapur highway is not urbanizing as rapidly as the 
Pune-Mumbai and Pune-Nashik highways. Integrated townships are coming up along the Pune-
Sholapur highway, but most of them are concentrated within a 30-kilometer radius from Pune city. 
These townships are advertising themselves as proximate to Pune, but far from the crime and 
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congestion that plagues Pune. Further from Pune along the Pune-Sholapur highway, where the 
demand for urban land is not as intense as in the regions around Pune, agrarian landowners are 
diversifying from agriculture into another sector that has become a bright economic prospect with 
urbanization  – wine. These landowners are shifting from agricultural production to wine grape 
cultivation, and I’ll return to this point in more detail in the next chapter on “Cities of Sugar.” 
The integrated townships that are emerging along the Pune-Sholapur highway, closer to 
Pune, are different from those along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway. State- level politicians and 
bureaucrats play a big role in determining the location of integrated townships along infrastructure 
corridors through influencing the master plan to incorporate projects that are strategically beneficial 
to them. On the other hand, the integrated townships along the Pune-Sholapur highway are more 
market-driven, with agrarian landowners seeing a real estate opportunity in converting their 
agricultural lands into townships. But, the Pune-Sholapur highways are not completely insulated 
from politics. The first of these highway developments was the Magarpatta township, formed in 
2001. The Magarpatta sugarcane landowners voluntarily pooled their fragmented agricultural lands 
and formed a shareholding company to manage the township. Only the agrarian landowners are 
equity members of the shareholding company, and they own shares in proportion to the land given 
up for the township. The protagonist in the Magarpatta case, the agrarian landowner, Satish Magar, 
has close political and personal connections with Sharad Pawar, which made it possible for him to 
navigate India’s byzantine land conversion process and form the township. But, Satish Magar was 
more pragmatic in conceiving and implementing the idea of a collective institution of land 
ownership that included agrarian landowners as partners in the development, as opposed to 
adopting coercive land acquisition strategies that displaced landowners and made them opponents to 
the project (the concluding section of this chapter discusses why the Magarpatta landowners took 
the more pragmatic solution of forming collective institutions of land ownership).  
	   61 
Following the commercial success of the Magarpatta township, agrarian landowners from 
the Pune region have started approaching the Magarpatta company to consult them on replicating 
the Magarpatta model in other areas. The Magarpatta company is now developing the Nanded 
township, 700 acres in size, located around fifteen kilometres from Magarpatta. The company owns 
51% of the shares in Nanded, with the remaining 49% shares owned by the local Nanded 
landowners who gave up their lands for the township. The 2006 Maharashtra Integrated Township 
Policy facilitates the setting up of new townships. Satish Magar is one of the key drafters of this 
township policy. Learning from the difficulties he faced in navigating land regulations, the township 
policy now has more streamlined regulations for converting agricultural lands to township lands 
(outlined in the previous section). The Magarpatta company has three more similar projects in the 
pipeline. I describe the Magarpatta township because it set the precedent for the Pune-Sholapur 
highway, and because, as of June 2012, it is the only completed township with this collective model 
of land ownership.  
 
MAGARPATTA TOWNSHIP  
Recitals of a legendary past: What started as a project to help farmers gain the full benefit of 
their land use has today spun into a dream for thousands who set out in search of a better life. 
Urban cities of Maharashtra faced the problem of unauthorized constructions and haphazard 
development. Pune city was also a patch of unplanned layouts that was destined to be a marionette 
in the hands of wealthy industrialists. Until 120 farmers of Magarpatta came together with a dream 
to create a new way of life. They pooled in their ancestral lands held by them for over 300 years and 
proposed the idea of ‘Magarpatta City’ – an innovative township, to the Pune Municipal 
Corporation and the Government of Maharashtra. 
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This is how Magarpatta is marketed in its brochure “The Story of Magarpatta – The pride of 
Pune City,” with the aspirational subtitle “Life as it should be...” The completed and functional 400-
acre Magarpatta City is a higher-income enclave of apartments, row houses, bungalows, food courts, 
information-technology (IT) complexes, school and 120 acres of gardens and lawns. A block from 
this dense urban environment of apartments and IT complexes, vestiges of the 1990s landscape 
remain in the few sugarcane fields surrounding Magarpatta City. These sugarcane growers, like the 
Magarpatta ones, have ambitions to be developers, but they are holding on to their plots, waiting for 
land prices to soar higher before starting their residential and commercial developments.  
 
	  
Figure 3.1: Sugarcane fields around Magarpatta Township waiting to be developed 
 
Before the 1990s, the Magarpatta City area was the site of fertile sugarcane fields. The largest 
landowning family in Hadapsar was the joint family of the Magars, a politically influential network 
whose most prominent member, Annasaheb Magar, had been a Member of Parliament for the 
Congress Party in the 1970s.  During his political tenure, Annasaheb Magar channeled many 
development projects to his home constituency of Hadapsar, including the setting up of a 
cooperative sugar factory to benefit the local sugarcane growers. The 1980s saw a wave of 
urbanization-related changes sweep over the Hadapsar area. In 1982, the Pune Municipal 
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Corporation’s Development Plan marked Hadapsar as a future urban zone, which meant that the 
Magars’ lands could be acquired in the future by the government under the Urban Land Ceiling and 
Regulation Act. This land ceiling act was legislated to redistribute urban lands – land beyond a 
certain threshold would be acquired by the government and used for public purposes, like housing 
for the urban poor. The Hadapsar area was also facing acute agricultural labor shortages, with the 
Dalit laborers who lived and worked on the sugarcane fields now finding alternative employment in 
Pune’s informal economy. With the impending threat of land acquisition, rising land values and 
agricultural labor shortage, the Magars saw an opportunity in land development. Consolidating 
agricultural lands owned by multiple landowners into a township is an ambitious endeavor, entailing 
huge efforts in convincing landowners, mobilizing capital, and navigating labyrinthine land 
regulations. Satish Magar had the economic, social and political savvy to get this done: 
Convinc ing landowners : Annasaheb Magar’s family owned nearly 40% of the agricultural 
lands in the area. The other landowners – many of them also with the surname Magar, but not 
related to Annasaheb – had smaller landholdings of less than ten acres in size. Market pressures on 
land were resulting in small landowners selling their agricultural lands to developers. Annasaheb’s 
nephew, Satish Magar, took the lead in convincing the other sugarcane landowners not to sell their 
lands to developers, and instead, to pool their fragmented landholdings, develop a township on the 
consolidated land, and enjoy the long-term benefits from their land assets as shareholders of the 
township company. The Magars’ long political history in the area and their strong political 
connections were key factors in bringing the other landowners together in a collective land 
development experiment. A 70-year old landowner-turned-shareholder, who gave up four acres of 
his land for the Magarpatta township, spoke of the landowners’ trust in the Magar family: 
I have been farming here since 1965. Hadapsar, Mundhwa, all of these areas were rich sugar-
growing areas. The best fields were here... In 1993, our Magar family had a meeting, and all 
	   64 
of us were convinced of the [Magarpatta] project. We gave a signature, we did not ask 
anything, we just gave our signature, we trusted Satish Magar. Annasaheb Magar became an 
MP [Member of Parliament] from here. He made a market here; it is the biggest market in 
Pune. He started a sugar factory here for the farmers - 20 kilometers from here. All our 
sugarcane from here went to this factory. Like Annasaheb Magar helped us, Satish Magar is 
also helping the farmers with the township.8   
The Magarpatta landowners agreed to join the collective experiment because they continue 
to own the private property rights to their land. Through the ownership of shares in the company, 
each family owns shares, with one share equivalent to one square meter of land. The shares cannot 
be sold outside the family.  These institutional arrangements around Pune – the earlier versions of 
the sugar cooperatives, the contemporary versions of the shareholding companies – are markedly 
different from the communal forms of property ownership practiced in the former communist 
economies and the community land trust arrangements in the United States. India has never had a 
strong tradition of collective property ownership, at least within the more formal discourses and 
policies of the modern nation-state. Soon after Independence, the Nehru-led government strongly 
advocated for commodity cooperatives like the sugar cooperatives because these cooperatives 
upheld the principles of private property ownership while giving small landowners the institutional 
support to compete in a market economy (I trace these post-Independence origins of cooperatives 
in more detail in the next chapter). For now, suffice to say that the history of trust cultivated 
through decades in Satish Magar’s family, and the guarantee that the title deeds to their land will 
remain in their names, convinced the landowners to transition from sugarcane farming to becoming 
shareholders of a township company.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Interview with author, 12 May, 2011. 
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Financing the township : Since no land acquisition was involved in the process, the project 
entailed no land costs. Satish Magar turned to the Housing Development and Finance Corporation 
(HDFC), one of the India’s largest housing finance companies, for loans to meet the development 
costs of the township. Satish Magar’s personal relationships with Deepak Parikh, the Chairman of 
HDFC, enabled him to get some much-needed financial advice on servicing the HDFC debt. Many 
of the earthmoving, landscaping, road-building and construction contracts for developing the 
township went to Magarpatta landowners who had recently started these companies. On the 
completion of the township, the cost of serviced, township land increased from INR 100 in 1998 to 
INR 1000 in 2008.  Thirty percent of the total development cost was earmarked as the cost of land 
at the current price, and paid to the shareholders.  
Navigat ing land regulat ions : The Magars’ close political connections with top-level state 
government politicians of the Nationalist Congress Party, including the Chief Minister at the time, 
helped them navigate the land regulatory process. The state government granted the Magarpatta 
township two exemptions: an exemption from the Maharashtra Land Revenue Act condition that 
only agriculturalists can apply for a conversion of their agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, 
and an exemption from the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act. Sharad Pawar was the Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra at the time the Magars began the land conversion process in the early 
1990s. More recently, Satish Magar’s political connections with Sharad Pawar became cemented in a 
personal relationship. As one of the Magar landowners drove me around the township, the backseat 
of his car was piled high with wedding invitations that had to be distributed for the May 2011 
wedding of Satish Magar’s daughter with Sharad Pawar’s nephew.  
 
The developers of Magarpatta, and of all townships approved under the new integrated 
township policy, are responsible for providing services – water supply, drainage, garbage disposal, 
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roads, and power (either through captive power generation, or from the existing grid). The private 
company, the Magarpatta City Property Management Services (PMS), manages Magarpatta’s 
services, providing electricity, roads, plumbing, and internet services within the township. Satish 
Magar’s brother owns this company. Magarpatt residents pay property taxes to the Pune Municipal 
Corporation (i.e. the municipal government), but they also pay maintenance charges to PMS for the 
services within the township. One of the sugarcane landowners-turned-shareholder proudly claimed 
that the stellar services provided by PMS is one the factors that makes Magarpatta a “world-class 
city”: 
If we have any problem – drainage, lights, roads, we call our services company, PMS. 
Someone will be here within five minutes. You will not find this anywhere in the world. 
Anywhere else, they give you a house, and then they will tell you to go to the corporation 
after that. We pay property taxes to Pune Municipal Corporation, though most of our 
services are maintained by PMS. We paid a one-time 3.5 lakhs [INR 3,500,000] for 
maintenance, and all the services are maintained from that interest. No corporation person 
comes here. Everything is done by PMS. This is the number one city in India, a world-class 
city.9 
 
Besides being shareholders, the younger generation landowners who started construction, 
landscaping and other businesses to service Magarpatta are now expanding their work to the 
upcoming Nanded and other townships. The smallest shareholder in Magarpatta, who gave up 0.12 
acres of land, now owns two apartments in the township, worth USD 35,000, and receives dividends 
from his township shares, rental incomes from the leased office buildings (all the office buildings in 
Magarpatta are owned by the company and rented out to firms), and income from his construction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interview with author, 13 May, 2011. 
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business that is now active in Nanded. The older generation landowners have bought agricultural 
lands in surrounding districts that are now rural, but have the potential to urbanize in the near 
future.  
Stories of Magarpatta’s success have diffused to other regions around Pune. When the 
bureaucrats of the Khed region, along the Pune-Nashik highway, faced resistance against the land 
consolidation of agricultural land for a new industrial development, they adapted the Magarpatta 
solution to reconcile their land conflict.  
 
 3.2.3 PUNE-NASHIK HIGHWAY 
 The Pune-Nashik highway differs from the other two highways in its character of the 
dominance of industrial, as opposed to residential/township, development. This highway is part of a 
successful agglomeration economy of automobile manufacturing firms, with automobile giants - like 
Volkswagon, Daimler-Benz, Mahindra and Mahindra, and Bajaj Auto - located along it. The 
automobile industrial cluster has been developing along this highway since the late 1980s, but the 
past decade saw two important changes. The first is that, despite the fact that firms will move to the 
Pune region anyway because of its thriving industrial clusters, many firms started demanding SEZ 
status for their proposed industrial developments along the Pune-Nashik highway. The first of these 
was the proposal for a multi-product SEZ in the Khed region, located around 40 kilometers from 
Pune along the Pune-Nashik highway, by one of India’s most successful domestic firms for auto 
components manufacturing, Bharat Forge. This was followed by other proposals, including the 
Sinnar SEZ 30 kilometers from Nashik along the Pune-Nashik highway. The second change is the 
reaction from agrarian landowners to these proposed SEZ developments. The heightened protests 
by agrarian landowners, activists and oppositional political parties have led to interminable delays, 
and even termination, of many of these developments.  
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The Khed SEZ stands out as a unique case of successful resolution of these land conflicts. 
The local Pune bureaucrats negotiated with the protesting landowners and formed a bureaucrat-
mediated land cooperative, where a certain percentage of the developed land is owned by a land 
cooperative – owned and controlled by the agrarian landowners who have given up their land for 
the industrial development – and the land cooperative leases its collectively owned land to industry. 
Soon after the formation of the Khed cooperative, the neighboring villagers of Avsari Khurd pooled 
in 3500 acres of unirrigated lands and approached the industrial parastatal to lease their consolidated 
lands for industrial development. The villagers of the neighboring villages of Chakan have agreed to 
part with their lands for the proposed Pune International Airport if they get a deal similar to the 
Khed agrarian landowners. The bureaucrats who mediated the Khed case are involved in creating a 
similar institutional arrangement for the Sinnar SEZ, located around 30 kilometers from Nashik 
along the Pune-Nashik highway. Here, I focus on the sequence of events that led to the formation 
of the Khed land cooperative.  
 
KHED SEZ 
In 2006, Bharat Forge, an Indian company that manufactures automobile components, 
identified 16,800 acres of land in 17 villages in Khed taluk for setting up a multi-product SEZ. The 
Khed agrarian landowners opposed the proposed development, and eminent activists and politicians 
of oppositional political parties congregated in Khed to join the landowners’ agitation. The industrial 
parastatal—the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) —approached the 
District Collector of Pune district to mediate the land consolidation process. The District Collector 
had worked in MIDC for five years before his transfer to the Revenue Department, and he had a 
close working relationship with MIDC bureaucrats. He delegated the power to acquire lands for 
Bharat Forge to his Revenue Department bureaucrat at the sub-district level, Shyam Patil.  
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Through repeated interactions with these villages, Patil was familiar with their local leaders. 
Most of the villages along the Pune–Nashik corridor and more broadly, in western Maharashtra, 
where this highway is located, are characterized by peasant agriculture. However, the villages have a 
few influential families that own larger tracts of land and are politically powerful. Negotiations 
between the local leaders and Patil resulted in an agreement whereby 15 percent of the acquired 
lands would be developed and returned to the landowners to form a land cooperative. Like the 
Hadapsar area in the Magarpatta case, the Khed villages are also facing an acute agricultural labor 
shortage because many of the agricultural laborers – mainly tribals – are finding alternative informal 
work in the factories coming up along the Pune-Nashik highway. Thus, the Kelkars and the other 
local leaders are eager to move from an agricultural to an industrial economy. However, they initially 
resisted the Khed development because they felt shortchanged by the cash compensation offered 
for their land. Patil was keen enough to recognize their urban aspirations and negotiate a more 
attractive deal of the land cooperatives with them. Also, the negotiating landowners opposed the 
earlier version of the SEZ plan that required the conversion of agriculturally fertile lands in the 
plains for the new development. Patil convinced Bharat Forge and MIDC to shift the SEZ to the 
agriculturally unproductive, dry lands on the hills, and leave the fertile lands on the plains 
untouched.  
Phase 1 of Khed City is located within four Village Panchayats – Kanersar, Nimgaon, 
Dhawadi and Shirur.  
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Table 3.4: Acreage of dry land acquired for SEZ 
 Fertile lands (in 
acres) 
Dry lands (in acres) Dry lands acquired 
for SEZ (in acres) 
Kanersar 358 2236 941 
Nimgaon 1112 662 946 
Dhawadi 1517 3489 608 
Shirur   965 
 
Mohanseth Kelkar, the the Police Patil of Kanersar, i.e., the Village Panchayat-elected representative in 
charge of law and order, and  Ramarao Kelkar, the Village Panchayat Sarpanch [head] at the time of the 
negotiations, explained the Khed land consolidation process:  
Earlier, even we had protested against the industry. Sarpanches of the 17 villages got together, formed 
an organization and in that protest, we went to the District collector’s office. We went there asking 
them to close it [the industry]. With Patil saab [Shyam Patil], we discussed what will happen if the 
industry comes here. Because of this discussion, four villages immediately agreed to the industry. 
Kanersar was the first village to agree…. Patil saab told us, ‘you prepare your people, we will arrange 
whatever you need.’ We went around all the farmlands in the village, what to keep and what to 
remove, we underlined that. We had a gram sabha [village assembly] and convinced the people. 
An MIDC bureaucrat pointed to the crucial role played by the local village leaders as conduits 
between the state and the agrarian landowners: “These are the leaders of the village, only they can 
convince the villagers, outsiders cannot.”10 The negotiations between the ‘local leaders,’ MIDC and 
the Revenue Department led to the formation of Khed Economic Infrastructure Private Limited 
(KEIPL). KEIPL is a joint venture company between the private-sector firm, Bharat Forge, the 
industrial parastatal, MIDC, and the agrarian landowners’ cooperative, Khed Developers Limited. 
The residents of the four villages will elect one represetative each at the Gram Sabhas - the village 
deliberative assemblies - and these representatives will participate in KEIPL decision-making. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Interview with author, 23 May 2011. 
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chief executive officer (CEO) of the KEIPL is a bureaucrat from the Maharashtra Industries 
Secretariat, with experience in industrial development. Bharat Forge and MIDC own 85 percent of 
the developed industrial land, and the land cooperative owns the remaining 15 percent. Bharat Forge 
has committed an undisclosed amount towards the new development, and the details on the 
identification, pricing and allocation of risks of this joint venture company are unknown.  This 
leaves many questions unanswered, including why the land cooperative owns only 15 percent of the 
shares of the new company, and if this is an accurate reflection of the allocation of risks among the 
different institutional actors involved.  
The Khed City development consists of a multi-product SEZ (including automotive, auto 
components, engineering, information technology, biotechnology, food and agro processing, 
electrical, electronics, plastics and pharmaceutical firms), a textile park, a domestic industrial park, 
and support amenities including housing, commercial and recreational uses. It is master planned by 
the international design firm, HOK International. Like Lavasa, the US-based firm, Biomimicry 
Institute, is providing ‘biomimicry’ design solutions for ensuring environmental sustainability. Other 
international consultants involved in the project include the US-based VHB for infrastructural 
development and CBRE (Richard Ellis) for feasibility studies.  
The four villages that agreed to be a part of the SEZ have given up 3,460 acres of land for 
Phase 1. These lands are partly owned by the dominant caste Maratha-Kunbi landowners, and partly 
by tribals called the Thakars. The initial protests in 2006 were initiated by the dominant caste, larger 
landowners who live in the plains. The Thakkars live in spatially segregated settlements on the hills, 
and each Thakkar household owns less than two acres of dry land. Unlike the tribals living in forest 
lands, the Khed Thakkars have legal titles to their lands. They depend on their dry lands for 
subsistence farming. Most of them have been working on the fields of the dominant caste 
landowners for generations.  
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The risks and benefits from the Khed SEZ varies for these different social groups. Most of 
the dominant caste agrarian landowners in these villages own multiple plots of land, sometimes in 
joint ownership with others, at several geographically dispersed sites.11 These landowners gave up 
their dry lands on the hills for the SEZ, but continue farming on their remaining cultivable lands on 
the plains. The cooperative offered these landowners the possibility of making profits from dry 
lands that were otherwise left unused. Besides the benefits as shareholders, the local leaders of the 
four consenting villages were promised construction and other jobs as additional incentives to 
convince their villagers to join the project. Mohanseth Kelkar, together with five other cousins, 
started a construction company in 2009 after MIDC and Bharat Forge promised them some 
construction contracts. Though they lack prior experience in construction, their newly formed 
company has the contract for the construction of homes for the displaced tribals. The Bharat Forge 
employee supervising the construction said that the Kelkars’ construction company is slow in its 
work, and quality is not up-to-the-mark, but these “concessions have to be made as confidence-
building measures.”12  
The landowners in these Khed villages are anxious about the status of the project. MIDC 
and the Revenue Department bureaucrats have not visited these villages in the past year. MIDC is 
still in the process of surveying the land, and the lack of any visible construction on the site is adding 
to the landowners’ anxieties. The only construction work that has started on the site is that of homes 
for the tribals displaced from the hills by the SEZ project. Interviews with the Khed landowners 
revealed strong feelings of uncertainty over the project. Many dominant caste landowners who had 
given up land for the SEZ asked me if I had visited MIDC. When I answered in the affirmative, they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Source: File with the details of landholdings for the SEZ project, compiled by the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). This file contains the names of the landowners, their 
land survey/title number and land acreage.  
12 Interview with author, 8 May 2011. 
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had many anxious questions on the project: “Our negotiations were completed in 2008, but we don’t 
see the buildings coming up.”13 “I gave up 15 acres of land four years back. For the three acres for 
which I am a shareholder [15% of the land], I should have received Rs. 120,000 in interest. But, for 
four years, I haven’t received anything.”14 Though these dominant caste landowners expressed 
anxiety over the status of the SEZ project, they still continue productive agricultural activities on 
their fertile lands in the plains. Aside from the anxieties on the status of the new industrial 
development, the Kanersar landowners are satisfied with the joint venture arrangement.  
The dominant-caste landowners of the neighboring village of Nimgaon, on the other hand, 
want more control over the 15 percent land that is part of the land cooperative. In January 2011, 
during a meeting between Nimgaon landowners and an MIDC bureaucrat over the status of the 
project, the Nimgaon dominant-caste landowners angrily demanded that the joint venture company 
return their land (the landowners erroneously stated that the KEIPL company had ownership and 
control over 5500 acres of land, of which 500 acres belonged to the land cooperative: 
You formed a different company for 500 acres – what was the need? The company [Bharat 
Forge] has 5000 acres, and now they have their eyes on our 500 acres. Give us back our 15 
percent lands. If you want to build a 600 crore [INR 6,000,000,000] company do it on your 
land. We know our land will not remain unused, we will build a shopping complex, 
apartment; people will come and rent our land. 
The MIDC bureaucrat assured them that, through the land cooperative, they would have 
control over how the 15 percent land is developed. The meeting ended with Nimgaon landowners 
unconvinced by the bureaucrats’ assurances. No more meetings have been held since, further 
exacerbating landowners’ anxieties.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Interview with author, 6 June 2011. 
14 Ibid 
	   74 
The dominant caste landowners can fall back on their fertile lands as a safety net during this 
uncertain transition from an agrarian to industrial economy. On the other hand, the sudden market 
demand for the Thakkars’ dry lands encouraged them to give up all of their dry lands for the new 
industrial development, and indulge in conspicuous consumption with the compensation money for 
85 percent of their land. The Thakkar settlements on the hills are fairly secluded and physically 
removed from the main village. The Kanersar Thakkar settlement does not have running water, and 
the Thakkar women have to trek 45 minutes down the hill every morning to fetch water from the 
public tap. In a settlement that lacks basic amenities of water and electricity, the surprise finding was 
a jeep parked outside the Thakars’ homes. Most of the Thakars refuse to work on the lands of their 
erstwhile agricultural employers, and are enjoying their economic freedom from the dominant caste, 
at least till their compensation money runs out.  This has led to acute agricultural labor shortage in 
the Khed region, and a common refrain amongst dominant caste landowners around the Khed 
region is “mazdoor milta nahin” [workers are not found]: 
[Before the SEZ proposal] people here had less money, now they have more money and 
employment opportunities. They have bought cars to roam around, lots of changes, lifestyle 
changes. Earlier, if we asked the laborer to come for work, he would come. Now, we do not 
find any laborers. Mazdoor milta nahin.15  
These Thakkar settlements are within the new SEZ boundary. Dominant-caste landowners 
own dry lands within the SEZ boundary, but they live in the main village settlement outside the 
boundary. Of all the landowners who gave up their lands for the new developments, it is only the 
Thakkars who have had to be relocated to new settlements. In May 2012, Bharat Forge completed 
its construction of the new Thakkar resettlement colony, located around 15 minutes from the main 
village settlement of Kanersar where the non-tribal population lives. Eighty five Thakkar households 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Interview with author, 4 January 2011. 
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were relocated to this new settlement, which is spatially segregated from the rest of the village, but is 
much closer to it compared to the locations of the previous Thakkar settlements on the hills.  
 
3.3 EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF LAND COOPERATIVES ALONG 
THE PUNE-MUMBAI HIGHWAY 
Agrarian landowners and bureaucrats along two of these highways – the Pune-Sholapur and 
Pune-Nashik highways – experimented with innovative forms of land cooperatives to distribute the 
benefits of highway urbanization more equitably among the small and marginal landowners. Two 
variables account for the more top-down processes and exclusionary outcomes along the Pune-
Mumbai Expressway – the politicized decision-making along an infrastructure corridor and the 
missing resistance from dominant-caste agrarian landowners.  
Poli t i c ized dec i s ion-making along an infrastructure corr idor :16 Some of India’s most 
contentious land consolidation processes are along infrastructure corridors – besides the Pune-
Mumbai Expressway, the Yamuna Expressway and the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor. 
Infrastructure corridors are generally master-planned. The master-planning process gives top state-
level politicians privileged access to information on the routing of these infrastructure corridors, and 
on the locations of specific urban developments along them. These politicians often purchase the 
land along these corridors, before the master plan is made public and through benaami [fictitious] 
companies, so that they can benefit from the windfall gains of the post-corridor land value 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Sanjoy Chakravorty’s 2012 book, The Price of Land, argues that the difference between land 
acquisition projects that have escalated into conflicts, and those that have taken place relatively 
smoothly and in the absence of the media glare, is the presence or absence of politics: when major 
political parties enter the land acquisition process for their own opportunistic political gains, they 
distort the land market. Chakravorty’s recommendation for the new Land Acquisition Act is for the 
creation of instruments to “defang both the state and the political parties.” Though I agree with 
Chakravorty’s analysis on the negative impacts of the politicization of land conflicts, I find it difficult 
to separate the politics of land from the economics of land, and am skeptical to suggest that a de-
politicization of the land markets can lead to more equitable and conflict-free processes.  
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increment. At other times, politicians influence the master-planning process to accommodate 
projects that are personally beneficial to them. Along the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor, 
politicians from oppositional political parties – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Janata Dal 
Secular (JD-S) – are machinating against one another to gain monopolistic control over the new 
corridor developments. Designating a highway as an infrastructure corridor makes it the target of 
opportunistic rent-seeking, with politicians abusing their privileged access to information to make 
locational decisions of personal advantage. Besides corruption, the industrial location literature also 
has countless examples of the poor expertise of the government in directing industries to locate in 
particular places. The Pune-Nashik highway reflects a more pragmatic approach where the state 
intervenes only to the extent of building a network of highways and then leaves it to the market to 
sort out the locational decisions of private-sector firms. This is an important insight for policy-
makers, as India launches one of its most ambitious infrastructure corridor developments, the 1483-
kilometer Delhi-Mumbai Infrastructure Corridor that cuts across six Indian states and union 
territories.  
Ironically, when political interests focus on those highways that are classified as corridors, 
the other highways are freed from negative politicizations. The focus of political attention on the 
Pune-Mumbai Expressway developments seems to have distracted top state-level politicians like 
Sharad Pawar from the Pune-Nashik highway, which continues to develop as a more market-driven 
agglomeration of industrial firms.  
Missing res i s tance f rom dominant-caste  agrarian landowners : The Sahyadri mountain 
range along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway is home to large numbers of tribals. India’s 70 million 
strong tribal population – composed of more than five hundred endogamous communities (Guha, 
2010) – is concentrated in the ecologically fragile upland and forest regions. Dominant-caste 
landowners occupy the low-lying plains – like the regions along the Pune-Sholapur and Pune-Nashik 
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highways – and they are few and far between in the forest regions along the Pune-Mumbai 
Expressway. The resistance against the urban developments along the Pune-Sholapur and Pune-
Nashik highways was spearheaded by the dominant-caste landowners, a politically powerful 
constituency that has been the backbone of Indian democracy since Independence (Vanaik, 1990; 
Varshney, 1998). The numerical strength and political organization of dominant-caste interests 
makes them a key pillar in maintaining the stability of Indian democracy, and, as the next chapter 
shows, successive eras of agrarian land reforms and policies have carefully accommodated the 
interests of this group. A dominant-caste landowner and his political constituency were the key 
protagonists in the formation of the voluntarily formed shareholding companies along the Pune-
Sholapur highway. Politically savvy bureaucrats along the Pune-Nashik highway recognized the high 
probability of having the highway urban developments derailed unless they made these 
developments attractive to the dominant-castes. The bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives are 
instrumentally rational arrangements to appease the protesting dominant-caste landowners, and 
make them partners, not detractors, in the new highway developments.  
The Pune-Mumbai Expressway lacks the critical mass of dominant-caste groups needed to 
successfully change the terms of the highway developments. Besides, the tribals, as a historically 
disadvantaged group, lack the political power of the dominant-castes in shaping land policy. 
Amongst India’s historically disadvantaged groups – the tribals, Dalits and Muslims – the tribals are 
the most politically fragmented, and consequently, most impoverished. The Dalits, for instance, have 
mobilized themselves into a pan-Indian political force. They are a formidable voice in India’s 
democracy, with Dalit-centered political parties - like the Bahujan Samajwadi party - playing an 
increasingly important role in Indian electoral politics. Dalits have held top political positions in the 
country, including as Union Cabinet Ministers and as judges of the Supreme Court. Tribals do not 
have a unified political party, neither have they ascended to the top echelons of politics.  
	   78 
Scholars have pointed to the geographic, structural and historical reasons for the deeper 
disenfranchisement of tribals compared to the Dalits. Geographically, the tribal population is 
spatially concentrated and isolated in the upland, forest belts (Guha, 2010). Dalits, on the other 
hand, live in “mixed villages” alongside the dominant and other castes (Ibid). The geographic 
dispersion and integration of Dalits amongst other caste groups makes them a more pervasive force 
in impacting electoral outcomes. For instance, in India’s general elections, the tribal vote may only 
account for 50 – 60 constituencies, whereas the Dalit vote accounts for more than 300 (Ibid). 
Structurally, the Dalits are unified as a caste-bloc by their shared experiences of caste-based 
oppression and untouchability. On the other hand, the lack of a shared history of oppression – some 
tribal groups were oppressed by forest officials, others by the developmental state through its dam-
building projects, and yet others by private sector mining companies – stood in the way of forging a 
pan-Indian tribal identity that could supercede their intra-community differences (Ibid; Sitapati, 
2010).  Historically, the Indian National Congress, since its formation at the end of the 19th century 
and particularly post-Independence, has tried to correct its image as an upper-caste Hindu party 
through aggressively reaching out to Dalits and Muslims. But, the tribals have remained a neglected 
marginalized group. Their political isolation has been exacerbated by their relative invisibility within 
the mainstream media, which is quick to take up Dalit and Muslim oppressions, but rarely discusses 
tribal issues (Guha, 2010).  
The experiences of the Thakkar groups along the Pune-Nashik highway are markedly 
different from those along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway. Interspersed among other caste groups 
within the low-lying Pune-Nashik region, the Khed Thakkars incidentally benefit from the 
negotiations between the Revenue Department bureaucrats and the dominant-caste landowners that 
led to the formation of the land cooperatives. As pointed out in the introduction, the Khed 
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Thakkars have private property rights to their land, and their territorial politics is one of 
redistribution, whereas the Pune-Mumbai Expressway is characterized by a politics of recognition.  
 
The next two chapters trace the formation of the Magarpatta and Khed cooperatives, with 
particular attention to the role of the dominant caste landowners in the creation of these institutions.  
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Chapter 4 
CITIES OF SUGAR: THE MAGARPATTA MODEL OF LAND CONSOLIDATION
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The Magarpatta model of land consolidation has attracted some attention from policy-
makers, the media and academics for its successful resolution of a seemingly intractable problem – 
of consolidating land efficiently, without displacing agrarian landowners. It has received unreserved 
acclaim as “inclusive capitalism (India Knowledge at Wharton, 2008; WSJ) and a “unique model of a 
company of farmers” (Ganguli, 2008). Some studies are more cautious in their celebration of 
Magarpatta, pointing instead to the vacuum in political leadership in India in managing urban 
development and the ability of some “urban stakeholders” like Satish Magar in opportunistically 
forming ad-hoc coalitions to advance their own interests (Sami, 2012).  
 My research takes a more longue durée approach to analyzing Magarpatta’s collective 
institution in land. I trace the origins of the collective institutions along the Pune-Sholapur highway 
to the region’s thriving history of sugar cooperatives in the 1950s to 1970s. I argue that the 
dominant-caste agrarian landowners articulated their interests from the 1950s to 1970s through the 
institutional form of sugar cooperatives. Within the new context of liberalized land markets, these 
sugar barons are diversifying from sugar cooperatives to shareholding companies in land. However, 
not all regions in India have a rich cooperative history. India’s two largest and most successful 
cooperative experiments – the dairy and sugar cooperatives – emerged in the states of Gujarat and 
Maharashtra respectively. These states have a common agrarian history. A large part of both these 
states came under the Bombay Presidency during colonial rule in the early 19th century. Since the 
cooperatives as an institutional form have persisted in the Pune region for almost a century, and 
local landowners and bureaucrats are re-working this existing institution to meet contemporary 
urban challenges, it is important to ask the question: why did cooperatives emerge in the area 
covered by the former Bombay Presidency and not in other regions in the country? What are the 
implications of this institutional history on the transferability of the idea of land cooperatives to 
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other regions within India that are facing similar land consolidation challenges? The answers to these 
questions point to the continuities and changes between post-Independent agrarian politics (of 
1950s – 70s) and contemporary land conflicts. The continuity is the role of dominant-caste politics 
in shaping India’s agrarian, and now urban, land policies. The difference is the recent scarcity of 
urban land and the attendant high demand for agricultural lands for conversion, and the changing 
aspirations of the dominant-caste landowners in desiring a transition to an urban economy.  
 
The emergence and spread of land cooperatives along the Pune-Sholapur highway is linked 
to the implementation of successive phases of agrarian land reforms. The oligarchic nature of land 
ownership by the upper castes and the existence of a vast majority of impoverished peasants and 
landless laborers made land reforms a top priority in the newly independent India. The first phase of 
land reform was implemented soon after Independence, in the 1950s, for the abolition of zamindars, 
or propertied, non-cultivating landowners. The second phase of land reform focused on land ceiling 
and tenancy abolition. These moments of land reforms are critical junctures that re-arranged 
agrarian social relations through the redistribution of land, and Maratha-Kunbis used sugar 
cooperatives as institutional instruments to consolidate power and retain/strengthen their social 
position after these times of agrarian restructuring. In this chapter, I use the Bangalore region as an 
institutional foil to the Pune region, to compare and explain why cooperatives emerged in Western 
India (in the Bombay Presidency area) and not in Southern Karnataka (where the Bangalore region is 
located). The Bangalore region is an instructive comparison because it has a critical mass of 
dominant-caste agrarian landowners, the Vokkaligas. Unlike the Maratha-Kunbis in the Pune region 
who consolidated power through the formation of sugar cooperatives, the Vokkaligas chose not to 
form sugar cooperatives in the 1950s after the implementation of the first phase of land reforms. 
The Bangalore region is also rich in sugar cultivation, but all the processing of sugarcane takes place 
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in private, not cooperative, sugar factories. Both of these regions have different agrarian histories 
and land tenure systems, which influenced the institutional forms that have emerged along their 
highways to manage contemporary urbanization - collective property institutions in Western 
Maharashtra and individual property institutions in Southern Karnataka.  
The Magarpatta model of voluntarily-formed shareholding companies in land works only for 
those regions that have a sugar cooperative history, because agrarian landowners keen on making the 
urban transition exploit the same political and social linkages that made the sugar cooperatives 
powerful institutions in the 1950s-70s to respond to contemporary urban challenges. It is more 
difficult to voluntarily bring together agrarian landowners who lack a past history in collective 
action. The sugar cooperatives thrived in certain regions of Western Maharashtra, including the 
Pune and Sholapur regions. The region along the Pune-Nashik highway, on the other hand, is rich in 
cabbage and onion cultivation, and lacks sugar cooperatives. The next chapter traces the formation 
of bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives along the Pune-Nashik highway that does not have a 
cooperative history. This chapter focuses on those land cooperatives that have sugar cooperatives as 
their institutional predecessors.   
 
The first section of this chapter traces the linkages between the first phase of land reforms 
and the formation of cooperatives in the Bombay Presidency area soon after Independence, the 
second section on the linkages between the second phase of land cooperatives and the growing 
popularity of sugar cooperatives in the 1970s, and the third section on the diversification of sugar 
barons from sugar to land. I conclude with a delineation of the variables that made voluntarily 
formed shareholding companies possible along the Pune-Sholapur highway.  
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4.1 FIRST PHASE OF LAND REFORMS AND COOPERATIVES 
During colonial rule in the 1920s and 30s, the nationalist movement, the Indian National 
Congress, made the first overtures towards a socialist agenda of land redistribution. The famine 
outbreaks of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the agrarian hardships during the years of the 
Great Depression stirred peasants to organize themselves into large-scale organizations like the 
Kisan Sabha [farmers’ movement] (Dhanagare, 1976; Hardiman, 1992). The peasant organizations 
demanded the abolition of the zamindars [landlords] – the non-cultivating propertied class inserted by 
the British between the cultivators and the colonial state. The Indian National Congress supported 
these peasant struggles for a number of reasons. The abolition of zamindars and intermediaries made 
an important political statement about the Indian National Congress. The zamindars represented the 
anti-nationalists and the abrogation of their powers resonated with the nationalist freedom struggle 
(Kohli, 1987: 67-70). More pragmatically, the zamindars, as local centers of power, posed a political 
threat to the Indian National Congress and the abolition of zamindari advanced the Congress’ 
interests in consolidating power in the soon-to-be independent India (Herring, 1983; Kohli, 2010). 
Soon after Independence in the late 1940s and 1950s, the democratically elected Congress party 
implemented its first phase of land reforms, mainly focused on the abolition of zamindars and 
intermediaries. 
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Figure 4.1: Agrarian systems in Maharashtra 
 
The implementation of the first phase of reforms had different impacts in different parts of 
the country. India has a diversity of agrarian systems, some with a thicker layer of intermediaries and 
others with less. Maharashtra can be broadly classified into five regions, with distinct agrarian 
systems (Shah and Sah, 2002). The central region of the state – the Marathwada region – emerged 
from a zamindari system. The eastern region – Vidharba – had a malgujari system, where the unit of 
revenue collection was the village, not the household. In this region, the powerful intermediary was 
the village headman who was responsible for the assessment and collection of revenue at the village 
scale. The southwestern coastal region – Konkan – had a khoti system which traced its origins to the 
	   86 
Muslim rule of the 15th century, where the intermediary was the revenue farmer. Western 
Maharashtra – in which the Pune region is located – had the ryotwari system. The ryotwari system was 
the only agrarian system that did not have intermediaries, and the cultivators – ryots – paid taxes and 
interacted directly with the state. Though these agrarian classifications are helpful starting points, 
they are not watertight systems. Not all ryotwari systems lacked intermediaries. A vestige of Muslim 
rule from the 15th century, the Bombay Presidency had inams and jagirs, a class of intermediaries who 
were gifted land by the rulers for military and/or good service (Bhuskute, 2002, Deshpande, 2002). 
Sometimes, entire villages were gifted to the inamdars and jagirdars (Ibid). Some of the Western 
Maharashtra villages, particularly those in the Pune region that become centers of sugarcane 
cooperatives, had jagirdari and inamdari systems (Attwood, 1992; Deshpande, 2002). This region also 
had unrecorded intermediaries like the revenue officials (Ibid). The Western Maharashtra region 
(Nashik region) was predominantly ryotwari. This had important implications for the first phase of 
land reforms.  
The peasant struggles of the 1920s and 30s were led by the dominant castes – a class of 
cultivators that worked for the zamindars, jagirdars, inamdars and other intermediaries. These dominant 
caste cultivators became the backbone of the peasant struggles and the national movement 
(Varshney, 1998; Vanaik, 1990) and they applied pressure on the Congress to implement its first 
phase of progressive land reforms for abolition of zamindars. The socialist faction within the 
Congress, under the leadership of Nehru, argued that the land reforms legislation would be 
incomplete without the formation of cooperatives (Pandey, 1994). They recognized that agricultural 
markets in newly Independent India were interlocked, i.e. the dominant-caste cultivators were locked 
in patron-client relationships with zamindars and moneylenders, on whom they were dependent for 
work and credit. Commodity cooperatives provided institutional support – in the form of credit, 
production inputs like fertilizers and seeds, and marketing services – to the beneficiaries of land 
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reforms, i.e. the dominant-caste cultivators, so that they can participate successfully in the market 
economy. At the same time, unlike communal ownership of land, commodity cooperatives upheld 
the ideals of private property – cultivators had private property rights to their agricultural lands. 
Thus, the idea of cooperatives befitted the ‘mixed economy’ ideology of newly Independent India 
(Ibid).  
The first phase of land reforms with its focus on abolition of zamindars saw the emergence of 
a new class of regional elites in different parts of the country – amongst others, the Maratha-Kunbis in 
Maharashtra and the Patidars in Gujarat. The successful implementation of the first phase of land 
reforms provided the context within which a new constituency of regional elites – the dominant 
caste landowners – emerged to initiate the formation of cooperatives and demand state support for 
cooperatives. This explains why dairy cooperatives started in the Patidar-dominanted regions of 
Gujarat and the sugar cooperatives in the Maratha-Kunbi-dominated regions of Western 
Maharashtra.17 
 
But, the emergence of new regional elites – the dominant-caste peasant entrepreneurs – in 
the wake of the first phase of land reforms is not enough in itself to explain the mobilization of 
support for the formation of cooperatives. Other regions that witnessed a successful implementation 
of land reforms – like West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Southern Karnataka – did not emerge as hotbeds 
of cooperatives. In his monograph on Western Maharashtra’s sugar cooperatives, Attwood 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Baviskar, B.S, “Milk and Sugar: A Comparative Analysis of Cooperative Politics” for an 
insightful comparison of the differences in the politics associated with Maharashtra’s sugar 
cooperatives and Gujarat’s milk cooperatives. Due to a number of political and technical reasons, 
Gujarat’s milk cooperatives were controlled by a technocratic agency, with the U.S educated Dr. 
Verghese Kurien leading the organization. On the other hand, Maharashtra’s sugar cooperatives 
became institutions of patronage for the Maratha-Kunbis and the political party, the Congress. It is 
not surprise, then, that the Patidars are not making the transition to urban real estate development in 
Gujarat using the institutional linkages established by the milk cooperatives, unlike the Maratha 
sugar barons who are.  
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compares Maharashtra to West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh (1992). Though West Bengal had a 
progressive communist party with a strong ideological commitment to rural development, Attwood 
argues that the urban and rural elite in West Bengal, called the bhadra lok, came from the same 
upper castes. Maharashtra’s urban elites were upper caste Brahmins, but the rural Maratha elite had a 
distinct caste identity: this “creative tension between rural and urban interests is the underlying cause 
of constructive grass-roots leadership in Maharashtra” (Ibid: 304). Unlike West Bengal, Uttar 
Pradesh has “peasant-caste leaders [with] political power and a distinct ideology favoring the 
interests of farmers” (Ibid). But, the state does not have cooperatives because of the large number of 
peasant castes, including Ahirs, Jats, Kurmis and Gujars, each of which dominates certain areas. The 
lack of a numerically dominant peasant caste detracts from a large enough constituency that can 
exercise control over state-level politics.   
Attwood’s explanation for the uniqueness of Western Maharashtra’s cooperatives - a distinct 
caste/class of peasant entrepreneurs, and a critical mass of these peasant entrepreneurs to influence 
state-level politics – does not explain the lack of cooperatives in Southern Karnataka. The 
Vokkaligas are a numerical majority in Southern Karnataka, they have a strong presence in state-level 
politics, and they have a distinct rural identity. The Vokkaligas did not mobilize support for the 
formation of cooperatives because of Southern Karnataka’s pre-Independent agrarian land history. 
The Mysore princely rulers in colonial Southern Karnataka wanted direct control over their subjects, 
and they leased out their lands to, and collected revenue from, their tenants without any 
intermediaries (Pani, 1983). On Independence, these tenants who went on to become agrarian 
landowners – the Vokkaligas - had the agricultural expertise to successfully compete in a market 
economy and did not rally the state for the formation of cooperatives. As mentioned earlier, 
Southern Karnataka is also rich in sugar cultivation, but, unlike Western Maharashtra’s sugar 
cooperatives, the sugarcane in the region was, and continues to be, processed by private sugar 
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factories.   
 
Whereas the Maratha-Kunbis were eager to form sugar cooperatives to enable them to 
become more successful market participants after the first phase of land reforms, they enlarged 
existing sugar cooperatives and formed new ones in the 1970s as institutional instruments to 
circumvent the second phase of land reforms.  
 
4.2 SECOND PHASE OF LAND REFORMS AND COOPERATIVES 
The focus of the second phase of land reforms, implemented in the early 1970s, were the 
land ceiling act - the redistribution of surplus lands beyond a certain threshold acreage to the 
landless – and tenancy reforms – for the reallocation of land from the non-cultivating owner to the 
tenant. These reforms were aggressively pursued by Indira Gandhi, who was keen on centralizing 
power and saw the land ceiling act as an effective means of weakening the power base of the 
regional Maratha sugar barons. But, since land reforms are a state subject, different state 
governments had the authority to implement the reforms in the form legislated by their state 
legislatures, and at their own time.  
The Maratha-Kunbis in Western Maharashtra who had pushed for the abolition of agrarian 
intermediaries in the first phase of land reforms, resisted the second phase by implementing the land 
ceiling act with loopholes that allowed them to evade redistribution.  The Act defined family to 
include husband, wife, unmarried daughters and minor sons. The dominant caste landowners, who 
belonged to large joint families, circumvented the act through re-allocating and registering their 
lands under different family members’ names (Pani, 1983; Chandra et al, 1999). Another loophole 
was the exemptions granted to cooperatives: “land held or leased out to…cooperative societies 
approved in the prescribed manner by the state government” were exempted from the land ceiling 
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law. The decade 1962-1972 witnessed a growth in cooperative membership. During this period, the 
membership in Western Maharashtra’s sugar cooperatives increased by 12.7% (Subramanyam and 
Taimni, 1976: 319). The Maratha-Kunbi sugarcane growers exercised control over their laborers 
through tenancy, and the cooperatives provided an institutional loophole through which the 
landowners could maintain control over their lands and tenants. 
 
In contrast, the land ceiling and tenancy acts were aggressively implemented in Karnataka. 
The land ceiling legislation was first introduced in Karnataka in 1961. The 1974 amendment to the 
act removed the tenancy exemptions from the 1961 act for widows, minors, unmarried daughters 
and mentally or physically challenged family members (Pani, 1983; Thimmaiah and Aziz, 1983). It 
also drastically reduced the ceiling threshold from 27 standard acres to 10 units (Pani, 1983). Though 
Karnataka’s tenancy and land ceiling reforms “sound radical, [they] retained the status quo” (Ibid), 
primarily because of the different form of agrarian control in Southern Karnataka. In an incisive 
analysis of the agrarian systems in Southern Karnataka from princely rule in the 19th century to the 
1970s, Pani argues that the dominant caste Vokkaligas exercised control over the low castes not 
through land tenancy but through indebtedness. In other words, Vokkaligas maintained their 
superior position in the social hierarchy not as landlords but as the main sources of credit for the 
small cultivator households.  
In terms of land ownership, since the 19th century to the late 20th century, a very small 
percentage – less than 5 percent – of Southern Karnataka’s agriculturalists come under the category 
of “tenants” (Epstein, 1973; Pani 1983). As pointed out earlier, the agrarian system established by 
the Mysore princely rulers led to a dominant class of cultivators, with tenants remaining an almost 
insignificant category within the region’s pre- and post-colonial modes of production. Yet, when the 
tenancy reforms were implemented in this region in 1971, the rates of implementation exceeded 100 
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percent. In other words, the number of tenants to whom land was granted after the implementation 
of the 1971 tenancy legislation far exceeded the number of tenants present in the region pre-1971. 
Pani attributes this finding to the “dominant caste tenancy” prevalent in the region. The low-caste, 
marginal cultivators lacked the resources to cultivate their small plots of land themselves and instead 
leased their lands to dominant caste landowners for cultivation. On the passing of the tenancy 
legislation, dominant caste landowners, as tenants, claimed the lands of the marginal groups. Other 
scholars have pointed to the capture of the land tribunals by dominant caste landowners (Natarajan, 
1980; Thimmaiah and Aziz, 1983). Land tribunals were set up to implement the 1971 tenancy 
reforms act – their main function was to adjudicate tenancy claims. These tribunals have been 
criticized for their procedural limitations. Mostly staffed by dominant caste landowners, the tenancy 
applications were not surprisingly decided in favor of the dominant castes. The tenancy reforms, 
then, actually benefited the dominant caste tenants. They had the insidious outcome of depriving 
marginal, low-caste landowners of their small plots of land and reducing them to agricultural 
laborers. 
In terms of credit, a combination of three factors makes the Southern Karnataka system 
quite different from other regions in the country (Pani, 1983). First, indebted cultivators in this 
region borrow not for agricultural investments but for frequently recurring household consumption 
needs. Debtors are not bonded to the lender because of a single debt over a large duration but are 
dependent on the lenders for frequent, immediately needed small consumption loans repayable over 
short periods of time. Second, more than 60 percent of cultivators in Southern Karnataka depend 
on “landlords” and “agriculturalist money-lenders” for their consumption loans, and not on the 
independent class of “professional money lenders.” Third, more than 80 percent of cultivators 
borrow based on their personal security (60 percent) or on no security (12 percent). These credit 
systems without any material security are possible only in tightly-knit village societies where it is not 
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easy for debtors to abscond, and where the survival of financially distressed cultivator households 
depends on getting urgently needed loans without any security from lenders through long-cultivated 
patron-client relationships. Since the Vokkaligas have always owned small tracts of land, and have 
maintained their control over the lower castes through credit systems, the land ceiling reform did 
not affect their land ownership.  
The difference in the form of agrarian control between Western Maharashtra and Southern 
Karnataka meant that the dominant caste landowners in the former region resorted to the formation 
of sugar cooperatives to circumvent the second phase of land reforms; the credit-based form of 
agrarian control in the latter precluded the need for forming cooperatives or other institutions to 
circumvent land redistribution.  
 
4.3 DIVERSIFYING FROM SUGAR TO LAND 
From the 1950s through the 1970s, the dominant caste landowners in Western Maharashtra 
controlled the region materially and politically through the sugar cooperatives – materially, because 
the decisions of the sugar cooperatives were made by an elected Board of Directors, and it was only 
the more affluent dominant caste landowners that had the financial and organizational resources to 
contest these elections; politically, because it was through the sugar cooperatives that the ruling 
Congress party mobilized its rural constituents. The Maratha faction within the Congress 
monopolized control over the region and the state through capturing two important institutions of 
local governance – rural local governments (Panchayati Raj Institutions) and sugar cooperatives (Lele, 
1981; Khekale, 1999). The sugar cooperatives were tightly intertwined with local and state politics, 
and the interdependence between the sugar barons and Congress politicians was a mutually 
beneficial one. The sugar cooperatives were advantageous to the Congress as key contributors to 
political campaigns. The large sugarcane growers diverted the cooperative surpluses for financing 
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political campaigns, with the result that input prices to small sugarcane growers registered significant 
drops during the electoral years (Banerjee et al, 2001). The small Maratha-Kunbi sugarcane growers 
did not challenge the large growers because the sugar cooperatives at least guaranteed them an 
assured income.18 The Congress party, on the other hand, recognized the sugar barons as local 
centers of power and offered many of the cooperative Board of Directors tickets to contest in state 
elections (Khekale, 1999; Lalvani, 2008). Elected membership to the sugar cooperative board 
became stepping-stones to Member of Parliament positions in the state government (Ibid).  
Western Maharashtra’s sugar cooperatives soon degenerated into institutions of patronage. 
The financially distressed cooperatives were propped up by heavy state subsidies - 90 percent of 
sugar cooperative finances came from debts from the cooperative banks with state guarantees, and 
over three-quarters of the 10 percent equity was a direct handout from the state budget (Jadhav, 
2008). The 1980s saw the rise of the Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as strong 
oppositional parties in the state. The Shiv-Sena and BJP have often entered into opportunistic 
alliances in the state against the Congress, and one of their most effective strategies for weakening 
the power base of the Congress was through a frontal attack on the sugar cooperatives. In the past 
decade, they have been rallying for a lifting of the “zoning of sugarcane” – removing sugarcane 
zones, which will allow sugarcane farmers to sell cane to factories outside their zone – and for a 
reduction in state subsidies for cooperatives (Rattanani, 1997). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Personal interview, Amit Narkar, National Center for Advocacy Studies (NCAS), Pune. Based on 
Narkar’s experiences of working for over ten years in the sugar-rich regions of Western 
Maharashtra, he recounted interviews with small sugarcane growers who admitted to the blatant 
corruption of the sugar barons controlling their cooperatives, but continued to support the barons: 
“He is a badmaash [rogue], but whatever we are, it is because of him” (when Amit Narkar asked a 
small sugarcane grower on why he continuing voting for a corrupt sugar baron in the cooperative 
elections).  
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In the wake of these changes, coupled with the generally poor performance of Indian agriculture and 
the growing agricultural labor shortage, sugar barons have been diversifying from the commodity of 
sugar to the other lucrative commodities like “land, liquor and learning” (Mehta, 2010). These 
sectors have been identified as the “least liberalized and least transparent” sectors in India today, 
which make them most prone to political capture and corruption (Ibid).  
The Magarpatta experiment is part of a larger process of the movement of former sugar 
producers out of agriculture into the money-spinning sectors of “land, liquor and learning.” The 
sugar barons in other regions around Pune district also have long, deep cooperative histories, but 
these regions are not urbanizing at the same explosive rate as the Pune region. One of these sugar 
barons, and one of the most powerful politicians not only in Maharashtra, but also at the Central 
Government level – Sharad Pawar – has been active in setting up wine cooperatives in his home 
constituency of Baramati, located around 100 kilometers from Pune along the Pune-Sholapur 
highway.  Pawar’s constituents of sugar growers have been shifting to wine grape cultivation. Pawar 
has been taking active steps to change liquor regulations to protect and promote Maharashtra’s 
nascent wine industry. For instance, in the past decade, the Maharashtra state government nearly 
doubled the special excise duty on imported wine, while simultaneously lowering the liquor sales tax 
from 20 to 4 percent (Rattanani, 1997; Bhattacharyya, Undated). Sharad Pawar’s political fortunes 
hinge on keeping his home constituents happy, and the wine cooperative model is not surprising 
given his political dependence on these sugar growers-turned-grape growers. 
In other examples of diversifying sugar barons, the regional elites with long-time control 
over the Kolhapur sugar cooperatives now own one of the largest educational empires in the state – 
the D. Y. Patil group of educational institutions. Sugar barons are also adapting the institutional 
form of cooperatives into new arrangements for educational institutions. Most of these are being set 
up as trusts. These trusts are legal entities that are separate from the cooperatives, and sugar barons 
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and their family members retain control over them through their designation as “life-long trustees” 
(Baviskar, 2007). The members of the sugar cooperatives are pressured to make donations to these 
trusts and it is not uncommon for cooperative board members to siphon cooperative profits into 
these activities that are personally advantageous to them.  
 
The transition from one type of commodity cooperative to another is not as easy as it 
sounds. Comparing sugar and land, it is relatively easy to convince sugarcane cultivators to join a 
cooperative because sugarcane is a highly perishable commodity – sugar cannot be extracted from it 
unless it is processed within 24 hours of harvesting (Sastry, 2011). This creates a strong incentive for 
sugarcane cultivators to send their crops to the sugar cooperative. Landowners, on the other hand, 
have the option of holding on to their land in anticipation of higher market prices, and it takes more 
effort to convince them to join a land cooperative. Also, sugarcane cultivators face lower risks in 
joining a sugar cooperative because they are, at most, risking one harvest by turning over their crops 
to the cooperative. Members of a land cooperative, on the other hand, face higher sunk costs and 
higher opportunity costs in placing all of their land in the cooperatives. It takes more convincing and 
stronger degrees of trust for landowners to come together in a collective land enterprise than it does 
to join a sugar cooperative. The long history of trust between Satish Magar’s family and the agrarian 
landowners of the Magarpatta area was crucial to the formation of the Magarpatta shareholding 
company in land.  
 
4.4 MAGARPATTA: TOO UNIQUE TO REPLICATE? 
A combination of unique factors, which are not easy to come by in the Indian agrarian 
countryside, made the transition from sugar cooperatives to shareholding companies in land possible 
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in Magarpatta. These variables include the consolidated pattern of land ownership, the past history 
of collective action, and a politically and economically savvy local leader in Satish Magar. 
Consol idated pattern o f  land ownership : The formation of voluntarily initiated 
shareholding companies in land is an exercise in collective action.  Though both Western 
Maharashtra and Southern Karnataka trace their agrarian history to the ryotwari system, and both 
regions are characterized by peasant proprietorship, Southern Karnataka has smaller landholdings 
and is more egalitarian in land distribution. According to the 2000-1 agricultural census in India, 
around 8 percent of Sholapur landowners are classified as marginal, i.e. having landholdings of less 
than 1 hectare, or 2.4 acres, in size, and another 8 percent are classified as large, i.e. having 
landholdings of over 50 acres in size.19 In contrast, the average size of operational landholdings in 
Southern Karnataka varies from 2 to 5 acres, with more than 25 percent of landowners classified as 
marginal and less than 5 percent classified as large. It is difficult to bring together a large number of 
fragmented landholdings in a collective action enterprise. Western Maharashtra, with its dispersed 
regional elites who control larger tracts of land, is more amenable to mobilizing agrarian support for 
collective institutions in land.  
Past his tory o f  co l l e c t ive  ac t ion : Agrarian landowners like Satish Magar exploited the same 
political and economic linkages that made the sugar cooperatives possible in the 1960s and 70s for 
the contemporary shareholding companies in land. Similar to the Magarpatta case, the shareholding 
cooperative companies emerging as a response to land conflicts in China also depend on past 
histories of collective action (Hsing, 2010). In the metropolitan fringes of Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen, organized village collectives have been at the forefront of retaliations against the urban 
governments’ requisitioning of agrarian lands from collectives for sale to industrialists and property 
developers. Negotiations between village collective and urban governments have led to the re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Agricultural Census of India, accessed online at agcensus.dacnet.nic.in 
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organization of village collectives into shareholding cooperative companies, with the urban 
government returning a certain percentage of appropriated, re-zoned land to these shareholding 
companies.  
Nevertheless, the presence of a past history of collective action alone does not assure the 
formation of institutions for the collective ownership and/or control over land. The peri-urban 
areas of Mexico City are characterized by ejidos – communally owned agricultural land with usufruct 
property rights. In response to the intense urbanization pressures from a metropolis swelling beyond 
its city boundaries, the ejido members did not form shareholding companies in land as in the Pune, 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen cases.  Instead, ejido members sold their lands individually to those who 
could not afford the high rents of Mexico’s housing market, and with the mediation of illegal 
developers, these peri-urban areas have now burgeoned into large-scale informal settlements 
(duBroff, 2009). Conversely, the Khed case lacked a past history in collective action, but the agrarian 
landowners successfully organized themselves into a land cooperative that owns and controls 15 
percent of the shares of the new industrial development. 
Poli t i ca l ly  and economical ly  savvy local  l eadership : Agrarian landowners like Satish Magar 
are quite rare. Satish Magar has strong personal and political connections with national-level 
politicians like Sharad Pawar. It is only because of his political networks that that Maharashtra state 
government introduced the integrated township policy that made urban developments like 
Magarpatta possible. In fact, Satish Magar was one of the key individuals in drafting this policy. 
Satish Magar’s personal relationships with state-level politicians enabled him not only to navigate 
India’s land regulations, but also to frame a new legislation that will facilitate his Magarpatta 
shareholding company to replicate similar township projects in other regions. As I will point out in 
the next chapter, most dominant caste agrarian landowners in the Pune region have the aspirations 
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to make the transition from an agricultural to urban/industrial economy, but they lack the political 
and economic resources of the Magars to make this transition themselves. 
Most agrarian regions in India are characterized by fragmented landholdings, an endemic 
problem of lack of clarity over land titles, and the absence of a single joint family like the Magars 
with control over local and state-level politics. This means that the Magarapatta model of highway 
urbanization is too unique to replicate in other regions of the country. Besides the practical 
considerations of replicability, how do we evaluate the Magarpatta model of urban development in 
terms of democracy and social equity? The next section addresses this normative question.  
 
4.5 MAGARPATTA: A DESIRABLE MODEL TO REPLICATE? 
The positive outcome in the Magarpatta model is that agrarian landowners capture all of the 
land value increments of the newly converted highway lands. But this model of highway 
urbanization has two shortcomings: i) in its reproduction of existing class and caste hierarchies, and 
ii) in streamlining land regulations at the discretion of certain (privileged) groups.  
Reproduct ion o f  exist ing c lass and caste  hierarchies : The main protagonists and 
beneficiaries of this land collective are the dominant-caste Magars, and the low-order sugar 
cooperative members continue to be under the patronage of these sugar barons-turned-real estate 
barons. The Magarpatta model, then, represents a reproduction of existing class and caste 
hierarchies. The powerful sugar barons materially and politically controlled the small and marginal 
sugarcane growers through a monopolistic control over the sugar cooperatives. As these highway 
regions urbanize, sugar barons like the Magars continue to hold sway over the small and marginal 
landowners through their lead roles in the formation and working of the shareholding companies in 
land. However, the past decade has seen some stirrings of resistance by the low-order sugarcane 
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growers against the sugar barons, and this may have implications on the future urbanization of these 
regions.  
An unpacking of the members of the sugar cooperatives into the sugar barons and the low-
order sugar growers requires a disaggregated analysis of the Maratha-Kunbi caste bloc. The Maratha-
Kunbi cluster is made up of the Marathas, who are the larger landowners and have a strong political 
presence in the state, and the Kunbis, who are generally small and marginal landowners. The 
numerical majority of the Kunbis made it politically expedient for the Maratha leadership in newly 
independent India to forge a larger Maratha-Kunbi identity that was based on a common battle 
against the upper-caste Brahmins and a common “material experience as peasantry” (Lele, 1981; 
Palshikar and Deshpande, 1999). With the decline in Congress dominance and the rise of 
oppositional political parties like the Shiv Sena and BJP in the 1980s, the Congress control over the 
Maratha-Kunbi caste block started to show signs of fracture. The poor Marathas started deserting 
the Congress because of the perception that the party supported a few rich Maratha elites to the 
neglect of the small and marginal Maratha landowners (Palshikar and Deshpande, 1999). The 
vitriolic caste politics of the 1980s, largely fueled by oppositional parties to the Congress, led to the 
incorporation of the Kunbis as a separate caste group that could avail itself of affirmative action 
reservations for education and public sector jobs (Ibid). This led to a further fragmentation of the 
Maratha-Kunbi caste bloc. In the past decade, small and marginal sugarcane growers have started 
calling for higher sugarcane prices and protesting against the Maratha sugar barons’ control over the 
sugar cooperatives (Gadgil, 2012; Wadke, 2012). It remains to be seen whether Western 
Maharashtra’s small and marginal landowners can organize themselves to break the Maratha 
hegemony over the region’s politics and economy, and what would be the implications of these 
changes in caste alliances on the urban transition.  
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Streamlining land regulat ions at  the discre t ion o f  cer tain (pr iv i l eged) groups : 
Maharashtra’s integrated township policy streamlines the land regulations process to expedite the 
conversion of agricultural lands to urban uses. It removes earlier restrictions on the sale of 
agricultural lands to a non-agriculturalist. It also exempts these townships from the Urban Land 
Ceiling and Regulation Act that limits the size of urban landholdings by individuals. The rationale 
for the integrated township policy is to “liberalize supply of land for urban growth and 
infrastructure…[and redefine] the role of the public sector in this process [as] facilitator and 
regulator of town planning, environmental and social welfare norms instead of a controller and 
provider of land for urban growth” (Joshi, 2009).  
Some of the regulations governing the conversion of agricultural land to urban land are 
outdated. The procedure was intentionally made restrictive during colonial times because agricultural 
revenue was a major source of revenue for the colonial government. This ceases to be a relevant 
criterion in guiding land regulations in the contemporary context. Agricultural land revenues have 
not been revised since Independence. In one of the villages in the Khed region, the agricultural land 
revenue collected in 2010 was an insignificant Rs. 3374 [USD 68].  
But, other justifications for a more stringent process for agricultural land conversions remain 
as relevant today as they did when they were framed in the 1950s and 60s. Besides the goal of 
redistribution, the other rationale for the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act was to curb 
“speculation and profiteering from land” (Ravindra et al, 1997). The restriction on the sale of 
agricultural land to non-agriculturalists was intended to protect the small and marginal agricultural 
landowners from the “unwary and fraudulent dispossession” of their lands by speculative developers 
(Ibid). Since the state has the power to acquire land through eminent domain for public purposes, 
the “cumbersome process” of land conversion was designed to “give adequate opportunity to the 
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landowner to contest compulsory acquisition of his land, and where acquisition must be made, to 
ensure that his claims for proper compensation are met” (Ibid: 90).  
The chief architect of the integrated township policy was Satish Magar. The policy was 
drafted and passed within a year. Without adequate procedures for public deliberations, this policy 
was clearly drafted to benefit a certain segment of real estate developers. The excessive streamlining 
and expediting of the land conversion process deprives it of “procedural due process,” the legal 
safeguard of giving landowners, particularly the small and marginal landowners, reasonable 
opportunity to respond to these urban proposals.  
 
In practice, the Magarpatta model of land consolidation is not as equitable as it appears on 
the surface. The successive phases of land reforms were initiated by, and benefited, the dominant 
caste Maratha landowners. As these highway villages transition into an urban economy, the dominant 
caste landowners continue to dominate the highway decision-making processes.  
 
The next chapter looks at another model of land consolidation, the bureaucrat-mediated 
land cooperatives exemplified by the Khed case, and analyzes if this model of voluntarily-formed 
cooperatives is more easily replicable, and more democratic and equitable in its outcome, than the 
Magarpatta model.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
ADVERSARIAL COOPERATION: THE KHED MODEL OF LAND CONSOLIDATION
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India’s agrarian to industrial transition along infrastructure corridors will be scripted by cases 
like Khed. The Khed case has a more complex cast of institutional actors compared to Magarpatta. 
The landholdings in Khed are more fragmented – though families like the Kelkars exercise control 
over the Dalits and tribals, their landholdings are not as consolidated as the Magars. Of the 941 
acres acquired for the Khed development from Kanersar village, nearly 275 acres, or 30 percent of 
the acquired lands, are locked in litigation; 550 acres of the 946 acres of acquired lands, or 60 
percent of the acquired lands, in Nimgaon village are in court.20 These are not uncommon statistics. 
Property disputes are a common problem with agrarian land that is passed on generation by 
generation to descendants of large joint families. The Khed area lacks a local leader like Satish Magar 
with the political and cultural capital to make large- scale urban changes. The landowners within the 
Khed SEZ area – encompassing four villages – are not a socially homogenous group like the 
Magars. Forming a land cooperative in areas like Khed involves huge transaction costs in bringing 
together a large number of fragmented landowners in a collective experiment. 
 
5.1 INVENTIVE BUREAUCRATS 
The protagonist who initiated the Khed land cooperative was the Revenue Department 
bureaucrat, Shyam Patil. Through their daily engagements with agricultural land tax collection and 
resolution of land disputes, bureaucrats like Shyam Patil are embedded in the social life of these 
highway regions. They spend long periods of time in particular geographic locations, and are familiar 
with local power structures and politics. It takes such socially embedded bureaucrats to navigate the 
messy land records and resolve any land disputes. It also takes such on-the-ground bureaucrats to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Source: File with the details of landholdings for the SEZ project, compiled by the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). 
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seize the right time to strike a deal that has benefits for groups that otherwise have conflicting 
interests. I outline the clever timing of the Khed land cooperative through focusing on the benefits 
of the Khed institutional arrangement for the Revenue Department, the private sector firm Bharat 
Forge, the industrial parastatals MIDC, the dominant caste landowners and the marginalized tribal 
landowners. 
 
5.1.1 REVENUE DEPARTMENT 
The Revenue Department bureaucrats mediate the land consolidation process between the 
industrial parastatals and the agrarian landowners. MIDC had a good working relationship with the 
Pune District Collector [the district-level bureaucrat in charge of the Revenue Department], because 
the latter had been an MIDC bureaucrat for five years before moving to the Revenue Department. 
Shyam Patil had also been an MIDC bureaucrat before being transferred to the Revenue 
Department in 2004.  
As MIDC bureaucrats, they had been involved in 2003 in the land acquisition for Phases 1 
and 2 of an information-technology (IT) park, called Hinjewadi, on the outskirts of Pune. The 
agrarian landowners had received cash compensation from MIDC for their acquired lands. By 2007, 
when MIDC and the Revenue Department approached the villages around Hinjewadi for acquiring 
more land for Phases 3 and 4, they were met with stiff opposition. Current landowners had learned 
from the past experiences of those who gave up their agricultural land for Phase 1 of the IT park in 
the early 2000s, and the raw deal they got in accepting then-prevalent market rates as compensation 
for land that is now almost ten to twenty times in value. Recognizing that the earlier landowners had 
not received their fair share of the land value increment, current landowners refused to give up their 
land for the future phases of industrial expansion.  
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In areas that lacked past experiences of collective action, the Revenue Department 
bureaucrats realized that including agrarian landowners as equity members of a land cooperative can 
cultivate relations of trust among these landowners and the bureaucracy, thus increasing chances of 
collaboration for future industrial/urban expansions. When I met with him in January 2011, the 
Pune District Collector was visibly proud of his accomplishment in successfully negotiating with 
protesting landowners and convincing them to be partners within the new highway development: 
“Farmers who had earlier protested with Medha Patkar and other prominent social activists have 
now given their consent to the development and are now our partners in this [Khed] development.”  
 
5.1.2 BHARAT FORGE 
The media and activists have harshly criticized private sector firms acquiring agricultural lands as 
“land grabbers” and industrial parastatals like the MIDC as “real estate brokers” (Lakshmikantha, 
2010; Angad, 2012) Bharat Forge and MIDC are canny enough to recognize that negative publicity 
from these protests can hurt their image and even terminate their projects.  
The CEO of Bharat Forge, Baba Kalyani, is the brother-in-law of the Managing Director of 
the private sector consortium, Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises (NICE). In 1994, the 
Karnataka state government selected the NICE consortium to build the Bangalore-Mysore 
Infrastructure Corridor – a six-lane private tolled expressway - along with five private townships 
along the corridor. According to the build-own-operate-transfer contract, the infrastructure corridor 
would be transferred to the government after 30 years, and the townships along the corridor would 
be sold to the private consortium. The NICE corridor and its five townships have been mired in 
litigation since 1994, with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) challenging the acquisition of 
agricultural lands for private township development. In October 2012, the Karnataka Lokayukta 
Court – an anti-corruption ombudsman organization – upheld the charges against the NICE 
	   106 
consortium, and ordered it to return the INR 720,000,000 [USD 14,400,000] of toll collected to the 
state government.  
The NICE experience is a harsh eye-opener to private industrialists and developers, that 
coercive land acquisition can lead to interminable delays, and even terminations, at a later stage. It is 
not surprising that Baba Kalyani learned from the mistakes of his brother-in-law, and took a more 
reconciliatory route of land consolidation.  
 
5.1.3 MIDC  
The role of the industrial parastatal in contexts like Khed, which have more fragmented land 
ownership, is crucial. Following the protests by the dominant-caste landowners, the MIDC acquired 
their agricultural lands for the Khed joint venture company through the use of eminent domain. But 
instead of paying landowners cash compensation, they were paid a non-monetary compensation in 
the form of shares. The acquisition of land through eminent domain was a pragmatic decision.   
India, and most developing countries, face the endemic problem of poor land records and unclear 
land titles. Most agricultural lands have encumbrances, including mortgage claims and restrictions on 
the alienability of agricultural lands (instituted soon after Independence to protect agrarian 
landowners from speculative transactions on their land). The wide variety of encumbrances on 
agricultural land makes direct land transactions between the private sector firm and the agrarian 
landowners a risky proposition for the private sector firm. For instance, if, as in the Khed case, the 
industrial firm purchases 3,500 acres of land for an industrial development, and if even two acres of 
that land has encumbrances, the entire project will be stuck in court till the property dispute is 
settled. It is to the advantage of the private sector that the parastatal is involved in land acquisition. 
When land is acquired by the state and is transferred to the private sector, the transferred land is 
	   107 
declared free of encumbrances. MIDC here plays a crucial role of delivering unencumbered land to 
the Khed joint venture company.  
 
5.1.4 DOMINANT CASTE AGRARIAN LANDOWNERS 
The dominant caste agrarian landowners, like the Kelkars in the Khed case, lack the political 
and economic resources of the Magars to make this transition themselves. However, they are 
powerful enough as local leaders to effectively block any urban developments that are not beneficial 
to them, and the Khed bureaucrats had to negotiate with them, placate them and win their support 
in order for the Khed project to continue. Due to structural changes in the agrarian economy – 
including the shortage of agricultural labor and the rising value of appropriately located agricultural 
land for urban uses – dominant caste landowners aspire to participate in India’s urban/industrial 
economy, but only with the requisite safety nets to mitigate the risks of an uncertain transition.   
Agricul tural  labor shortage : One of the main push factors out of agriculture is agricultural 
labor shortages. A common refrain heard among dominant-caste landowners along the Pune 
highways is the phrase “mazdoor nahi milte” [workers are not found]. The availability of alternative 
factory jobs has led to intense labor shortages in these highway regions:  
Earlier, the villagers used to come for work - Thakkars, others. Once the land payment was 
made, people work less. Earlier, the Thakkars used to work from morning to night, now they do 
not. The nearby places - Chakan, Rajgurunagar, there is chota-mota [small] MIDC work there, people 
have gone to work there. Earlier, we used to pay INR 60, now no one comes for less than INR 100. 
And they come at 11 and leave at 5, take a break for lunch. This is everywhere. Here [in Khed], 
because of the land money [compensation for 85 percent of the land], it is more.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Interview with author, 4 January 2011. 
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Urban aspirat ions : Besides the agricultural labor shortage, the push factor towards an 
urban/industrial economy is the agrarian aspiration to be a part of the ‘India Shining’ growth story. 
Of the 20 Maratha-Kunbi landowners I spoke to in Kanersar, the first village that had agreed to give 
up its land for the Khed SEZ, all of them were educating their children in private, rather than 
government schools, and they were unanimous in wanting their children to leave agriculture and join 
industry. For these Maratha-Kunbi landowners, one of the most attractive benefits of the land 
compensation package is the assurance that one family member will be guaranteed admission to the 
Khed Industrial Training Institute (ITI), a joint initiative for vocational education institute between 
the Government of India and Bharat Forge.  The ITI graduates will almost certainly be employed in 
the Khed industrial development. Not surprisingly, admission to the Khed ITI is coveted:  
We have an agreement now with the ITI. It is not difficult to get admission there. It is based 
on marks in the 10th standard. A person from every family gets admission to the ITI. The 
Thakkar families do not go there because they do not have education.22 
Of the 20 Kanersar landowners, 14 of them have some service/industrial business in 
addition to their agricultural fields. A smaller number of Nimgaon landowners – 4 out of the 20 
interviewed – have service businesses. The MIDC has targeted benefits for the Sarpanches of both 
Kanersar and Nimgaon – these political leaders have been guaranteed construction and earthmoving 
contracts for the new industrial development. Though they lack prior experience in the construction 
and earthmoving sectors, a Bharat Forge employee conceded that these construction contracts were 
necessary as “confidence-building measures.” Of the 14 Kanersar landowners, 12 of them had 
transportation companies to transport agricultural produce from Khed and surrounding areas to 
Mumbai. The only Maratha-Kunbi who expressed nostalgia for an earlier, agricultural way of life is an 
attorney, who studied in the law college in Rajgurunagar (the nearest town to Kanersar) and now 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview with author, 11 June 2011. 
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lives and practices law in Pune. Having fulfilled his aspirations of becoming a city-dweller, he 
nostalgically recalled India as a country that is “known through its agriculture,” and evoked 
romanticized images of the Indian farmer through slogans like “jai jawan jai kisaan” [hail soldier, hail 
farmer - a patriotic slogan by the Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in the 1960s, to boost the 
morale both of Indian soldiers in the war against Pakistan and of farmers to increase agricultural 
production and reduce India’s dependence on imports]. The Maratha-Kunbis who were experiencing 
urbanization and industrialization without leaving their villages welcomed these developments with 
the view that “we are becoming like Mumbai, like a city, with city life.”  
Managing the r i sks o f  an in-s i tu agrarian to urban transi t ion : Despite its advantages, 
the transition from an agrarian to urban/industrial economy is fraught with uncertainties and risks. 
The Khed case illustrates some of the uncertainties posed by highway urbanization. The Khed 
industrial development is being delayed by changes in political and bureaucratic administration. Both 
the District Collector at the time of the negotiations, and his mediating bureaucrats including Shyam 
Patil, have been transferred to other administrative departments, and the Khed landowners have lost 
their main liaison with the MIDC and the Revenue Department. The lack of visible construction on 
the site, despite the land negotiations being completed in 2008, is a legitimate cause of anxiety for 
the dominant-caste landowners:  
If the company's share dividend had started, that would have been good for us. We gave up 
their land four years back. I gave up 15 acres of land, but have not received the dividend on 
my 2.25 acres [15 percent of the 15 acres that the landowner is the shareholder of]. For my 
2.25 acres, I should have received INR 120,000 interest. But for four years now, I have not 
received anything.23 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Interview with author, 6 June 2011. 
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What assurance do we have that the SEZ will be completed? Will they give us jobs or not?24 
Besides these delays, agrarian landowners face the typical market risks of real estate 
development of financial profitability. Changes in interest rates, in material costs, in demand for the 
industrial services being provided by the SEZ, and a number of other changes can seriously affect 
expected project returns. In case of losses to the Khed SEZ, the agrarian landowners pay the high 
price of losing their landed assets in an unprofitable industrial venture.  
It was in anticipation of these risks that the dominant caste agrarian landowners protested 
against the initial Khed proposal in 2006. Following the protests, the Revenue Department and 
MIDC re-drew the boundaries of the Khed SEZ: the earlier 2006 proposal included fertile and dry 
lands within the SEZ boundary, but the 2008 proposal moves away from a Cartesian rigidity to a 
more zig-zagged boundary that only encompasses the dry lands on the hills and leaves the fertile 
lands on the plains untouched. The dominant caste landowners in the Khed region own multiple 
plots of land, sometimes in joint ownership with others, at several geographically dispersed sites.25 
Despite their anxieties over the status and performance of the Khed industrial development, the 
dominant-caste landowners continue farming on their fertile agricultural lands. If the Khed industrial 
development does not do well and undergoes losses, they still will have their fertile agricultural lands 
to fall back on. The land cooperative offered these landowners the possibility of making profits 
from dry lands that were otherwise left unused.  
Clever bureaucrats like Shyam Patil re-negotiated the land compensation package to facilitate 
an easier transition for dominant-caste landowners from an agrarian to urban economy. It is 
important to underscore that the dominant caste landowners oppose parting with their fertile lands 
not because of the economic value of these lands – after all, along the highways, location has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Interview with author, 7 June 2011.	  
25 Source: File with the details of landholdings for the SEZ project, compiled by the Maharashtra 
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC).  
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trumped fertility as the metric for determining land value – but because these lands are their safety 
nets in the transition from a lower productivity but secure agrarian present to a higher productivity 
but uncertain industrial future. 
 
5.1.5 MARGINAL TRIBAL LANDOWNERS 
As owners of marginal plots of dry land, tribal landowners – the Thakkars - benefit as 
members of the Khed land cooperative. Though the negotiations for a mutually acceptable land 
compensation package between the agrarian landowners and the bureaucrats did not involve the 
Thakkars, the latter - particularly the younger generation male Thakkars – approve of the Khed 
SEZ. In fact, these Thakkars did not participate in the 2006 protests against the SEZ, and were 
willing to give up their lands for the industrial development in exchange for the initial proposal of 
100 percent cash compensation.  
The enthusiasm of the Thakkars in joining the land cooperative and making the urban 
transition is surprising, given that they face lower opportunities and higher risks in making this 
transition compared to the dominant caste landowners. Unlike the dominant caste landowners who 
hedge their bets of an uncertain transition through only giving up their dry lands, the Thakkars only 
own single plots of dry land. By agreeing to join the land cooperative, they are giving up all of their 
landed assets for the new industrial developments. For the dominant caste landowners, one of the 
most attractive inducements for giving up their land for the Khed industrial development is the 
guarantee that a member of each landowning/shareholding family is entitled to admission to the 
vocational industrial training institute (ITI), the Khed ITI. The Thakkars, on the other hand, lacked 
the basic educational qualifications of a high school degree to avail of the ITI guaranteed enrolment 
benefit.  The literacy rates of the 25 Thakkar households I interviewed are a sample of the poor 
educational levels of the Khed tribals: 
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Table 5.1: Literacy levels of Thakkar adults above 18 years from 25 households26 
 
 Men Women 
Primary school (1st – 4th grade) 16 42 
Middle school (5th – 7th grade) 22 6 
High school (8th  - 12th grade) 18 4 
Diploma/ITI  3 2 
College  - - 
 
Despite the bleaker opportunities and higher risks, the Thakkars have their own rationales 
for joining the Khed land cooperative. Their cost-benefit calculus in making the urban transition is 
markedly different from that of the dominant caste landowners.  
Dry lands and informal fac tory jobs : Two changes brought about by highway urbanization 
are particularly favorable to the Thakkars. First, the Thakkars benefit from the change in the 
functional orientation of land from fertility to location. Through long histories of sociospatial 
segregation, the Thakkars owned the driest, most agriculturally unproductive lands along the 
highways, and the dominant caste landowners owned the most fertile lands. In other words, these 
highway villages were characterized by a neat mapping of social power with land ownership. The 
recent demand for highway lands, and the Indian state’s policy to acquire dry lands as far as possible 
in the interests of food security, has made the Thakkars’ dry lands, desirably located close to the 
highways, a coveted market commodity. This restructuring of the land market is unsettling 
historically produced sociospatial hierarchies, with the highway-proximate dry lands of the Thakkars 
increasing in market value, and fertile lands located far from the highway declining in value. Besides 
the change in the valuation of highway lands, the Thakkars also benefit from the availability of 
alternative informal work in the factories coming up along the highways. Before highway 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The Thakkars living in the four Village Panchayats of Kanersar, Nimgaon, Dhawadi and Shirur 
who gave up their lands for the new SEZ have been relocated to a new settlement. Through a 
random sample selection, I interviewed 25 of these Thakkar households. The interviews were 
conducted in the new relocation settlement, approximately four months after relocation.  
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urbanization, the Thakkars were solely dependent on the dominant caste agrarian landowners for 
employment opportunities as agricultural laborers on the latter’s lands, but the factory jobs – albeit 
of an informal nature – allows them to reduce their dependence on the dominant caste landowners 
as the only employment generators in the region.  
Breaking away from re lat ions o f  dependency on dominant caste  landowners : Before 
highway urbanization, the Thakkars worked through various forms of tenancy – ranging from 
bonded labor to seasonal leasing – on the lands of the dominant castes.  After highway urbanization, 
the younger generation male Thakkars lacked the educational qualifications to join the ITI. 
Nonetheless, they are making the transition to an industrial economy through finding work as daily-
wage or contract laborers in the factories along the Pune-Nashik highway. The Thakkars are also in 
high demand in the hyper-active construction industry. The tight labor market of the construction 
industry – construction work has to be completed in certain months before and after the monsoons 
– gives them more bargaining power with their employers. The account of Somu captures the shift 
of the Thakkars from an agrarian to industrial economy: 
For 18 years, I’ve worked at the Maratha’s house, only in one house. He has large fields - his 
fields are grand. That's why they kept me, and others, there permanently for 18 years. In 
1986, I was paid INR 7 coolie [daily wages]. I stopped working for him in 1994. We have to 
work according to our free will. I wanted to work with swatantrata [independence]. Now, I 
work for a construction contractor as a daily wage labourer. He gives me INR 150 [USD 3] 
per day. If I work permanently, he will give me INR 180 [USD 3.6] per day. I do not work 
permanently for anyone. If there is a problem with someone, then I will change to someone 
else.27  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Interview with author, 9 June 2012. 
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Somu’s assertive language of swatantrata – a Hindi word that translates to “political selfhood” 
and has a strong resonance with India’s freedom struggles against the colonial state – and “free will” 
is partly because of the availability of informal jobs in the construction industry. These jobs – albeit 
of poor working conditions, and lacking in security and benefits – increase Somu’s bargaining 
powers not only with his industrial employers, but also with the dominant caste landowners. The 
tribals now commonly negotiate their daily wages with agricultural landowners using the wage rates 
set by the industrial informal economy as the standard: “The construction contractor pays me INR 
150 [USD 3] per day. Why should I work on their [dominant caste landowners’] land for less?”28  
The factories along the Pune-Nashik highway are reluctant to hire local labor as permanent 
employees, both because they lack of requisite skills and because of a fear of unionizing. Though 
they are asserting their autonomy from dominant-caste agrarian landowners, the tribals are entering 
a poorly paid, exploitative informal economy that lacks any obligations on the part of the state or 
employers in guaranteeing informal workers basic benefits and security. 
Disaggregat ing the Thakkar household : Not all members within the Thakkar household 
approve of the younger generation male members’ decisions to give up their land for the new 
industrial development. Women and the older generation Thakkars would have preferred to hold on 
to their single plots of dry land. 
Of the 25 Thakkar households interviewed, women in 18 households were unhappy that 
they no longer have dry lands in which to graze their goats. Since relocation to the new settlement, 
these households have sold their goats. Mothers complained that the goats provided their children 
with their daily dose of milk, but now, with no goats, and with the unaffordable price of milk in the 
market, they have had to remove milk from their children’s diets.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Interview with author, 15 June 2012.	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The Thakkar males in their 40s are less enthusiastic than the younger generation about 
joining the informal industrial economy. One of the Thakkars I interviewed, Nandu, who is in his 
forties, tried industrial work for sometime, but is now back to agricultural work. His experience 
reflects the riskiness of these unprotected informal factory jobs: 
In the 1980s, I used to work on the Maratha’s lands. Five years back, I stopped doing this. 
The factories here were giving us contract work. I was ready to do any work. They [the 
factory owners] give the contractor INR 10,000 [USD 200] per month, he [the contractor] 
will give us INR 4000 [USD 80] per month. The contractor got me work in the auto parts 
factory. I had to assemble all the auto parts in a line, lots of heat involved in the work. No 
‘surety.’ No ‘safety’ [he uses the English words surety and safety]. Even if I die or have some 
injury, there's no surety. I can break my arm and they will not do anything. That is why I left 
a year back. Now, I get INR 150 [USD 3] per day for agricultural work.29 
Whereas the Thakkars in their 40s and 50s, like Nandu, are wary of mechanization, the 
Thakkars in their 60s and older lack the physical strength to work in factories. Most of them 
expressed dissatisfaction over their sons’ decisions to give up their lands for industry. Dairy farming 
has been a common supplemental occupation along these highways since the 1970s. In the earlier 
decades, before highway lands became a hot market commodity, the Thakkars used the village 
common lands for grazing their cattle. Some of them grazed their livestock on the dry lands owned 
by dominant caste landowners. If their families had been working on the lands of the dominant 
caste landowners for generations, norms of reciprocity obliged the dominant caste landowners to 
allow their laborers to graze their cattle on their lands for free. The past decade has seen a rampant 
privatization and commodification of village common lands for urban development (Gidwani and 
Baviskar, 2011). As Thakkars are now breaking away from the old norms of dependence and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Interview with author, 9 June 2012. 
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reciprocity from dominant caste landowners, the latter have started charging a monthly rent for the 
use of their dry lands for grazing.  
Highway urbanization enfranchises certain members within the Thakkar households, while 
disfranchising others. The younger generation Thakkars, those in their 20s and early 30s, are most 
resolved in breaking all links with dominant caste agrarian landowners, and are reckless in lurching 
into an uncertain informal industrial future. Women are worried that they no longer have access to 
milk – the sale of their goats and the unaffordable prices of milk in the market are depriving their 
children of basic nutrition. The Thakkars in their late 30s, 40s and 50s are wary of the risks to safety 
posed by mechanization. Nandu’s words sum up these apprehensions well: “Even if I die or have 
some injury, there's no surety. I can break my arm and they will not do anything.” The older 
generation lack the physical ability and strength to work in industrial jobs, and the loss of their dry 
land deprives them of the only sources of livelihood they are familiar with - agriculture and dairy 
farming. Thus, a physically disabled, uneducated, female senior within the Dalit and tribal collectivity 
encounters multiple disadvantages of gender, age and physical ability in making the urban transition.  
 
5.2 KHED: HOW REPLICABLE IS IT? 
The dominant caste landowners aspire to be a part of the ‘India Shining’ growth story, and are eager 
to make the urban transition, but under conditions that will mitigate the risks and uncertainties of 
the transition. The marginal tribal landowners welcome the urban transition because of the 
possibility if offers in moving from a caste-ridden agrarian reality to a caste-free industrial future. I 
call this coming together of two historically antagonistic groups – the dominant caste and tribal 
landowners – in a collective land experiment, for markedly different instrumental reasons, 
adversarial cooperation.  
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Inventive bureaucrats like Shyam Patil can play a crucial mediating role in bringing together 
different social groups with conflicting interests in a collective land experiment. In the previous 
chapter, I compared Western Maharashtra to Southern Karnataka to explain how past institutional 
and land reforms histories facilitated the formation of voluntarily-formed shareholding companies in 
land in the former region, and not in the latter. Similarly, a comparison with the Bangalore region in 
Southern Karnataka is instructive in an analysis of bureaucrat-mediated land cooperatives. Like 
Khed, the Bangalore region lacks a past cooperative history, and has a more egalitarian pattern of 
land ownership that proved to be a hindrance to collective action in land consolidations. The Khed 
region overcame these constraints through the mediations of inventive street level bureaucrats. The 
Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor, on the other hand, continues to be mired in litigations 
and activist protests, and the bureaucrats in this region have not experimented with innovative 
solutions as in Khed. How unique are bureaucrats like Shyam Patil in the Indian agrarian 
countryside? I answer this question through a comparison of the Khed region with the Bangalore-
Mysore region in Southern Karnataka.  
 
Consolidating land for meeting the demands of urban expansion is not a new exercise in 
India. The earliest precedents for the consolidation and conversion of agricultural lands into urban 
lands are the colonial projects of the 19th century. The colonial government set up parastatals called 
the City Improvement Trust Boards (CITBs) in the late 19th century to acquire agricultural lands 
outside the city boundaries for the building of India’s first planned suburbs (Nair, 2005). The CITB 
activities were partly a move to relocate the native poor from slums to these “model hygienic 
suburbs” in response to the plague epidemics sweeping through colonial cities (Ibid, Kidambi, 2007; 
Legg, 2007) and partly a legitimation of colonial rule through demonstrating the civilizing effects of 
these rationally planned suburbs over the unsanitary and chaotic native settlements (Ibid). The 
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colonial government framed the Land Acquisition Act – India’s eminent domain legislation - in 1898 
to enable the conversion of agricultural lands in the peripheries into CITB planned suburbs. After 
Independence in 1947, the demand for urban land continued with the expansion of Indian cities 
under Nehru’s policies of state-led industrialization.  
It is at this point that the institutional histories of the Bangalore and Pune regions start to 
diverge. The planning of new suburbs, and the extension of infrastructural services (mainly water 
supply and sanitation) to them, is a capital-intensive activity. Cities like Mumbai and Pune in 
Maharashtra, with a flourishing industry and large tax bases, had the financial capabilities to manage 
these capital-intensive expansions of serviced land (NIUA, 2004). Cash-strapped cities like 
Bangalore, on the other hand, turned to international financial institutions like the World Bank, 
which recommended the setting up of parastatals for more efficient land and service delivery 
(Sivaramakrishnan and Green, 1986). In response to fiscal pressures, the Bangalore Water Supply 
and Sewerage Board (BWSSB) was set in 1964, and the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) 
was set up in 1976 as a successor to the CITB. Pune does not have land and water parastatals, and 
its land, water supply and sanitation responsibilities continue to be managed by the local 
government.30  
Historically, local governments in India have been viewed with distrust, and, as public 
corporations, strict legal limits have been imposed on them to curb their private, economic activities 
(Frug, 1980). In India, local governments cannot leverage municipal lands for for-profit activities. 
Municipal lands can only be used for public uses, including hospitals, schools, and parks (Sridhar 
and Reddy, 2010). On the other hand, in the Bangalore region, the BDA has emerged as one of the 
most powerful [quasi] public organizations. The main source of revenue for the BDA is land 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Though it does not have residential or water parastatals, the state of Maharashtra does have an 
industrial parastatal – the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC).   
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disposition, i.e. the BDA acquires land for residential development through eminent domain, it 
services these lands, and then sells the serviced residential plots at the prevalent market value.  
The local government in Pune does not have residential parastatals, and has had to 
experiment with innovative, non-coercive models for assembling land, and for capturing some of 
the land value increment of the serviced land. One of these models is the Town Planning Scheme, 
also called land pooling or land readjustment, where the local government brings together disparate 
agrarian landowners within a certain boundary and re-assembles their fragmented, agricultural 
landholdings into serviced plots of regular dimensions. The new serviced plots will be of higher 
value than the fragmented plots, and the local government distributes the land value increment 
between itself and the landowners. Though the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act has 
enabling legislation for land pooling schemes like the Town Planning Scheme, Bangalore bureaucrats 
have never used these schemes for consolidating land. The reliance on urban parastatals like the 
Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) to acquire land through eminent domain precluded the 
need for local governments to get involved in non-coercive land consolidation activities (Ravindra et 
al, 1997). Not surprisingly, local bureaucrats in the Bangalore region lack the institutional capacity to 
implement land consolidation projects like Khed. More broadly, the regions in India that relied 
heavily on residential parastatals with their eminent domain powers are less successful in resolving 
contemporary land conflicts because of a lack of institutional capacity among local bureaucrats in 
experimenting with, and dealing with the nitty-gritties of, non-coercive land consolidation methods. 
 
5.3 KHED: A DESIRABLE MODEL TO REPLICATE? 
Unsett l ing agrar ian caste  hierarchies: The positive, but incidental, outcome from the 
Khed case is that, with the rising market value of their dry lands, and with the availability of 
alternative informal work, marginal tribal landowners are unsettling agrarian caste hierarchies and 
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imagining more emancipated, caste-free industrial futures for themselves. However, informal 
industrial work has its own forms of exploitation. But, the recent raft of ambitious social welfare 
programs launched in India over the past two decades offers some hope for an improved status for 
tribals in India’s growth story. These programs include the 2008 Unorganized Sector Workers’ Social 
Security Bill (USWSSB) to cover informal workers’ disability, health and old age insurances, and the 
2006 National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) that guarantees one adult members 
of every rural households 100 days of employment, or unemployment allowance, every year.  Unlike 
the dominant caste landowners, tribals like the Khed Thakkars have no way of hedging their bets 
during the transition, thereby exposing them to higher risks. State welfare programs like the 
USWSSB and NREGS provides them with the essential safety nets while making a precarious 
transition.  
In a seminal article on the democracy and economic transformation of India since 
liberalization, Partha Chatterjee offers an explanation for the emergence of a welfare state in India 
(2008). With the rapid growth of the Indian economy, more and more primary producers are being 
alienated from their means of production, and are entering an unprotected informal economy. The 
political conditions of a functioning electoral democracy makes it imperative for the Indian state to 
extend welfare services to these informal workers; otherwise, there is the threat that they may turn 
into “dangerous classes.” Recent social welfare programs are creating a new contract between the 
state and its citizens. Informal workers are targeting their demands to the state and not to 
exploitative employers or landowners (Agarwala, 2006). They are demanding welfare rights – like 
health and unemployment insurance – instead of workers’ rights – like minimum wages. These 
changes are leading to new forms of state-society politics. As Agarwala points out in her analysis of 
India’s informal organizations, “on the one hand, [these movements] could grow to shape the state’s 
role in workers’ lives across all sectors of the economy; on the other hand, the movement could fall 
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backward into a scenario where the state continues to extend its responsibilities to its workers, but in 
an ad hoc manner that eventually mirrors traditional patron-client relations” (Ibid: 440). As India’s 
marginalized agrarian groups transition into the informal industrial economy, it shifts the focus of 
the discourse on enfranchisement of India’s marginalized populations from impoverished peasant 
groups to the informal industrial sector.    
Inst i tut ional  ambigui t i es : The joint venture company – Khed Economic Infrastructure 
Private Limited (KEIPL) - is a complex assemblage of a land cooperative, an industrial parastatal, 
and a private sector firm, set up with the intention of leveraging the comparative advantages of these 
different institutions. The land cooperative is essential in gaining the trust and consent of agrarian 
landowners. The endemic problem of poor land records, unclear land titles and property disputes in 
India makes direct land transactions between private sector firms and agrarian landowners risky for 
the private sector. However, when land is acquired by the state and transferred to the private sector 
firm, the transferred land is declared free of encumbrances. The parastatal plays a crucial role in 
negotiating with a large number of fragmented landowners and conveying encumbered land to the 
private sector. The private sector firm has the technical and financial expertise to deal with such 
large-scale industrial/property developments.  
Complex hybrid institutions like KEIPL leave many questions unanswered. In this complex 
interlinking of a cooperative with a private for-profit company, whose interests—agrarian 
landowners or industrialists—is the KEIPL accountable to? How are clashes in interests reconciled 
within the organization? In terms of allocation of land value increments, why does the land 
cooperative own only 15 percent of the Khed company shares? Bharat Forge has committed an 
undisclosed amount towards the Khed SEZ, but more work has to be done on the identification, 
allocation and pricing of risks in these complex joint venture companies so that the private sector is 
compensated only to the extent of their risk component. Researchers and policy-makers need to 
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turn their attention to these questions on accountability, and risk pricing and allocation, as these will 
form the basis of evaluating the equitability of these cooperatives in allocating land value increments 
amongst different institutional actors.  
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Chapter 6 
LAND COOPERATIVES AS REDISTRIBUTIVE REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
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The 2011 Kannada31 movie, Puttakkana Highway, follows the travails of Puttakka, a marginal 
rural landowner, after the state government announces its decision to acquire agricultural lands in 
Puttakka’s village for the construction of a highway. Puttakka has four acres of land where she has 
buried her husband. Adamant that she will not give up her land, she tries everything within her 
meagre means to hold on to her land, including a visit to the state capital, Bangalore, to appeal to 
state-level politicians.  She discovers the harsh realities of development when her daughter, deprived 
of their land and agricultural livlihood, turns to prostitution to make ends meet. The film ends with 
Puttakka walking away from her land in helpless anger.  
The director of Puttakkana Highway drew inspiration from the ongoing fracas over the 
Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor. He portrays Puttakka as lacking the capabilities to have 
her voice heard, as powerless against an authoritarian state. Puttakka’s helplessness in reel life finds 
parallels in real life in the media accounts and activists’ narratives of the highway land conflicts. A 
Bangalore-based activist described his interview with a marginal landowner whose lands had been 
notified for acquisition for the Bangalore-Mysore highway: “When I asked her [the landowner] what 
she would do if she lost her land, she replied: I will commit suicide. She said this quietly, as though 
this were the only option open to her.” Puttakkana and the woman interviewed by the activist 
helplessly resign themselves to these injustices, either through silently surrendering their land or 
through commiting suicide. Media accounts of the land conflicts along highways focus on the 
farmers’ protests against a juggernaut state: “The great land grab: India's war on farmers” (Shiva, 
2011), “In India, fresh clashes over rural land as farmers stand up to government” (Denyer, 2011).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The regional language of the Indian state of Karnataka, in which Bangalore city is located.  
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But, as evident from the diverse Thakkar responses to highway urbanization, the experiences 
of residents of India’s urbanizing villages cannot be captured by the simplistic framing of farmers v. 
industrialists, or rural v. urban interests. As I pointed out in the introductory chapter, the 
experiences of the highway Thakkars can be characterized as a politics of redistribution, a politics of 
recognition, or a politics of exclusion, depending on their relationship to their land. In my research 
that focuses on the politics of redistribution, we can further categorize agrarian landowners into 
three types: 
-­‐ Rural capitalists, like Satish Magar, who blur the distinctions between industrial/urban 
capitalists and agrarian landed elites. With strong personal and political connections with national-
level politicians like Sharad Pawar, and with the educational and cultural capital available only to the 
highest echelons of urban India, the agrarian landed elites like the Magars are undistinguishable from 
India’s urban/industrial capitalists.  
-­‐ Agrarian aspirants like the Kelkars in the Khed case along the Pune-Nashik highway are 
more common than rural capitalists like Satish Magar. These agrarian aspirants desire participation in 
an industrial/urban economy, but they lack the political and economic resources of the Magars to 
make this transition themselves. The Kelkars were clear that they were not in the same league as 
Baba Kalyani, the CEO of the private sector firm in the Khed development, Bharat Forge: “15 
percent of the land belongs to us, the remaining land is with the government and the bada-bada [big] 
industrialists, like Kalyani, Bajaj, Tata.”32 However, they are powerful enough as local leaders to 
effectively block any urban developments that are not beneficial to them, and negotiated solutions 
like the land cooperatives are institutional solutions to placate them and win their support.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 The private sector firms, Bajaj and Tata, are not part of the Khed development. But, “Bajaj and 
Tata” – two of India’s oldest and largest industrial families – is a common colloquial metonym in 
India for rich industrialists.  
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-­‐ Marginal agrarian groups – in this study, the tribals – who are not part of the negotiations 
between the agrarian landowners and the state, but who benefit incidentally from this transition in 
two ways: the highway industrialization opens up alternative informal, factory work besides the only 
economic opportunity hitherto available to them as agricultural laborers for dominant-caste 
landowners, and the rising value of their dry lands now makes them the owners of an attractive 
market asset.    
 
The urban transition along Pune’s highways alerts us to a new form politics in these highway 
regions. The most rapid urbanization in India is taking place not within cities, but in-between cities, 
making it imperative to understand the politics driving these contemporary processes of 
urbanization. The urban-rural divides blinds us both to the intra-urban and intra-rural conflicts (for 
instance, the caste-based conflicts between dominant-caste and tribal landowners) and to the urban-
rural coalitions that are being formed between agrarian and industrial elites. For instance, the 
growing work on the hegemonic role of India’s middle class in driving the “world-class” aspirations 
of Indian cities focuses exclusively on the urban middle class to the neglect of the rural middle class. 
My work orients attention to agrarian social groups like the dominant caste landowners in Khed, 
many of whom have urban aspirations for their children, and are excited at the possibility of their 
highway villages becoming “like Mumbai.” The aspirations of this numerically large and politically 
important constituency cannot be ignored in any analysis of India’s urban transformation. After all, 
it was the urban aspirations of an agrarian landowner, Satish Magar, that led to the framing of an 
urban land policy for integrated townships. The politics of these in-between highway regions is most 
visibly articulated in the dynamics of restructuring land markets along Pune’s highways and in the 
emergence of new hybrid institutions like land cooperatives to reconcile the conflicts accompanying 
India’s urban transition. 
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6.1 COMPARING THE INSTITUTIONAL OUTCOMES ALONG PUNE’S 
HIGHWAYS  
With the more active and direct role of the private sector in land development, on-the-
ground public and private actors are experimenting with new forms of hybrid institutions that are 
now forming a new, and important, part of India’s institutional landscape. Do certain modes of land 
consolidation – pure state, pure market or hybrid - lead to more democratic processes and socially 
equitable distributional outcomes? I use the empirical cases offered by Pune’s natural experiment to 
answer this question.  
The pure state model of land consolidation, which is best exemplified by the Pune-Mumbai 
Infrastructure Corridor, is more prone to political capture and corruption. The Indian state has been 
acquiring land through eminent domain since Independence, but it is only in recent times that these 
coercive land acquisition practices have met with such violent opposition that it threatens the 
stability of Indian democracy. One reason is that contemporary urban processes are spilling beyond 
city boundaries into agricultural lands. When parastatals and other state agencies started acquiring 
the agricultural lands of dominant caste landowners, these agrarian landowners retaliated with 
protests. As I pointed out earlier, the dominant castes are part of the tripartite ruling coalition, and 
the state cannot ignore these protests by a politically important constituency. The second reason is 
the political economy of the media. Since liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, the country 
has seen a proliferation of private news channels that broadcast 24/7. These protests now have high 
visibility, as regional and national news channels are quick to scoop in on these events, and have the 
power to amplify local protests into national headlines. The political risk of alienating the dominant 
castes and the higher visibility of protests due to a liberalized media is making it more and more 
difficult for the state to acquire land coercively through eminent domain.  
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The pure market model of land consolidation is largely an exercise in voluntary collective 
action. There are few agrarian regions in India that have the unique set of background conditions – a 
consolidated pattern of land ownership, a past history of collective action through commodity 
cooperatives – that made the Magarpatta and the other Pune-Sholapur urban developments possible. 
Besides, when a few agrarian landowners take the lead in forming land cooperatives during an urban 
transition, the entrenched power structures of an agrarian economy remain unchallenged. In the 
Pune-Sholapur cases, the main protagonists and beneficiaries of the land cooperative are the large, 
dominant-caste sugarcane growers (like Satish Magar’s family) and the low-order sugar cooperative 
members continue to be under the patronage of these sugar barons-turned-real estate barons. The 
Magarpatta case also highlights that these purported pure market models of land consolidation 
require an active role of the state. Satish Magar’s close political connections with top state-level 
politicians led to active state intervention in changing land conversion and integrated township 
regulations, which set the legal framework within which the Magarpatta development could take 
place.  
The pure state model of land consolidation – through eminent domain – is becoming 
politically risky and untenable. The pure market model requires a set of background conditions that 
are too unique to replicate. India’s agrarian to urban transition will be scripted by cases like Khed, 
which is representative of the more general condition of India’s agrarian systems. Most agrarian 
regions in India have fragmented land ownership and lack a past history of collective action. The 
Pune-Nashik cases point to the crucial negotiating roles that bureaucrats have to take on to resolve 
the complicated land politics of an urbanizing country. The Revenue Department bureacrats had the 
technical expertise to sort through arduous and messy land records. They had the political savvy to 
bring together different social groups with conflicting interests in a collective land experiment. The 
complexities of bringing together diverse social groups, all of whom are trying to maximize their 
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own benefits and minimize their risks during an uncertain urban transition, demands politically 
savvy and flexible planners/public officials like the Revenue Department bureaucrats. Within the 
planning literature, the communicative model has focused on the crucial role that planners like the 
Khed bureaucrats play in transforming conflicting interests into practical plans for change. The 
communicative model has particular salience in the contemporary context of a globalizing economy, 
where large urban conurbations like the highway regions are become contested sites of co-habitation 
amongst diverse social groups with competing interests. The communicative planners - who are 
variously called “cultural brokers” (Wulff, 1976), “deliberative practitioners” (Forester, 1999) and 
“consensus planners” (Innes, 1996) - experiment and innovate with new negotiated institutional 
arrangements to cope with the new challenges of an urbanizing, globalizing and liberalizing society. 
One of these negotiated solutions along Pune’s highways is the land cooperative.  Since negotiation 
is a key variable that can lead to new hybrid institutional arrangements, I turn to the role of 
negotiations in mediating land allocation conflicts along India’s highways.  
 
6.2 THE ROLE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN MEDIATING HIGHWAY LAND 
CONFLICTS 
Successful negotiations do not depend only on the skill of public officials in bringing together 
diverse social groups and building consensus amongst them. The process leading to the formation of 
the Pune land cooperatives alerts us to the background conditions needed to make land-use 
negotiations happen. Here, I elaborate on three of these conditions: the inclusion of protests as a 
legitimate form of communication, the strengthening of local democratic institutions, and the 
equalizing of power relations through some form of material redistribution. 
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 6.2.1 PROTESTS AS A LEGITIMATE FORM OF COMMUNICATION 
As I pointed out earlier, a key variable that distinguished the Pune-Mumbai highway from 
the Pune-Nashik one is that dominant caste agrarian landowners protested against the highway 
developments in the latter case. The Pune-Mumbai highway lacked a critical mass of dominant caste 
protestors. As mentioned earlier, the electoral importance of the dominant caste landowners and the 
increased visibility to protests due to the proliferation of 24/7 private news channels made it 
politically untenable for the Revenue Department bureaucrats to ignore these dominant caste 
protests. But, the larger background condition that made it impossible for the state to ignore or 
repress these dominant caste protests is the acceptance of protests as a legitimate form of political 
communication. Communicative theorists recognize that participatory planning processes can be 
genuinely representative of diverse voices only if the accepted modes of discourse are made more 
inclusive. This means that a democratic process of negotiation should not privilege dispassionate 
argument alone as a rational mode of communication, as argument – “the construction of an orderly 
chain of reasoning from premises to conclusion” (Young, 2002: 37) - is the speech culture of 
educated and privileged social groups. Privileging argument then biases the negotiation towards the 
speech cultures of the more socially privileged (Ibid), making it imperative to include other modes of 
discourse – such as storytelling (Forester, 2000) and the expression of fears and dangers (Healey and 
Hillier, 1995) – as accepted forms of communication. But rarely are protests included within this 
repertoire of legitimate political communication, when, in fact, protests are often the most accessible 
modes of dissent amongst the more marginalized groups against the perceived unfairness of the 
decision-making process.  
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 6.2.2 STRENGTHENING LOCAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 
Besides highlighting the importance of protests as a legitimate form of communication, the 
dominant caste protests also alert us to a serious shortcoming in the formal land allocation process 
along the highways. Elected rural local governments, or Village Panchayats, are the most basic of 
India’s democratic institutions. Despite the presence of these elected local governments, dominant 
caste agrarian landowners registered their grievances against the highway urbanization process not 
through the formal democratic channel of Village Panchayats but through the extra-formal route of 
protests. This points to the limited power given to rural local governments in the formal planning 
procedure for highway land allocation.  
Rural local governments have some power in the formal land conversion process from 
agricultural to non-agricultural land, but it is severely limited. After the industrial firm or property 
developer gets a land conversion permit from the Revenue Department and other parastatal 
agencies, the last step is a building permit from the rural local government. Without the Village 
Panchayat’s granting of the building permit, the land conversion process is not complete. However, 
the Village Panchayat can deny a building permit only if the proposed development contravenes the 
public purpose, i.e. if the development negatively impacts the health and safety of residents. In more 
concrete terms, the Village Panchayat “can take action if there is water or air pollution, if people from 
nearest villages give us a requisition with the signature of 20-30 members complaining of pollution 
from the industries.”33 Village Panchayats in India have rarely exercised this power to deny building 
permits to industries or residential developments. The rare exception is the 2003 Kerala case of 
Perumpatty Village Panchayat.34 The Panchayat cancelled the building license of the Coca Cola factory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Interview with author, December 2010.  
34 http://www.righttowater.info/ways-to-influence/legal-approaches/case-against-coca-cola-kerala-
state-india/ 
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when local residents complained of water scarcity and drying up of wells due to indiscriminate 
groundwater extraction by the factory, and groundwater contamination from the factory’s chemical 
effluents. Coca Cola appealed to the Kerala High Court. The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that 
“the Panchayat has the power to independently consider as to whether the setting up of an industrial 
unit within its area would adversely affect the people of the locality, even if authorities like the 
Pollution Control Board, District Medical Officer, etc., grant permission.”35 Though the Kerala case 
is a significant step forward in strengthening the power of local governments vis-à-vis private firms 
and mobile capital, it circumscribes the power of local governments to matters relating to the 
“public purpose.”  
In other words, local governments have no voice in deciding the economic futures of their 
villages. They do not have the political power to weigh in on important economic decisions like: is 
industrial development desirable for their villages, are SEZs the appropriate forms of industrial 
development, and what are the negotiating terms between the villages and the private sector firm? It 
is because of this circumscribed role for local governments within the formal highway land 
allocation process that dominant caste landowners turn to other extra-formal modes of dissent like 
protests.  
 
6.2.3 NEW ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS 
As is evident from the decentralization literature, one of the main challenges with local 
democratic institutions is that they are often hostage to local elite capture (Dreze and Sen, 1996; 
Manor, 1999). In the Khed region along the Pune-Nashik highway, members of the Kelkar joint 
family make up eight of the fifteen elected representatives within the Village Panchayat. Five of the 
remaining seven representatives are dominant caste landowners who occupy important economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid.	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and social positions within these villages. The Central Government in India passed electoral quota 
legislation in 1991 to reserve a certain percentage of electoral seats within Village Panchayats for 
marginalized Dalits and tribals in proportion to their population within the village. These formal 
“democratic fixes” (Young,  2002), though crucial, are not enough to remedy the distortions in the 
formal decision-making process due to structural inequalities and unequal power relations.   
The marginalized tribal groups in the Khed villages were not included in the negotiations 
that took place between the Revenue Department bureaucrats and the protesting agrarian 
landowners. However, as owners of marginal plots of dry land, the tribals did incidentally benefit 
from the negotiated solution of the land cooperatives. Though the benefit to the Khed Thakkars 
was an incidental outcome of the negotiations, the changed market valuation of the Thakkars’ 
highway-proximate dry lands and the availability of alternative informal work in the factories coming 
up along the highways is destabilizing traditional agrarian caste hierarchies. The rampant agricultural 
labor shortage all over India is an indicator of these changing caste-based labor agrarian labor 
relations. Low-caste groups are using the changed market valuation of their landed assets to 
challenge caste power and to demand more respect for their labor and recognition for themselves.  
One of the main criticisms of the communicative model which views democratic 
negotiations as the route to transformative outcomes is that inclusive political argument, in itself, is 
not enough to level unequal power structures. The critics of the communicative model argue that an 
“intervening stage of mobilization is required” that changes the consciousness of marginalized 
groups which, in turn, can lead to a challenging, and unsettling, of existing power structures 
(Fainstein, 2003: 178). The restructuring of land markets during an urban transition opens up new 
economic opportunities for marginalized tribal groups in the form of a changed market valuation for 
their landed assets and the availability of alternative sources of employment that reduces their 
economic dependence on dominant caste landowners. These economic changes, combined with 
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changes to the formal democratic process through reserving electoral seats within Village Panchayats 
for Dalits and tribals, are necessary fixes to empower India’s most disadvantaged groups.     
 
Having laid out some of the background conditions that can facilitate more inclusive 
negotiation processes - the inclusion of protests as a legitimate form of communication, the 
strengthening of local democratic institutions, and the equalizing of power relations through some 
form of material redistribution – I now turn to a serious limitation of Pune’s land cooperatives.   
 
6.3 LAND VALUE CAPTURE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
REDISTRIBUTION 
A lesson from the Pune cases is that however inclusive the planning process is, negotiations 
done on a project-to-project basis can lead to socially and spatially exclusionary built environments. 
Along Pune’s highways, agrarian landowners, bureaucrats and private sector firms are negotiating 
with one another, not with the intention of advancing a regional vision for the highways, but with 
the instrumental rationality of maximizing their own interests during an uncertain urban transition. 
Negotiated solutions like the Khed joint venture company is effective means of allocating land value 
increments equitably amongst competing social groups, but they also lead to the production of 
fragmented built environments.  
 
Fragmented bui l t  environments : The Revenue Department bureaucrats negotiated with the 
protesting agrarian landowners to build consensus for the Khed SEZ development. Satish Magar, in 
the Magarpatta case, brought together agrarian landowners in a collective land experiment to build 
an integrated township.  
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But, the integrated townships and SEZs are far from ideal forms of urban development. The 
integrated townships are more commonly referred to as “gated communities” in the urban planning 
literature (Blakely and Snyder, 1997; Caldeira, 2001; Libertun, 2006). Unlike apartments and other 
urban building typologies that restrict public access to lobbies, elevators and other shared amenities 
within the private development, gated communities restrict public access to traditionally public 
spaces like streets and sidewalks. For instance, milk is traditionally delivered in India by doodhwalas 
[milkmen], who collect the milk cartons either directly from cattle owners (more common in peri-
urban areas and in the highway villages) or from the outlets of large milk companies, and distribute 
these packets on bicycle to individual households within a few neighborhoods. To increase the 
perception of Magarpatta as a “secure township that does not allow outsiders,” the shareholding 
company is planning to restrict doodhwalas from entering the township. A company employee told 
me that residents will rely on the hypermarkets, like Star Bazaar, which are slated for development 
within the integrated township, for their everyday grocery needs. Besides restricting public access to 
traditionally public spaces, gated communities also privatize public services that are traditionally 
provided by local governments. In Magarpatta, the private utilities company, the Magarpatta City 
Property Management Services (PMS), owned by Satish Magar’s brother provides and maintains the 
township services, including electricity, roads, plumbing, and internet. Here, residents who can 
afford to live within the township privilege “exit” over “voice,” i.e. these upper classes, in response 
to the poor, unsatisfactory delivery of public services by local governments, “exit” into privatized 
enclaves instead of exercising their political “voice” to demand better public services.  
Like gated communities, SEZs have met strong trenchant criticism as “zones of exception” 
and “special exemption zones,” i.e. “differently administered spaces of graduated or variegated 
sovereignty” that have been carved out from within the territory of the nation-state for “for 
economic freedom and entrepreneurial activity” (Ong, 2006: 7, 16; Menon, 2009). India’s SEZ 
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policies have drawn sharp invectives for a number of reasons. Analyzing data on the location of 
SEZs, the Delhi-based research think-tank, Center for Policy Research, concludes that all of India’s 
SEZs are located in the most industrially developed regions and do little to mitigate regional 
imbalances in economic growth (which is one of the main purported justifications for SEZs) (CPR, 
2009). The economist, Jagadish Bhagawati, argues that “SEZs are a sort of scaffolding with which 
you climb into more openness…But [in India], now that you have the building, why do you need the 
scaffolding?” (Narayanan and Nair, 2006).  
This “secession of the successful” (Reich, 1991) into privatized residential and industrial 
enclaves produces starkly unequal environments of ghettos juxtaposed against citadels.  The choices 
of the rich of “exit” over “voice” poses a threat to democracy (Hirshman, 1970) because gates and 
barricades allow certain citizens to secede from social contact (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). The 
decline of social contact erodes the very foundations of the social contract amongst citizens, of 
working towards the ideals of the common good and general welfare (Ibid). The production of these 
fragmented built environments points to the third background condition needed to ensure that 
highway land negotiations lead to socially equitable built environments – redistributive value capture 
instruments.  
 
Regional  redis tr ibut ive  value capture instruments : The negotiated solution of land 
cooperatives along Pune’s highways leads to a relatively equitable distribution of land value 
increments of the newly converted highway lands among the various caste groups of agrarian 
landowners, the private sector firm and the parastatal. The Village Panchayats have a circumscribed 
role in these negotiations and are excluded from partaking of the land value increment. A stronger 
role for local governments in these formal planning processes is imperative as these are the most 
basic units of democracy. But, the inclusion of local governments in the planning process in itself 
	   137 
will not lead to an amelioration of sociospatial inequalities along the highways. One reason is that 
local governments may be hostage to elite capture and elected representatives may make decisions 
that are advantageous to themselves and to their social groups, and not for the larger public good. 
Even if local governments are made inclusive through “democratic fixes,” they may not have the 
resources and capacity to negotiate deals that are most beneficial to their citizens vis-à-vis state-level 
bureaucrats and private sector firms (Weber, 2007). Another reason is that even if local governments 
have the capacity to negotiate and capture some of the land value increment for their political 
jurisdiction, this may do little to lessen sociospatial inequalities. For instance, if the group of highway 
villages within which large urban/industrial developments are located are successful in capturing the 
land value increments and in re-investing these increments in improving the public services within 
their political jurisdictions, it can worsen the sociospatial inequality between the revenue-rich 
highway regions in which these new urban developments are located and those which do not have 
any new revenue-generating urban/industrial developments. Relying on successful project-by-project 
based negotiations misses the opportunity of using land value capture as an instrument of 
redistribution (Furtado, 2000 ;Fainstein, 2012).  
Redistributive value capture instruments include policies like linkage fees and inclusionary 
zoning. Linkage fees are regulatory land use programs generally applied to new office developments, 
with the justification that new office developments will increase the demand for housing, and office 
developers should bear the cost of the “negative externality” – of increased housing demand – 
generated by their development. Nowadays, linkage fees are imposed regardless of any essential 
nexus between the new development and housing demand.  Linkage fees will ensure that the 
township and SEZ developers pay a certain amount per square foot of development to a trust fund 
earmarked for improving services and constructing affordable housing along the highways. 
Inclusionary zoning is a land use regulatory program that reserves a certain proportion of new 
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residential construction for affordable housing. Inclusionary zoning regulations for all new urban 
developments will open up integrated townships and SEZs to low-income social groups.  
 
Timing o f  redis tr ibut ive  value capture pol i c i es : However, getting redistributive policies 
passed and implemented is not easy, especially as power social groups that benefit from the status 
quo will stand in the way of these reforms. The timing of these reforms matters and now is an 
opportune moment for equity planners in India to get these reforms passed. During an interview 
with a private township developer in the Pune region, I was surprised to learn that the developer 
wanted to reserve a certain percentage of land within the integrated township for affordable housing. 
These inclusionary intentions, however, did not stem from altruistic reasons, but from the practical 
concern that some of these developments were inaccessible by reliable public transit, leading to 
shortages in domestic maids, chauffeurs and other workers needed to service these middle-class and 
high-income residential enclaves. Besides these pragmatic market demands for inclusionary zoning, 
these fragmented and unequal sociospatial built environments pose serious threats to political 
stability. Spatial inequality is more visible than other forms of inequality – like, for instance, income 
inequality – and it can generate mistrust and alienation, eventually triggering various forms of social 
unrest (UN-HABITAT, 2008). It is these moments that equity planners can seize to introduce 
redistributive value capture policies that can channel some of these land value increments towards 
public uses and towards impoverished highway regions.  
 
Pune’s land cooperatives are far from ideal institutions of democracy and social equity. 
However, they do provide the empirical moorings around which new theories on regional 
institutions can be articulated. As traditional institutions like urban and rural local governments 
flounder in managing land markets in the rapidly urbanizing highway regions, on-the-ground 
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bureaucrats and agrarian landowners are innovating with new institutional arrangements like land 
cooperatives. These emergent regional, hybrid institutions deserve attention both because they are 
not adequately captured within our current institutional frameworks and because they open up new 
possibilities for managing these contemporary processes of urban change. My dissertation takes a 
first step in this direction.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
My research is based on seventeen months of fieldwork, divided into three phases.  
 
Phase 1:  June – October 2010 
During this period, I was a research affiliate at the Center for the Study of Regional 
Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. I spent these initial months of fieldwork in 
Delhi so as to interact with policy makers, NGOs and academics who are working on issues of land 
in India. Starting my research in the national capital gave me a birds-eye view of the main planning 
challenges confronting those working on land. I asked all my Delhi interviewees for cases that, to 
them, exemplified best practices in land management. Some of the examples mentioned were the 
Town Planning Scheme in Ahmedabad and the Magarpatta township in Pune. The Pune case had 
received little attention in the scholarship at the time I started my fieldwork, and for the unique 
research possibilities it opened up (discussed in the introductory chapter under the “Research 
Design” section), I decided to focus on Pune’s highways as the centerpiece of my study.  
 
Phase 2:  November 2010-Apri l  2011 
Having decided on the Pune highways, I was looking for another region that could provide 
an institutional contrast to Pune. The Bangalore region provided a useful foil for a number of 
reasons – this region too was rich in sugarcane cultivation, but it lacked a sugar cooperative history; 
it had a critical mass of dominant caste landowners who were protesting against the highway 
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developments, but neither the agrarian landowners nor the bureaucrats in the region had innovated 
with new institutional solutions to resolve these conflicts.  
During these six months, I identified the largest urban developments along the Pune and 
Bangalore highways, and selected the cluster of villages within which these developments were 
located as the main sites of my study. Along the Pune highways, the main villages were the four 
Village Panchayats of Kanersar, Nimgaon, Dhawadi and Shirur. I also spent a month in the 
Magarpatta region, interviewing agrarian landowners who managed the township, those who lived 
within it and those who lived in the surrounding area, just outside the township. I spent a week in 
Lavasa along the Pune-Mumbai Expressway, and also in Sinnar, the area where another bureaucrat-
mediated land cooperative similar to Khed is being proposed. Along the Bangalore-Mysore 
Infrastructure Corridor, I selected a cluster of three Village Panchayats – Ittamadu, Bidadi and 
Byramangala, located around 30 kilometers from Bangalore city - as these were the sites of the most 
rapid industrialization along this highway.  
Through open-ended interviews with the institutional actors listed below, I mapped out the 
main institutional actors in the land consolidation process for these developments. 
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The respondents for the open-ended interviews included: 
 Elected representatives 
. Elected representatives of the four Village Panchayats along the Pune-Nashik highway and the 
three Panchayats along the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor 
. Members of the [State] Legislative Assembly (MLA) for these Bangalore and Pune districts  
Bureaucrats 
. Revenue Department street-level bureaucrats who maintain the land records at the village 
level; these bureaucrats are called ‘village accountants’ in the Bangalore region and ‘thalatis’ in the 
Pune region 
. Revenue Department tahsildar, Sub-Divisional Officer and District Collector (the three ranks 
of bureaucrats, the former two at the taluk [made up of a cluster of Village Panchayats] and the latter 
at the district levels) for Bangalore and Pune 
. 3 bureaucrats at the parastatal, the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation 
(MIDC) 
Private sector firm 
. 4 employees of Bharat Forge, the private sector company involved in the Khed SEZ 
Magarpatta shareholding company 
. Satish Magar, the brainchild behind Magarpatta 
. 2 employees within the Magarpatta shareholding company 
 
On the basis of these interviews, I learned that caste is a central analytic in structuring the 
experiences of the urban transition. To get a better understanding of the caste-based opportunities, 
risk and aspirations of these highway residents, I decided to focus on semi-structured interviews 
with the dominant-caste and marginalized caste agrarian landowners in these villages.  
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Phase 3:  May to July ,  2011, and June to August ,  2012 
The questions for the semi-structured interview (questionnaire attached below) emerged 
from the previous rounds of open-ended interviews with the institutional actors involved in the 
highway developments. I conducted the following caste-stratified interviews: 
 
. Dominant caste agrarian households in Kanersar: 20 
. Dominant caste agrarian households in Nimgaon: 10 
. Tribal (Thakkar) households of all 4 Khed Village Panchayats: 25 
. Dominant caste agrarian households in Ittamadu: 20 
. Dalit households in Ittamadu: 25 
 
Each interview lasted around 60 minutes. I am fluent in Kannada and Hindi, and conducted 
all the dominant caste, and the Dalit interviews myself. Many of the Thakkars speak only Marathi, a 
language that I can understand but cannot speak, and I had a translator for the 25 tribal interviews. I 
was present with the translator during all of the interviews. All interviews were conducted in the 
agrarian landowners’ homes. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DOMINANT CASTE LANDOWNERS 
(The land section of the Bangalore dominant castes questionnaire is slightly modified and the 
specifics of the Bangalore land conflicts are included) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why don’t you tell me a little bit about yourself?  Maybe you could start off telling me a little 
bit about your family.  
(Intent: Warm-up to establish rapport, get a sense of family context.) 
 
Probe:    
Your name 
Your age 
Family members living with you - names of adult family members 
How long lived here? 
 
 
1. EDUCATION 
Education of respondent: Never went to school/ 5th Standard/ 9th Standard/ 12th Standard 
(PUC)/ Diploma/ Graduate/ Post-Graduate 
Education levels of all family members (adults and children): Never went to school/ 5th 
Standard/ 9th Standard/ 12th Standard (PUC)/ Diploma/ Graduate/ Post-Graduate 
 
What do you want your child to become when he/she grows up? 
 
  
2. POLITICS 
Have you been an elected representative an any level? If yes, details – when, which 
political party.  
Have any of your family members been elected representatives? If yes, details.  
 
3. JOBS 
Tell me about your typical workday. For example, describe a typical workday from last 
week.  
 
If the respondent has a non-agricultural job: 
 
If working for someone else: If owner of business: 
Name of employer When started? 
How long worked there? Number of employees 
Salary Capital for it 
Type of work Current projects 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DOMINANT CASTE LANDOWNERS (Continued) 
 
Many people around here have been telling me about agricultural labor shortage. Have you 
been facing any shortages for your field? 
 
How many workers worked on your fields in the past? 20 years back? 10 years back? 
Form of payment then. If in cash, how much? 
How many workers now? 
Form of payment now. If in cash, how much? 
 
4. LAND 
How much land do you own? 
Do you have a 7/12 (saath barah) [title] for your land? Any restrictions on use of land?  
If joint ownership of land on 7/12, the names of the other landowners. 
Number of acres 
What grown on the land? Who works on the land? 
Is the land irrigated? If yes, what kind of irrigation (public irrigation, wells, others)? 
Who paid for the irrigation? 
Other uses for your land – cattle grazing, medicinal plants, others? Any revenue from 
these additional uses of land? How much?  
 
A big company is now being built in this area, and the land on this hill is part of the new 
project.  
 
Chapter 7 Tell me about this new project – what is it? Who are the industrialists 
involved? What is the current status of the project?  Has your village elected its 
representative? If yes, who is the representative? (Get a sense of how much the 
respondent knows about the project).  
Who initially told you about the company? 
Your view on the company that’s coming up?  
How much land have you given up for it? Did you agree to part with the land in the 
beginning itself? If yes, what benefits did you foresee from the project? If no, have you 
changed your mind since? What caused the change? 
Details on the compensation you received. (They should have received compensation 
for 0.85% of the land given up, and are shareholders for the remaining 0.15%. Do 
they understand that they are shareholders of the company?) What was promised? 
What was actually received? 
Tell me in detail (with names) of the people you interacted with during this project 
negotiations - government officials, Village Panchayat members, industry 
representatives, local Thakkar leaders, others. If they have local Thakkar leaders, are 
these leaders members of the Village Panchayat? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DOMINANT CASTE LANDOWNERS (Continued) 
 
5. CREDIT 
Tell me about the biggest expenditure you’ve had in your life (wedding, others?) 
How did you pay for this expenditure (sold land, borrowed money from landowner, others)?   
Probe: If the father/family borrowed money, from whom, what were the terms of 
repayment; did he/family repay the loan through working on the lenders’ lands?) 
 
When was the last time your family lent money to someone else?  
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THAKKARS AND DALITS 
Recognizing the interlocked nature of these agrarian economies – the interconnectedness of land, 
labor and credit in structuring social relations and hierarchies – my questionnaire was organized into 
four modules: education, jobs, land and credit (the land section of the Dalits questionnaire is slightly 
modified and the specifics of the Bangalore land conflicts are included):   
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why don’t you tell me a little bit about yourself?  Maybe you could start off telling me a little 
bit about your family.  
(Intent: Warm-up to establish rapport, get a sense of family context.) 
 
Probe:    
Your name 
Your age 
Family members living with you - names of adult family members 
How long lived here? 
 
1. EDUCATION 
Education of respondent: Never went to school/ 5th Standard/ 9th Standard/ 12th Standard 
(PUC)/ Diploma/ Graduate/ Post-Graduate 
Education levels of all family members (adults and children): Never went to school/ 5th 
Standard/ 9th Standard/ 12th Standard (PUC)/ Diploma/ Graduate/ Post-Graduate 
 
What do you want your child to become when he/she grows up? 
  
2. JOBS 
(Intent: My sense is that there is an agricultural labour shortage in this area. Many of the Thakkars, who previously 
worked as agricultural labourers, now work as daily wage labourers in the new factories that are coming up in Khed. 
This section is to understand changes in the Thakkars’ employment since before industrialization started in this area, 
and now.) 
Tell me about your current job. For example, describe your typical workday from last week.  
If the respondent has a job: 
 
Location, distance – how do you get there? 
Pay, hours of work (daily wage, contract labor, others) 
Description of work – what do you do when you’re there? (If working on someone’s 
land, details on the landowners name, acres of land, crop grown, details of work) 
How long have you been working there? 
How did you get this present job? 
 
If the respondent does not have a job: 
What was your last job? Why did you stop working there? 
Are you currently looking for a job? What kind of job (agriculture, industry, others)? 
How are you supporting your family now (food, other expenditures)? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THAKKARS AND DALITS (Continued) 
 
Tell me about your last agricultural job.  
Did you work on others’ lands? (details on the landowners’ name, acres of land, crop 
grown, details of work).  
Location, distance – how do you get there? 
Pay, hours of work (daily wage, contract labor, others) 
How long did you work there? Did you father (previous generation) also work with 
the same landowner? 
When did you stop working there? Why? 
Your relationship with your previous landowner now? 
 
 
3. LAND 
How much land do you own? 
Do you have a 7/12 (saath barah) [title] for your land? If no, did the government grant 
you the land? Details on this: If government granted land, when did they get this land? 
Any restrictions on use of land?  
If joint ownership of land on 7/12, the names of the other landowners. 
Number of acres 
What grown on the land? Who works on the land? 
Is the land irrigated? If yes, what kind of irrigation (public irrigation, wells, others)? 
Who paid for the irrigation? 
Other uses for your land – cattle grazing, medicinal plants, others? Any revenue from 
these additional uses of land? How much? Any benefits from land (security, daughter’s 
dowry, others)?  
 
A big company is now being built in this area, and the land on this hill is part of the new 
project.  
Tell me about this new project – what is it? Who are the industrialists involved? What 
is the current status of the project?  Has your village elected its representative? If yes, 
who is the representative? (Get a sense of how much the respondent knows about the 
project).  
Who initially told you about the company? 
Your view on the company that’s coming up?  
How much land have you given up for it? Did you agree to part with the land in the 
beginning itself? If yes, what benefits did you foresee from the project? If no, have you 
changed your mind since? What caused the change? 
Details on the compensation you received. (They should have received compensation 
for 0.85% of the land given up, and are shareholders for the remaining 0.15%. Do 
they understand that they are shareholders of the company?) What was promised? 
What was actually received? 
Tell me in detail (with names) of the people you interacted with during this project 
negotiations - government officials, Village Panchayat members, industry 
representatives, local Thakkar leaders, others. If they have local Thakkar leaders, are 
these leaders members of the Village Panchayat? 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THAKKARS AND DALITS (Continued) 
 
4. CREDIT 
Tell me about the biggest expenditure you’ve had in your life (wedding, others?) 
How did you pay for this expenditure (sold land, borrowed money from landowner, others)?   
Probe: If the father/family borrowed money, from whom, what were the terms of 
repayment; did he/family repay the loan through working on the lenders’ lands?) 
Do you have daughters/sisters? Yes, No 
If yes, are they married? Yes No 
If yes, how did you/your father/your family pay for your daughter’s/sister’s wedding (sold 
land, borrowed money from landowner, others)?   
Probe: If the father/family borrowed money, from whom, what were the terms of 
repayment; did he/family repay the loan through working on the lenders’ lands?) 
 
 (For interviewer: Do you see any new improvements to the house, any two wheelers? Cars? Any large electrical items? 
If yes, details on how they raised finances for these large expenses? My assumption is that many of the new purchases 
have come from the compensation money for the land. )  
Cost of purchase 
Where did you get the money for this purchase? 
What have you spent your land compensation money on? 
 
Other observations  
A description of the basti, total number of homes, whether it has access to basic services 
(water, sanitation, electricity), other assets (cows, cars).  
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